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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-
3(2)(b) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Since the administrative court itself ruled that it is unable to hear Appellant's 
constitutional challenge, is Appellant exempted from the exhaustion requirement under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-465-14 (1988)? 
2. Given the fact that the administrative tribunal ruled it had no authority to hear the 
constitutional claims, that the constitutional challenge in federal court was dismissed and that the 
United States Supreme Court ruled in Ward v. Village ofMonroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) that 
a person against whom the state was proceeding has a right to a neutral and detached judge in 
the first instance, did the Third Judicial District Court err when it dismissed Appellant's 
constitutional claims and left him without a forum? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is a correctness standard; i.e. whether trial court properly granted 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a question of law in which the reviewing court accepts 
factual allegations in the Complaint as true and considers them and all reasonable inferences to 
be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). 
Appellant Davis is asking this Court to interpret a state statute, Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-14 (1988). This Court does not defer to a trial court's interpretation of a statute, and thus 
v 
reviews it independently. Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City Corp., 828 P.2d 1071, 1072 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1988) provides: 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final 
agency action, except in actions where judicial review is expressly 
prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only aflcr exhaii'sling 
all administrative remedies available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust 
administrative remedies if this chapter or any other statute 
states that exhaustion is not required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial 
review of the requirement to exhaust any or a11 
administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the public 
benefit derived from requiring exhaustion. 
(3) (a) A party shall iile a petition for judicial review of 
a final agency action within 30 days after the date that the 
order constituting the final agency action is issued or is 
considered to have been issiled iinder Subsection 63-46b-
13(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other 
appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet ihe form 
requirements specified in this chapter. 
vi 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case 
Robert Davis is presently being prosecuted by the Appellees under Utah Code Ann. §58-
12-35.1 (1987) for alleged unprofessional conduct. The 155 count Petition seeks to revoke or 
suspend Robert Davis' license to practice medicine in the state of Utah. Robert Davis' license 
is a property right protected by the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. 
However, Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 (1987) and the statutory scheme under which 
it operates is unconstitutional on its face. Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 (1987) empowers the 
Director with the authority to administer oaths, certify to official acts, issue subpoenas, compel 
production of documents, and otherwise oversee and direct the investigation. In addition, the 
statute vests in the Director the sole discretion in meting out the appropriate penalty for 
violations of the act. The statute impermissibly vests in one person the authority to investigate, 
prosecute and adjudicate alleged violations of the Utah Medical Practice Act.1 
Robert Davis raised these claims in the Federal District Court for the District of Utah, 
the administrative tribunal and the state district court. All have declined to hear Robert Davis1 
constitutional challenges to Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 (1987). The Federal District Court 
held that principles of comity and exhaustion demanded that the claims be heard in state district 
court first. The administrative court held that it had no jurisdiction to rule on constitutional 
1
 It is not the purpose of this appeal to brief the substantive constitutional issues which 
Robert Davis attempted to litigate in state district court. For purposes of review, this Court 
accepts factual allegations in the Complaint as true and considers them and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. St. Benedict's, 811 
P.2d at 194. 
vu 
issues. The state district court held that Robert Davis must first exhaust his remedy in the 
administrative court. As a result, Robert Davis has been completely deprived of a neutral and 
detached judge in the first instance as contemplated by the United States Supreme Court in Ward 
v. Village ofMonroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972). Robert Davis has also been deprived of a forum 
for his constitutional challenge to the Utah Administrative Procedure Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-1 et seq.9 the Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-16 et 
seq.y and the Utah Medical Practice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-26 et seq. 
Robert Davis has thrice attempted to challenge the validity of the Utah Medical Practice 
Act before he is subjected its unconstitutional operation. The order appealed from here required 
Robert Davis to exhaust administrative remedies despite an explicit ruling by the Administrative 
Law Judge that there was no such remedy exists. It is the purpose of this appeal to seek judicial 
review of the state district court's ruling. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b)(i) (1988), prior decisions of Utah's appellate 
courts and the United States Supreme Court's recent decision of McCarthy v. Madigan, U.S. 
, 112 S.Ct. 1081 (1992) the district court's ruling was incorrect. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
Robert Davis filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in state district 
court. R.000002-000011; see Addendum "A." The Complaint alleged deprivations of property 
and liberty without due process of law in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution. Robert Davis 
vi i i 
asked for a determination that the Utah Medical Practice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-26 et 
seq.y was unconstitutional on its face and as applied. 
Instead of filing an Answer, the Appellees ("the Division") filed a Motion to Dismiss 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(a). The Division argued that: (1) Robert Davis' claims were barred 
by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.; (2) Robert Davis 
failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) the subsequent recusal of the Director of the 
Division, David Robinson, rendered the Complaint moot.2 R.000024-000101. Both sides 
briefed the issues and oral argument was heard on February 28, 1992.3 
C. Disposition at the Trial Court 
The state district court issued a Memorandum Decision on March 4, 1992. R.000136-
000139; see Addendum "B." The court held that Robert Davis' Mas applied" challenge to the 
licensing statutes was rendered moot by David Robinson's recusal. 
The court defined the issue as "whether [Robert Davis] can, during the pendency of the 
administrative proceeding, bring an action for declaratory . . . relief against the agency . . . 
claiming the statute under which they are proceeding is unconstitutional." R.000137. The court 
cited Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980) for the principle o\ 
exhaustion and ruled that Robert Davis "should pursue his remedies in the administrative 
2
 During the pendency of this case, the Director of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing, David Robinson, recused himself. This occurred only after numerous 
challenges and motions to remove Robinson from Dr. Davis' case for bias and prejudgment. 
3
 No transcript was made of the February 28, 1992 hearing. Therefore, the record in this 
case is limited to the pleadings. 
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proceeding and if it becomes necessary to address the constitutional issue then it can be done so 
in the appropriate manner." R.000138. 
The Court left no indication of what would necessitate a consideration of the 
constitutional claims and did not elaborate on what procedure may be appropriate.4 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On December 7, 1989, the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("the 
Division") filed a Petition against Appellant Robert C. Davis ("Davis"). R.000035-000099; see 
Addendum "C." The Petition seeks to revoke or suspend Davis' license to practice medicine 
in Utah. The Petition was filed under the Utah Administrative Procedure Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-l etseq., the Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-16 
et seq., and the Utah Medical Practice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-26 et seq. 
A. Davis' Challenge In Federal Court Was Dismissed On the Basis of Comity. 
On December 7, 1989, Davis filed a constitutional challenge to the licensing statutes in 
federal district court. See Addendum "D.M In that complaint, Davis alleged that: (1) the 
Division issued illegal subpoenas in violation of the fourth amendment of the United States 
Constitution; (2) his due process rights had been violated as a result of bias and interest on the 
part of the Division; (3) that the licensing statutes were facially unconstitutional; (4) procedural 
due process violations due to the filing of the Petition; and (5) disclosure of confidential 
information by the Division to the media and other third parties. 
4
 The Court did not rule on the Division's Governmental Immunity Act argument. 
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On or about November 6, 1990, the Division moved the Federal District Court to dismiss 
Davis' complaint or alternatively for summary judgment. The basis for the Division's motion 
was that Davis had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and otherwise failed to show 
that the action was appropriate under one of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. Judge 
Greene dismissed this challenge on the ground that Davis should have been proceeding in state 
court. See Addendum "E." Judge Greene ruled that "in comity as well as the doctrine of 
exhaustion you ought to be proceeding in state court." See Addendum "F." The Tenth Circuit 
upheld this ruling on appeal. See Addendum "G." 
B. Davis' Challenge In Administrative Court Was Dismissed For a Lack of Jurisdiction. 
On August 2, 1991, Davis filed a Motion To Dismiss Based on the Unconstitutionality 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 (1987) in the administrative court. See Addendum "H." Davis 
argued that Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 (1987) violates the due process rights of physicians 
by concentrating investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicatory power are vested in one person, 
the Director of the Division, David Robinson. The due process clauses require that there be a 
separation between the adjudicator, prosecutor and investigator.5 
In addition, David Robinson, the Director of the Division and the sole finder of fact, is 
biased against Appellant. None of the statutes potentially applicable to disciplinary actions 
against physicians provide procedures for the disqualification of a biased hearing officer or 
decision maker. Additionally, the statutory scheme fails to provide for the selection of an 
5
 See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1974); In re Disciplinary Action ofMcCune, 111 
P.2d 701 (Utah 1986). 
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alternative finder of fact. As a result, Robinson's voluntary recusal has resulted in this power 
being exercised by a statutorily undetermined party. 
On October 29, 1991, at an administrative law hearing, Administrative Law Judge 
Eklund heard oral argument on the motion and ruled that the administrative tribunal did not have 
the authority to adjudicate the constitutional issue presented in Davis' Motion. See Addendum 
"I." Judge Eklund, the administrative law judge in this matter, stated: 
I acknowledge the fact, as set forth in the Clayton v. Bennett case, which is 
cited by the Division . . . that Justice Crocket recognizes that declaratory relief 
and injunctive relief pursuant thereto is a correct method for challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute. I think what I am suggesting from what I just 
indicated is I would deny any stay here and leave to you the opportunity to file 
that request for a declaratory relief in the district courts and accompany it with 
a request for injunctive relief and let the court address the issue whether they 
think these proceedings ought to be stayed. 
See Addendum "I." Judge Eklund suggested that Davis file his constitutional challenge in state 
court, a forum with jurisdiction rule on constitutional issues. 
I don't believe I have the authority and would not presume to exercise any 
jurisdiction over whether the statutory scheme here is unconstitutional on its face. 
It is clear, from the cases the Division has cited, that that's a matter for the 
courts to decide. Although it is not inappropriate for you to raise the issue here, 
for purposes of preserving it if necessary, for judicial review or independent 
action before any other court, I have no intention and will not rule on that aspect 
of your motion . . . Because / don't have the authority to address it. 
See Addendum "J." (Emphasis added). Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge expressly 
precluded an administrative remedy for Davis' constitutional claims. 
6
 298 P.2d 531 (Utah 1956). 
xu 
C. Davis' Challenge In State District Court Was Dismissed On the Ground of 
Exhaustion. 
Upon receiving Judge Eklund's Order Davis filed a Complaint for Injunctive and 
Declaratory Relief in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah on 
November 22, 1991. R.000002-000011; see Addendum "A." The Complaint alleged 
deprivations of property and liberty without due process of law in violation of the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
State Constitution. Davis asked for a determination that the Utah Medical Practice Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-12-26 et seq., was unconstitutional on its face and as applied. 
After Davis instituted the state district court Complaint, David Robinson recused himself 
from the licensing proceeding against Davis. R.0001000; see Addendum "K." Davis admitted 
that this recusal substantively mooted his First Claim for Relief. That claim had alleged a due 
process violation based upon David Robinson's personal and long-running bias against Davis. 
R.000007. 
However, Davis' Second Claim for Relief, the facial constitutionality claim, was still 
relevant because: (1) the statutory scheme does not contain any disqualification procedure for 
the Director; and (2) the Utah Medical Practice Act, on its face, unconstitutionally vests 
investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative power in one person. R.00007-00008; 000105-
000106. The recusal, in effect, left Davis open to prosecution and adjudication by a statutorily 
undetermined party. 
X l l l 
Davis' Third Claim for Relief was also unaffected by the recusal of David Robinson from 
the proceeding. The Third Claim for Relief alleged due process violations under the Utah and 
federal constitutions. This claim stemmed from action taken by the Board of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing which concerned Davis and adjudicated his rights. The Board took this 
action without giving Davis notice or an opportunity to respond to the allegations. R.000009; 
see also R.000005-000006. 
On December 16, 1991, the Division filed a Motion to Dismiss. R.000024-000101. The 
Division argued that: (1) Davis' claims were barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.; (2) Davis failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and 
(3) the subsequent recusal of the Director of the Division, David Robinson, rendered the 
Complaint moot. 
Subsequently, Judge Noel entered an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. See 
"Disposition at the Trial Court," p. "x," supra. It is from this Order that Appellant appeals. 
After Davis filed his Notice of Appeal, a federal grand jury returned an indictment 
against Davis. On October 8, 1992, the Administrative Law Judge stayed Davis' license 
revocation hearing until after the resolution of a federal criminal charges. See Addendum "L.-
Notwithstanding, these issues are still relevant and very important to Davis because he will 
eventually be prosecuted under Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 (1987). See Addendum "L." A 
license revocation hearing will commence on or about mid-May, 1993. See Addendum "L." 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1988) statutorily exempts parties from exhausting the 
administrative process where those processes are inadequate or where a party will suffer 
irreparable harm. Robert Davis attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the physicians' 
licensing statutes under which he is about to be prosecuted. The administrative court ruled that 
it was without jurisdiction and authority to hear these issues. Therefore, his administrative 
remedy was inadequate. As such, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1988) provided Robert Davis 
with a specific exemption from the exhaustion requirement. Alternatively, Robert Davis is 
exempted from the exhaustion requirement because he will suffer irreparable harm to his 
professional reputation and livelihood if he is forced to undergo prosecution by an 
unconstitutional statutory scheme. 
Since Robert Davis unsuccessfully attempted to raise the constitutional issues in federal 
and administrative court, it was error for the state district court to dismiss Robert Davis' 
Complaint. This left Robert Davis completely without a forum to litigate his constitutional 
challenge. The state district court had original jurisdiction to hear Robert Davis' Complaint 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (1953). The state district court incorrectly declined 
jurisdiction specifically conferred by statute when it dismissed Robert Davis' Complaint. 
xv 
ARGUMENT 
I. DAVIS IS EXEMPTED FROM THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-14 (1988). 
Generally, a party must exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking judicial review 
or judicial relief. McCarthy v. Madigan, U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1081, 1086 (1992) attached 
as Addendum "M;" McGrath v. Weinberger, 541 F.2d 249, 251 (10th Cir. 1976); State Tax 
Comm'n v. Ivenon, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989). Exhaustion allows an agency to: (1) 
exercise its discretionary power; or (2) apply its special expertise before judicial review is had. 
McCarthy, 112 S.Ct. at 1086. Exhaustion also allows for the creation of an administrative 
record for subsequent judicial consideration. Id. at 1086-87. 
However, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) (1988) statutorily exempts parties from the 
exhaustion requirement in certain situations. That statute states that: 
A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies 
available, except that: 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial 
review of the requirement to exhaust any or all 
administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are 
inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result 
in irreparable harm disproportionate 
to the public benefit derived from 
requiring exhaustion. 
1 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) (1988) (emphasis added). In this case, Davis' administrative 
remedies were wholly inadequate. Furthermore, the balance of equities suggests that Davis be 
exempted from the exhaustion requirement. 
A. Administrative Remedies Are Inadequate to Adjudicate Davis' Constitutional 
Challenge to the Medical Practice Act. 
The Utah legislature has specifically provided that a party is excused from the exhaustion 
requirement if the administrative remedy is inadequate. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b)(i) 
(1988). Recently, the United States Supreme Court discussed those situations in which 
administrative remedies are inadequate. McCarthy v. Madigan, U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1081 
(1992). 
These situations are: (1) where there is an unreasonable time frame for administrative 
action; (2) the agency is not empowered to grant effective relief; and (3) the administrative 
body is biased or has predetermined the issues. Id. at 1087-1088. In Davis' case, the first two 
situations are present. The third situation was substantially alleviated with the recusal of the 
Director of the Division, David Robinson. R.000105; 000136. 
In addition, the Utah Court of Appeals has identified a fourth situation in which 
exhaustion is not required. When exhaustion would serve no useful purpose, a party need not 
complete the administrative process. Parkdale Care Center v. Frandsen, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 
28 (Utah Ct. App. August 20, 1992). In light of this analysis, the state district court's Order 
was erroneous. 
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1. The State Court's Refusal to Hear Davis' Constitutional Challenges 
Before he is Prosecuted is Prejudicial. 
In McCarthy, the United States Supreme Court noted that "requiring resort to the 
administrative remedy may occasion undue prejudice to subsequent assertion of a court action." 
McCarthy, 112 S.Ct. at 1987. When undue prejudice results, exhaustion is not required. Id. 
In this case, Davis has been wholly deprived of a forum for his constitutional challenges. As 
it now stands, Davis may not have a substantive adjudication on the constitutionality of the 
licensing statutes until after he has been subjected to their operation. The Division has zealously 
advocated this result in the past: 
In the present case, Utah law provides an adequate and meaningful remedy for 
administrative and judicial review of plaintiffs claims. The Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act . . . provides that a party has a right to judicial review of any 
final agency action . . . 
Since the issues raised by plaintiff in this case will by fully adjudicated either in 
the administrative proceeding or on appeal from that proceeding to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, a declaratory judgment by this Court is inappropriate . . . 
R.000032-000033 [citations omitted]. This is clearly prejudicial. 
The United States Supreme Court has spoken on this exact issue. In Ward v. Village of 
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), the petitioner was denied a trial before a disinterested and 
impartial judicial officer. See Addendum "N.H The Village argued that since the petitioner 
could be later be tried de novo in another impartial court, any due process violations could be 
"cured." The Supreme Court rejected this argument stating that "the State's trial court 
procedure [may not] be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply because the State eventually 
offers a defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled to a neutral and detached 
3 
judge in the first instance." Id. at 61-62 (emphasis added); see also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 
U.S. 564, 575-77 (1973); Wolkenstein v. Reville, 539 F.Supp. 87, 94-5, n.3 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) 
("an impartial initial adjudication is an irreducible minimum"); Matter of Ross, 656 P. 2d 832, 
839 (Nev. 1983). 
Requiring exhaustion of all administrative procedures before allowing a constitutional 
challenge is prejudicial to Davis. Davis will "suffer irreparable harm if [he is] unable to secure 
immediate judicial consideration of his claim." McCarthy, 112 S.Ct. at 1087. Davis' license 
to practice medicine is a property right protected by the Constitution, it is Davis' livelihood and 
it is his lifelong profession. He should be allowed to challenge the constitutionality of the 
licensing statutes before he is divested of these important interests. Because of the resulting 
prejudice to Davis, exhaustion should not be required. 
2. The Administrative Law Judge Lacked Jurisdiction to Rule on the 
Constitutional Issues, Rendering the Administrative Remedy 
Inadequate. 
Before filing his declaratory judgment action in state district court, Davis raised the exact 
same constitutional claims before the administrative court. The Administrative Law Judge told 
Davis that the constitutional challenge was a matter for the district court. He ruled that the 
administrative tribunal did not have the jurisdiction or the authority to rule on the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 (1987). During a hearing held October 29, 
1991, Judge Eklund ruled that: 
I don't believe I have the authority and would not presume to exercise any 
jurisdiction over whether the statutory scheme here is unconstitutional on its face. 
It is clear, from the cases the Division has cited, that that's a matter for the 
4 
courts to decide. Although it is not inappropriate for you to raise the issue here, 
for purposes of preserving it if necessary, for judicial review or independent 
action before any other court, I have no intention and will not rule on that aspect 
of your motion . . . Because / don't have the authority to address it. 
See Addendum "J." By bringing the declaratory judgment action in state district court, Davis 
did what the administrative tribunal concluded was appropriate; namely, file a lawsuit in a court 
of competent jurisdiction to hear the constitutional claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (1953). 
An agency may "lack[] institutional competence to resolve the particular type of issue 
presented, such as the constitutionality of a statute." McCarthy, 112 S.Ct. at 1088 (citing 
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 497, n.5 (1977) (emphasis added); Mathews v. Diaz, 
426 U.S. 67, 76, (1976)); see also McGrath, 541 F.2d at 251. (exceptions to the exhaustion 
doctrine). Where this is the case, exhaustion will not be required. 
Simply put, "exhaustion [is] not required where 'the remedy sought is one that the 
administrative body is not empowered to provide/" Parkdale Care Center, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 30 (quoting Pounds v. Denison, 766 P.2d 1262, 1265-66 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988)); Hatton-
Ward, 828 P.2d at 1074. "The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies does not require one to 
initiate and participate in proceedings where an administrative agency clearly lacks jurisdiction.H 
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 1992) [citations omitted]. 
It is well-established that administrative courts have no power to declare unconstitutional 
the statutory and regulatory scheme it is authorized to administer. McGowan v. Marshall, 604 
F.2d 885, 892 (5th Cir. 1979). This principle is well settled in federal circuits. Accord 
McGowan, 604 F.2d at 892 (It would be "utterly fruitless" to petition constitutional claims to 
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the administrative body because they couldn't rule on them); Panola Land Buyers Ass'n v. 
Shuman, 762 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Adjudication of the constitutionality of 
congressional enactments has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative 
agencies"); Vargas v. United States Dep't of Immigration & Naturalization, 831 F.2d 906, 908 
(9th Cir. 1987) ("[D]ue process claims generally are exempt from [the exhaustion doctrine] 
because the [administrative body] does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues"); 
National Advertising Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[Plaintiff] 
was not required to exhaust administrative remedies since it challenged the ordinances as facially 
invalid"); Farrokhi v. United States I.N.S., 900 F.2d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 1990) (Administrative 
courts have no authority to adjudicate constitutional issues.); O.K.C. Corp. v. Williams, 461 
F.Supp. 540, 546 (N.D.Tex. 1978) ("Complaints that an agency is violating . . . constitutional 
rights . . . are excepted from th[e] general rule"). Further, a Utah case recognized that 
"[administrative agencies do not generally determine the constitutionality of their organic 
legislation." Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980). 
The McCarthy case recently stated that "where the challenge is to the adequacy of the 
agency procedure itself, such that 'the question of the adequacy of the administrative remedy . 
. . [is] for all practical purposes identical with the merits of [the plaintiffs] lawsuit" exhaustion 
is not required. McCarthy, 112 S.Ct. at 1088 (quoting Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 63 
(1979)). Such is the case here. The issues raised in the declaratory judgment action went 
directly to the constitutionality of the statutory scheme. The statutory scheme is the source of 
the Division's authority to proceed with its Petition. 
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Colorado has specifically considered and ruled upon the precise issues raised in this 
,I|7|HM1, I I'll', "i '•• 111•• • nvrntly cited with approval a Colorado case which exempted a party from 
exhaustion where the administrative remedies would not provide the relief sought. Hanon-Ward, 
K2K P ,"il ii  K HI)'; vi hi i|i|iini dl if .ilfiiMM,- ,. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 P.2d 994, 1006 (Colo. 
O \op. 1981 ,u. A .iUT Colorado case also built upon the Collopy decision explicitly holding 
that / a statute or _ v 
administrative remedies ^ %x:e ^viiuiM J ^ .»,;* *. * r ,«, V-. . Kiate, 807 \* i,i ^ 5 , 
1191 (Colo. Ct A ^ i w , t _ u 
P.2d lui vv-uio. i77i;. M^ucchesi also noted iha: .ne
 r'i.*;x- :oru:n for such challenges .- * 
declaratory judgment action in district court I ucchesi, 8 0 / I" J!J ai I I'. I. 
Ii i tl lis :as 2, tl le - \dministrat ive Law Judge expressly and correctly ruled that he had no 
jurisdiction to rule upon Davis ' constitutional claims. This, in and of itself, is conclusive that 
no ndcqiialr n mi \\\ «'• i •il". "Therefore, it i i rust follow that exhaustion was not required. 
3 . Exhaustion in this Case Wou ld Serve No Useful Purpose. 
In i. 28 (Utah Ct. App. August 
20, 1992), this Court reaffirmed prior Utah, cases which have stated that a party need not exhaust 
administrative remedies vn in n ill M nhl i m '< i M n ii lull imipi ii! ml w) (cuing Hatton-Ward. 
828 P.2d at 1073-74; Iverson, 782 P,2d at S24; lohnson, t\l\ F M at 1237). Exhaustion, is 
required because it s e r u » ll M i i i I I*I« u< ii.ift *iliiumsriiHiv# apmcy authority aj id 
promoting judicial efficiency. : s . j v.n purposes tor t^e doc:r-e 
of exhaustion include: (a) nmtert geiK> 
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expertise; (c) facilitating judicial review through creation of a factual record by the agency; and 
(d) avoiding repetitive adjudication or to avoid judicial involvement at all. In re Inspection of 
Norfolk Dredging Co., 783 F.2d 1526, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1986); National Fed'n of Fed. 
Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 940 n.6 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Association for Retarded 
Citizens of Alabama v. Teague, 830 F.2d 158, 160 & n.3 (11th Cir. 1987). 
None of the purposes of the exhaustion doctrine are served in this case. An 
administrative agency has no authority over or expertise in constitutional issues, so there is no 
authority or autonomy to protect. Consequently, time and energy would actually be wasted in 
pursuing an administrative remedy. A factual record below would be unhelpful in ruling on the 
constitutionality of the statutory scheme: Davis' claims are questions of law. If Davis is 
required to exhaust the administrative process and prevail, his constitutional due process 
challenge would be lost. See McGrath, 541 F.2d at 253. Furthermore, judicial involvement 
should not be protected against, because the district court has original jurisdiction in this case. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (1953). Davis should not be required to incur the additional damage 
which would result from the futile and pointless endurance of the administrative proceeding. 
This is especially true in light of the fact that it is this very process which Davis was attempting 
to bring into question in the state district court case. 
Since none of the judicially established purposes of exhaustion are satisfied, exhaustion 
is not required in this case. Absolutely nothing will be accomplished by requiring Davis to 
endure prosecution before raising his constitutional claims. 
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Q ^ Balance nil! Hiiutu.* Miggtsls that Exhaust i i lis l ni j : • : fie • 11 i t l il s 0 : i ites L 
Courts "must balance the interest of the individual in retaining
 r:or-r>t acee^ v a [] 
judicial forum against countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion ; ; . - 12 
i'i i 'Hill'":"': Administrative remedies need not be pursued if the litigant's interests in 
immediate judicial review outweigh the government's interests in the efficiency or administrative 
aiitui ni I ll I ll vl iiiihliiiii iKM liiiiiii'i in dcsipneif to lurthei ."" Id. A balai icing test may be 
applied to determine whether or not it is equitable to require a party to exhaust the administrative 
process t 
In Davis' case, the balance ot annuo wrongly suggests that Davis should be allowed to 
challenge the constitutional] . t, 
the Petition seeks to revoke a constitutionally protected imnvm r J n n *".:-.? o .e pr.xc-
of law is required. Secondly, Davis sta nd\. h- niH. . •<icpacabl^ . ,• I*u \ |»'l'l ' • ' m 
unconstitutional licensing hearing is held. 11ic Division has repeatedly argued that it has an 
interest in protecting the public However,, this interest should h. I * .nloi aJ jf ,h. -
 M » 
( ^mplete and effectual denial of Davis' due process right to receive a hearing before a fair 
and impartial tribunal. 
1* Davis* License to Practice Medicine is a Constitutionally Protected 
Property Right. 
A physician has a proper!j \IALI\V '"> [,r;nlier T.nhcinr fall i Larson, 
402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Beauchamp v. , ' • ^ F.2d 773 "5 (1st Cir. i985> " 4 
clearer example of 'new property' is not easilv imat - / 
9 
F.2d 1229, 1233 (7th Cir. 1988); Domino v. O'Neill 702 F.Supp. 949, 952 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). 
Property "interests attain . . . constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been 
initially recognized and protected by state law, and we have repeatedly ruled that the procedural 
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment apply whenever the State seeks to remove or 
significantly alter that protected status." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1976). 
Therefore, a physician may not be deprived of a his license to practice medicine without due 
process of law. U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 
238-39 (1957). 
Accordingly, Davis should be given the full protections of due process of law in the 
license revocation proceeding against him. 
It is not accidental that many of the specific provisions of the original constitution 
and the Bill of Rights are procedural. The only way we know when the 
government is behaving within its limits is when it goes through each step that we 
require of it. Those are not silly technicalities, but they are the essence of 
ordered liberty. 
Ramirez v. Ahn, 686 F.Supp. 590, 591 (S.D.Tex. 1987) (Procedural irregularities resulted in 
a denial of due process in a physician's license revocation proceeding.) "To perform its high 
function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.'" In re Murchison, 349 
U.S. 133, 136 (1954) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). 
These fundamental principles apply to administrative proceedings with the same force as 
they do to judicial proceedings.7 Anderson v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 
7
 The Supreme Court tried to determine due process requirements in administrative 
proceedings in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). 
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(' j and 
are entitled to the protections of due process. Matter of Johnston, 663 P.2d 457, 462 (Wash. 
198.V) (quoting i - * \ ] s 1 23S- V i^ l \ i \ is' 
due process rights in this case are of the utmost importance and should be scrupulously 
observed. 
2 . Davis Stands to Suffer Irreparable Harm to His Professional 
Reputation and Business. 
Da1! is* licei ise to practice i nedicii ite is a lso I lis li 'elil i : od, 1 lis s oi iree • :>f in it :< :>i: i le a nd his 
lifelong profession. The Petition, seeks to completely divest Davis of these interests. If his 
medical license is improperly and i u ICOI istiti iti : i La ill) i: e : ke i , It i i > ill si i f i i i inn lecliate, 
irreparable, substantial damage. No series of subsequent appeals and/or reinstatements u, ill 
remedy the loss Davis will s n i . . - '^e is even temixMvnly \m i.'Pic I i p"'ii/t"i i!),!,,< medinne . 
Even if Dr Davis was eventually re-licensed, the injury to his professional reputation would be 
impossible to restore. Davis' interest in litigating the constitutionality ol i'lici 'lUluk" uiult'i 
weighty. 
Furthermore, the media coverage of the license revocation proceeding has already been 
a racjj0 n e w s programs have attended even procedural 
[The] exact boundaries [of due process] ai e in idefinable, and its content vai ies 
according to specific factual contexts. Thus, when governmental agencies 
adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights 
of individuals, it i* imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have 
traditionallv beer, associated with the ji idicial process " 
Id. at 4-+^. Quasi-judicwi- proceedings must entail, "at the very least," a fair trial. Id. (quoting 
Murchison, 349 U S . AX • \h; see Utica Packing Co, v. Block, 781 F.2d 7 1 , 78 (1986). 
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hearings at the administrative court. Notwithstanding any subsequent determination that the 
licensing statutes are unconstitutional, if Davis is fully prosecuted under an unconstitutional 
statute he will already have sustained substantial adverse publicity and irreversible damage to 
his reputation. 
3. The Public Interest is Outweighed by the Severity of the Consequences 
to Davis. 
The Division has repeatedly argued that its interest in protecting public health and safety 
is more important than Davis' interests. While this interest is important, it is not controlling in 
all situations and does not outweigh the meticulous observance of an accused is constitutional 
rights to due process of law. 
C. Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office is Distinguishable from this Case and 
Has No Applicability Here. 
It is important for purposes of this appeal to distinguish the Johnson case from the issues 
presently before the Court because the state district court relied on the Johnson decision when 
requiring Davis to exhaust his administrative remedies. In its Order, the state district court 
stated: 
Both parties cite Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P. 2d 1234 (Utah 
1980). That case however, did rule that plaintiff had failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies and dismissed the matter referring it back to the 
administrative agency for further hearing. The Court said in that case: 
Plaintiffs assertion of a constitutional issue does not alter the 
necessity for compliance with the requirement of first adjudicating 
their claim before the Retirement Board . . . As stated in Public 
[sic] Utilities . . . 'If . . . an administrative proceeding might 
leave no remnant of the constitutional question the administrative 
remedy plainly should be pursued/ 
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R.000137. The court's reliance on Johnson for requiring ext laustioi i 1 lei: e vn 'as pei plexii tg. 
Johnson is factually and legally distinguishable from the instant case. First of all, ihe 
Johnson plaintiffs were not awaiting prosecution. They were not facing an unconstitutional 
deprivation I proivrlv uiihout due process of law, as is Davis. Instead, the Johnson plaintiffs 
were government employees who were attempting to recover monies in the state retirement fund. 
j"« h m i " " ! 1 , 'ii'V'1"' 'I I >• I '"" 11 1'i'fiilli in' i i«i"" \\v\ larulory ir'bd was dismissed without 
prejudice and with leave to re-nU- ;«' *ii ^v ^mra^ * MVN nas been told that he ^ ; ^ 
suiier prosecutii' ar 
irreparable injury to his livelihood and reputation. 
In Johnson, there was an ex, 
Ann. § 49-10-49 et seq. provided for a Bouid of Review ic K%I: r*refits appeal s tviore *VM "• 
to district court, which was also explicitly provided foi", l\l ,i,l I.' 11' I lu •«„ | in.ciluit * "" 
mplicable to tl le Johnson plaintiffs. In Davis1" case, no rele\ }ant administrative 
procedure exists, express or implied. Significantly, the Administrative Law Ji idge in Davis' case 
constitutional claims for a lack of authority and 
jurisdiction. 
in i mi | MI» ,! i ii MI .i in inn tlidlivi pKNidun1 iiiilnlonli, '>necified and available in Johnson, 
but the agency had express jurisdiction and experti.se:. ^ c Johnson court held that the 
plaintii particular responsibility and 
expertise. " "Id Hie Adminis t ra t ive Law Judge in Davis" case, not only had no experti.se or 
responsibi l i ty , but had 
Further, in Johnson the court found that a reviewing court would benefit from the Board 
of Review's interpretation of terms and procedures of retirement plan administration. Id. In 
Davis' case, the state district court has original jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (1953). A full and completed prosecution of Davis would add 
nothing to an adjudication of the facial validity of the statutes. The Board of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing is not expert in constitutional law, but in medical licensing matters. The 
Board has no authority to determine the "constitutionality of their organic legislation." Id. 
The Johnson court ruled that the "mere introduction of a constitutional issue does not 
obviate the need for exhaustion of administrative remedies." Id. In Johnson, there were claims 
other than the constitutional issue. Id. In Davis' case, only constitutional issues have been 
raised. Therefore, an entire administrative proceeding will not "obviate" the need of addressing 
the constitutional challenges as it may have in the Johnson case. 
In conclusion, the Johnson decision has little, if any, applicability to Davis' case. The 
state district court was incorrect in relying on the Johnson exposition on exhaustion to preclude 
Davis from litigating his constitutional challenge. 
H. THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED 
DAVIS' CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS AND LEFT HIM WITHOUT A FORUM 
Exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement. Norfolk, 783 F.2d at 1528-29; Panola. 
762 F.2d at 1556. Instead, it is a matter of discretion with the district court. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-14(2)(b) (1988) ("the court may relieve a party. . ." from the exhaustion requirement); 
Norfolk, 783 F.2d at 1529; Panola, 762 F.2d at 1556-57. In this case, the state district court 
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abused i 
for his constitutional ciaiir.s See utu> , VJ; i\*Jc -v- ^ ^ . ; ^ M. 
As sreued *upra. declaratory _ • • u district Coi n t: '< .s 
dismissed on the grounds of comity and exhaustion. See Addendum "P." ("in comity as well 
as the doctrine of exhaustion you ought to be proceeding in state court"). 
Si lbsequentlj , the Administrative Law Judge specifically ruled that he had no authonty 
to adjudicate Davis* constitutional claims. 
I don't believ e I have the authority and. would not presume to exercise any 
jurisdiction over whether the statutory scheme here is unconstitutional on. its face. 
It is clear, from the cases the Division has cited, that that's a matter for the 
courts to decide. Although it is not inappropriate for you to raise the issue here, 
for purposes of preserving it if necessary, for judicial review or independent 
action before any other court, I have no intention and will not rule on that aspect 
of your motion .'Because / don 7 have the authority to address it. 
I acknowledge the fact, as set forth in the Clayton v. Bennett* case, which, is 
cited by the Division . , that Justice Crocket recognizes that declaratory relief 
and injunctive relief pursuant thereto is a correct method for challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute. I think what I am suggesting from what I just 
indicated is I would deny any stay here and leave to you the opportunity to file 
that request for a declaratory relief in the district courts and accompany it with 
a request for injunctive relief and let the court address the issue whether they 
think these proceedings ought to be stayed. 
ic Addendum • ii.v. i<oi • ;i - vderai and administrative courts ruled that state district 
co -. /i u ititi itic i la 1 :1a in: i is. 
531 (Utah 1956). 
However, when the claims were presented to the state district court for review, the court 
dismissed the case. The state district court first wanted Davis to exhaust the administrative 
process. The state district court held that Davis must endure prosecution under the statutes 
before he could challenge their constitutional integrity. The state district court never reached 
the substantive challenge. 
In his Motion in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Davis cited Ward v. 
Village ofMonroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) for the proposition that trial court procedure may 
not be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply because the litigant may eventually appeal due 
process violations at the trial court level. R.000102-R.000112 at 000110. In the Order of 
dismissal, the state district court summarily dismissed the applicability of the Ward case because 
it does not "deal specifically with the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies." 
R.000137. 
However, as support for its exhaustion argument, the Division argued that "any 
subsequent appellate review by the Utah Court of Appeals" could cure Davis' allegations of 
constitutional deficiency. R.000033. The Division and the state district court failed to take into 
account that Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1988) specifically provides for judicial review before 
entry of a final order when the administrative remedy is inadequate. This has been considered 
and approved in Utah Restaurant Ass'n v. Davis Co. Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Utah 
1985) (Although statutes provided for judicial review of the final agency action, district court 
has jurisdiction over any case brought to question the validity of an ordinance). 
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A declaratory iiu_ .„ ,r 
challenging the constitutionality o: LV \-att. .lUmim^trauve sv uior\ **efne. tlfah ( »x3c \ n. 
§ 78- J) states that: "' * e 
power to declare rights, status and other legal relations, wheiher or not further relief is or could 
be claimed/' (Emphasis added). A ~ourt has no more right to decline the exercise of 
ji an to usurp that which is not given. McCarthy, 112 S.Ct. at 1087. 
The state district court declaratory judgment Complaint was the proper forum for the 
c : i i ? i ^explicitly so holding); see also Phi 
Kappa Lota Fraternity w Salt Lake G;> ** J 1 W TT4 h 1^49); Brackma- v ?.7.;r rrJrr 
County, " .* • o^5 5o.2d 
432, 433 (Fla. A^f. i^7*) {"Th i , uiiiment am: injunctive remedies [apply] only 
where a party has no other adequate admimsiMl^» > > « ' ' i i '.•}.'n i^ous ageni '^ynr, or 
where a party's constitutional rights are endangered emphasis added). 
Additionally, the exhaustion doctrine shou construct 
collateral claims to be lost." McGrath, 541 F.2d at 249, 252. liy dismissing Davis' declaratory 
judgment action, on the basis of exhaustion, the state district court .- ; e^ 
opportunity to have his constitutional argument heard before he was subjected \> *-
unconstitutional operation. Thence, the exhaustion doctrine is not applicable in this c^ >c is 
is nilitlnl lii a forum for his coiis'titutional claims before he is prosecuted under the siatu:cs 
which are the subject of his challenge. The stale district court abused, its discretion unc 
I ' Il '", ,* mi ' i -"'I I1]1! 4fil* IN! ml I'MiiRS) when it required Davis to complete the administrative process. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, there is no administrative remedy to exhaust. The state district court's Order 
wholly deprived Davis of a forum for his constitutional challenges to the facial validity of the 
very statutes under which he is to be prosecuted. It was error for the state district court to 
require exhaustion where no alternative adequate remedy exists. Such an exemption is 
specifically provided for by statute and should have been applied to Davis' case. In every other 
adversary proceeding there is a procedure whereby a party may take an interlocutory appeal 
when necessary. This is also true with administrative procedures, embodied in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-14 (1988). 
Davis respectfully requests that this Court reverse the state district court's March 4, 1992 
order and allow him to raise his constitutional challenge to the statutes before he is prosecuted 
under them. 
DATED this 7th day of December, 1992. 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
^y^e/^i'.£U*n. 
BENSON"?. HATHAWAY, JR. 
MARGARET H. OLSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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(1987) and Memorandum in Support 
I. Hearing Transcript of Administrative Law Hearing, October 29, 1991 
J. Hearing Transcript of Administrative Law Hearing, October 29, 1991 
K. Notice of Recusal of David Robinson 
L. Order Staying Administrative Hearing dated October 8, 1992 
M. McCarthy v. Madigan, U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1081 (1992) 
N. Ward v. Village ofMonroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) 
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ELIZABETH J. BUCHANAN (BAR NO. 5923) 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. DAVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
DAVID E. ROBINSON, 
in his individual capacity 
as Director of the Division 
of Occupational & Professional 
Licensing of the Department of 
Business Regulation, and the DIVISION 
OF OCCUPATIONAL &. PROFESSIONAL 
LICENSING at the Department of Business 
Regulation, State of Utah, and 
the UTAH MEDICAL LICENSING BOARD, 
and PAUL VAN DAM, in his capacity as 





AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL 
civil NO. Cfioqn 744^1 
Judge 
L 
Robert C. Davis, M.D., by and through counsel, Peter Stirba, hereby complains of David 
E. Robinson, in his individual capacity as the Director of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing of the Department of Business Regulation, the Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing of the Department of Business Regulation, State of Utah (collectively 
referred to hereafter as the "Division"), the Utah Medical Licensing Board (hereinafter the 
"Board"), and Paul Van Dam, in his capacity as Attorney General for the State of Utah as 
follows: 
NATURE OF ACTION 
This is an action for declaratory judgment, preliminary injunctive relief, and other 
appropriate relief pursuant to Section 18-33-1 et. seq. of the Utah Judicial Code, and Rules 57 
and 65 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for deprivation of property and liberty without due 
process of law in violation of the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Plaintiff is seeking a Declaratory 
Judgment that Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 is unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied. 
Plaintiff further seeks to enjoin the Division from bringing an administrative proceeding under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-l, et. seq. (Administrative Procedures Act), Utah Code Ann. § 58-
1-16 (Occupational and Professional Licensing Act), and Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-26 (Medical 
Practice Act). The Attorney General has been joined as a Defendant in this action pursuant to 
Section 78-33-11, Utah Code Ann., in order to give him an opportunity to be heard. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Plaintiff is licensed to practice medicine in the State of Utah, and is presently 
practicing medicine within the State. 
2. Plaintiff has a protected liberty and property interest in his medical license, which 
permits him to practice medicine as his livelihood. 
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3. Plaintiffs right to practice medicine m the State of Utah, is protected by the due 
process provisions of Utah and the United States Constitutions. 
4. For over the past four years, Defendant Robinson and the Division have been 
engaged in a repetitious yet intense investigation of Plaintiff. 
5. The Division has filed an administrative Petition under the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-l, et. seq., the Occupational and Professional 
Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-16, et. seq., and the Utah Medical Protective Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-12-26, et. seq.t seeking to suspend or revoke Plaintiffs license to practice 
medicine in the State of Utah. 
6. Defendant Robinson, as Director of the Division, is statutorily vested with the sole 
authority to make the ultimate decision, following a finding by the Board that the charges have 
been proved, regarding whether Plaintiffs license is revoked, suspended or what other action 
should be taken under Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1. 
7. Defendant Robinson also supervises discovery, the investigation of claims by the 
Division, directs and participates in any hearings before the Division, and is closely involved 
with each claim from its inception until he makes the ultimate decision regarding sanctions. 
8. The Plaintiff has been investigated on at least two previous occasions, at the 
direction of Defendant David Robinson. 
9. Defendant Robinson has been personally and closely involved in the investigation 
of the Plaintiff. 
10. Defendant Robinson has been privy to information concerning the Plaintiff which 
is irrelevant to the Petition and will bias Defendant Robinson against the Plaintiff. 
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11. Defendant Robinson has also been involved in protracted prior investigations of 
Plaintiff, as well as the litigation of several lawsuits filed by the Plaintiff against Defendant 
Robinson for alleged wrongdoings by him in this and earlier investigations. 
12. Due to Defendant Robinson's past involvement with the Plaintiff, his direct 
involvement in this current investigation and Petition, and his involvement with the claims made 
against him by the Plaintiff, Defendant Robinson is biased against the Plaintiff. 
13. None of the statutes potentially applicable to disciplinary actions against physicians 
(Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l to 22 (1953), as amended); 
Utah Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-1 to 21 
(1953), as amended); Utah Medical Practice Act § 58-12-26 (1953), as amended) provide 
procedures for the disqualification of a biased hearing officer or decisionmaker. 
14. Plaintiffs business has suffered as a result of the State's pending agency action 
and will continue to suffer general and special monetary damages if the State is permitted to 
proceed with the planned hearings concerning Plaintiffs license. 
15. Revocation, suspension, or other disciplinary action against Plaintiffs license will 
cause permanent and irreparable harm to Plaintiff. 
16. Therefore, Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law to avoid the continuation of 
this fundamentally unfair proceeding and the potential sanctions or revocation of Plaintiffs 
license which may result unless Defendant Robinson and the Division are restrained and enjoined 
from taking further action against Plaintiffs license, including bringing the Petition to a hearing. 
4 
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17. Plaintiff has been required to employ the attorney appearing herein to prosecute 
this action, and have agreed to pay him a reasonable fee for his service and to pay the costs 
incurred. 
18. Concerning an earlier and separate transaction between Plaintiff and the Board, 
Plaintiff met with the Board as the first step in complying with certain conditions of his 
previously imposed probation. At this meeting, he was instructed to file a practice plan with 
the Board. 
19. Following these instructions, the Plaintiff submitted a practice plan and revised 
the practice plan for the Board's approval, and made every attempt to comply with the terms of 
the probation. 
20. Regarding these efforts to comply with probation, Plaintiff sent a letter dated July 
11, 1988 to the Board requesting information on the success of his efforts. 
21. The Board never responded to this letter, and never gave Plaintiff any information 
on whether his practice plan and efforts to comply with probation had been approved. 
22. Without any opportunity for a fair hearing before the Board, and in fact without 
even any notice to the Plaintiff, at a meeting on July 13, 1988, the Board determined that 
Plaintiff had violated the probation. 
23. The Division then brought the aforementioned Petition before the Board, claiming 
that Plaintiff had violated the terms and conditions of probation. 
24. The Board's bias is shown by the institution, existence, and results of the former 




FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(DUE PROCESS VIOLATION) 
25. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs I through 
24 above as set forth herein. 
26. The procedure under Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1, as applied in this situation, 
is a violation of the provisions of the Utah and Federal Constitutions, due process and the 
Fourteenth Amendment in that the decisionmaker is so intertwined in the claims investigation, 
the discovery process, and the actual hearing and decisionmaking process, that he cannot 
possibly act in his capacity as an unbiased final decisionmaker. 
27. As a result of the lack of an adequate procedure for the disqualification of a biased 
hearing officer, the statutory provisions which purport to permit the Division to revoke or 
suspend the license of a physician violate the due process and equal protection provisions of the 
Utah and United States Constitutions. 
28. The Division must be enjoined from bringing its Petition before the Board to 
revoke Plaintiffs license to practice medicine in the State of Utah for the reason that Defendant 
Robinson's extensive participation and long-running bias against the Plaintiff creates a violation 
of Plaintiffs due process rights and will result in irreparable injury to Plaintiff. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment below. 
SECOND CLArM FOR RELIEF 
(STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL) 
29. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 25 
through 28 above as set forth herein. 
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30. Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 empowers the Director of the Division, Defendant 
Robinson, with the authority to administer oaths, certify to official acts and records of the 
Division, issue subpoenas, compel production of documents, and otherwise oversee and direct 
the investigation. 
31. In addition, Section 58-12-35.1 vests the director, Defendant Robinson, with the 
sole discretion to determine an appropriate penalty for those determined to be in violation of the 
Act, including public or private reprimand; supervision or restriction of license; revocation of 
license, requiring licenseholder to submit to care, counseling or treatment; requiring participation 
of licenseholder in education program, or assigning licenseholder to the direction of another 
physician. 
32. Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 vests in one person, the director, the authority to 
investigate, issue subpoenas, adjudicate and determine a penalty in cases of alleged violation of 
the Medical Practice Act. 
33. Plaintiff will be irreparably damaged by the operation of Section 58-12-35.1. 
34. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against Defendants for all general and special 
damages Plaintiff has incurred or which Plaintiff will probably suffer as a result of the violations 
alleged herein. 
35. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their reasonable attorney's fees incurred herein. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment below. 
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(UNFAIR PROCEEDING) 
36. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 29 
through 35 above as set forth herein. 
37. The Board meeting held on July 13, 1988 violated the due process provisions of 
Utah and Federal Constitutions in making a decision concerning the Plaintiff and his medical 
license without affording him his constitutional right to notice and an opportunity to respond to 
the allegations before the Board. 
38. The Board is therefore biased, as shown by this proceeding, its determination in 
violation of Plaintiffs due process rights, as well as the ongoing depravation of his constitutional 
rights to a fair and objective tribunal by being asked to deliberate on a matter that it has already 
determined, and therefore should be enjoined from hearing the Petition which concerns the 
Plaintiff. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
1. For a judicial determination that Section 58-12-35.1 is unconstitutional both on 
its face, and as applied violates Plaintiffs due process rights under Article I, Section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution 
as under the facts of this case wherein Plaintiff will be denied a fundamentally fair proceeding. 
2. For an Order of this Court immediately enjoining the Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing, as presently constituted with David Robinson as the Division 
Director, from proceeding to a hearing on the Petition filed by the Division regarding Plaintiff. 
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3. For an Order of this Court immediately enjoining the Utah Medical Review Board 
from hearing the Petition filed by the Division concerning Plaintiff. 
4. For general damages. 
5. For special damages. 
6. For reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff herein. 
7. For costs of this action incurred by the Plaintiff herein. 
8. For such other relief as to which Plaintiff may show himself entitled, or as the 
Court deems proper under the circumstances. 
DATED this of November, 1991. 
STIRBA?£ HATHAWAJ 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
The Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial in the above matter. 
DATED this day of November, 1991 
STIR 
Plaintiffs Address: 
1519 West 9000 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
jb\rb\pl\dav-rob .cmp 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. DAVID, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 910907449 CV 
vs. : JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
DAVID E. ROBINSON, et al., 
Defendant. : 
This matter is now before the Court is defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss. The Court has reviewed the memos submitted in 
connection with said Motion, has heard oral argument, has taken 
the matter under advisement and now rules as follows: 
A substantial portion of this Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief has been rendered moot by defendant David 
E. Robinson's recusal of himself from participating in any 
further proceedings in this matter involving the plaintiff. 
What remains is estentially a constitutional attack on the 
statutes under which the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing and the Utah Medical Licensing Board is 
?rQ12C> 
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proceeding against plaintiff. The narrow issue before the Court 
is whether the plaintiff can, during the pendency of the 
administrative proceeding, bring an action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief against the agency involved claiming the 
statute under which they are proceeding is unconstitutional. 
Defendants claim that this issue can be decided by the Court of 
Appeals in the proper manner after the hearing, and that 
plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
Plaintiff relies primarily on Ward v. Village of 
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) and Utah Restaurant Association 
v. Davis County Board of Health. 709 P2d 1159 (Utah, 1985). It 
should be noted, however, that neither of those cases doil 
specifically with the issue of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies. 
Both parties cite Johnson v. Utah State Retire-o^t 
Office, 621 P2d 1234 (Utah, 1980). That case however did rule 
that plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies *r. i 
dismissed the matter referring it back to the administrative 
agency for further hearing. The Court said in that case: 
"Plaintiff's assertion of a constitutional issue does 
not alter the necessity for compliance with the 
requirement of first adjudicating their claim before 
the Retirement Board....As stated in Pulic Utilities... 
"If...an administrative proceeding might leave no 
remnant of the constitutional question the administrative 
remedy plainly should be pursued."" 
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The Court is of the opinion that plaintiff should pursi 
his remedies in the administrative proceeding and if it becomes 
necessary to address the constitutional issue then it can ce 
done so in the appropriate manner. 
Accordingly defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
Counsel for defendants is to prepare an order consistent 
with this ruling and submit it for signature in accordance the 
the local rules of practice. 
DATED this ^ day of March, 1992. 
C0C13S 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this ( day of March, 1992: 
peter Stirba 
Elizabeth J. Buchanan 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dan R. Larsen 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID, ROBERT C 
VS 
PLAINTIFF, 
ROBINSON, DAVID E 
UTAH MEDICAL LICENSI DEFENDANT. 
CASE NUMBER 910907449 CV 
DATE 02/28/92 
JUDGE FRANK G NOEL 
COURT REPORTER NOT PRESENT 
COURT CLERK PAJ 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
SUM 
P. ATTY. STIRBA, PETER 
D. ATTY. LARSEN, DAN 
ORDERS 
BASED UPON ARGUMENT OF RESPECTIVE COUNSEL, THE STATE'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. 
Cliti 
R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3 312 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN - 4865 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. DAVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID E. ROBINSON, in his 
individual capacity as 
Director of the Division 
of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing of 
the Department of Business 
Regulation, and the 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING at 
the Department of Business 
Regulation, State of Utah, 
and the UTAH MEDICAL 
LICENSING BOARD, and R. 
PAUL VAN DAM, in his 
capacity as Attorney 
General for the State of 
Utah, 
Defendants, 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 910907449CV 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing 
before the Court on February 28, 1992, at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff 
was represented by Peter Stirba; defendants were represented by 
Dan R. Larsen, Assistant Attorney General. Having heard and 
considered the arguments of counsel, together with the 
memorandums of law, and having filed a Memorandum Decision on 
March 4, 1932, it: 13 hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as 
follows: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted for the 
reasons stated in the Memorandum Decision. 
2. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice 
DATED this ^ !^day of (\{ ^ j A V 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
FRANK G. NOE^ i ^ ' ,^ v Y-/ / 
District Court''Judge / 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, postage 
prepaid, this _/.^?L day of March, 1992, to the following: 
Peter Stirba 
Elizabeth J. Buchanan 
Stirba Sc Hathaway 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
<<.-.--
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DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)530-6628 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
LICENSING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES 
OF ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS 
TO PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO 
ADMINISTER AND PRESCRIBE 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
PETITION 
CASE NO. OPL-89- 73 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
These causes of action were investigated by the Utah Division of 
Occupational & Professional Licensing (the Division) upon complaints that ROBERT 
CHARLES DAVIS, a licensee of the Division, has engaged in acts and practices 
which constitute violations of the Medical Practice Act, Utah Code Ann., §58-12-1 . 
et seq. 
PARTIES 
1. The Division is a Division of the Department of Commerce of 
the State of Utah, established by virtue of Section 13-1-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
as amended. 
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2. ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS is a licensee of the Division. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
3. 1. During all times pertinent to the allegations made herein, 
DAVIS has been the owner and manager of Family Medical Center located at 1781 
West 9000 South, West Jordan, UT 84088. Family Medical Center was and is a 
business corporation and not licensed to practice medicine in the state of Utah. 
2. From on or about August 1987 to on or about May 17, 
1988, DAVIS employed Dr. Owen G. Reese and from on or about June 7, 1988 to 
on or about April 13, 1989 DAVIS employed Dr. Taira Fukushima as hourly part-
time employees who had no ownership, control or authority in Family Medical 
Center and who worked for wages under the supervision of DAVIS. 
3. On or about July 8. 1987, DAVIS? license to practice 
medicine was placed on probation by the Division. This probationary period will 
not expire until July 17, 1992. It was found in Division case OPL 86-105 that 
DAVIS intentionally misled insurance companies and Medicare by misusing the 
term "comprehensive". Conditions of Davis' probation include the following: 
a. Respondent shall appear before the Board for 
interviews at the end of his 90 day suspension and every 
six months thereafter for a period of one year, and 
thereafter yearly until the end of his probation. 
b. Respondent shall present to the Board at his first 
six month interview evidence that ten of his medical 
records have been reviewed at random by a qualified 
practitioner in his field, and that the practitioner has also 
examined the billing record and states that the billing is 
appropriate to the level of service provided. The name of 
the person to be used in these reviews shall be provided 
to the Board and approved by it m advance. 
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c. Respondent shall provide the Board with a practice 
plan which includes acceptable methods of peer review. 
Such methods might include membership on a hospital 
staff, membership in the county and state medical 
societies, a practice system that brings him into contact 
with peers such as a group practice or a partnership, or 
the frequent use of consultations with an agreement that 
said consultations may be provided to the Board. 
d. Respondent shall arrange for back-up by a 
physician that has no restrictions on his license with the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. 
DAVIS has failed to comply with all the conditions of his probation. 
4. On or about January 17, 1989, the Division served DAVIS with a 
Subpoena Duces Tecum, together with properly signed liability releases executed 
by the patients whose records were sought. DAVIS refused to produce the patient 
records requested. 
5. On or about May 4, 1987, Tanya Anne Stauffer consulted with 
ROBERT DAVIS at the Family Medical Center because she was having sinus 
problems and bad headaches. DAVIS caused health insurance claim forms to be 
submitted to Medicare for services rendered to Stauffer on May 4. 7, 9. 12, 22 and 
26, 1987. For services on May 4, 1987, DAVIS billed code 70210.26 for "sinus x -
ray 2 view (reading proof)" in addition to code 70210 for "sinus x-ray 2 view 
(taking tech.)" which constitutes double billing. Codes 70210 "sinus x-ray 2 view 
(taking tech.)" and 70210.26 "sinus x-ray 2 view (reading proof)" were also billed 
for services performed on May 7, 1987. For services on May 7, 1987, DAVIS also 
billed code 85021 (complete blood count) and code 85009 (differential white blood 




6. For services rendered to Stauffer on May 22, 1987 and again 
on May 26, 1987, DAVIS billed code 85021 (complete blood count) and code 85009 
(manual differential) resulting in higher fees because they can be rebundled to an 
85022 (complete blood count with differential). 
7. On or about November 9, 1987, to on or about June 30, 1988 
DAVIS caused billing claims to be submitted to Medicare for Stauffer, billing 
numerous visits for allergic reaction and injections of allergen. Health insurance 
claim forms submitted to Utah State Department of Health by DAVIS between 
November 24. 1987 and July 13, 1988, represent services provided by DAVIS as 
having been provided by Owen G. Reese or Taira Fukushima. 
8. DAVIS caused health insurance claim forms to be submitted to 
the Utah State Department of Health representing Owen G. Reese as the provider 
of services to Stauffer on May 19, 1988, May 23, 1988, May 26, 1988, May 31, 
1988 and June 2, 1988. In fact, Owen G. Reese ceased to work for DAVIS May 
18, 1989. 
9. On or about November 16, 1987, David L Wilcox visited the 
Family Medical Center, due to what he thought was a bronchial attack. Wilcox was 
treated and instructed to return in two or three days. When Wilcox returned he 
was seen by DAVIS. Wilcox saw DAVIS several more times concerning his diet 
and cholesterol. As a result of these visits DAVIS billed Wilcox's health insurance 
carrier, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois, 90080 (established patient -
comprehensive service) for services rendered on November 23, 1987, December 1 
1987, December 11, 1987, December 18, 1987, January 5, 1988 and January 12, 




10. For services rendered to Wilcox on November 23, 1987, DAVIS 
billed Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois code 86171 for "strep". Code 86171 is the 
code for a complement fixation test and results in a higher fee. DAVIS billed code 
80053 (executive profile) in addition to codes 85021 (complete blood count), 85009 
(differential), and 84435 (T-4). Code 80053 (executive profile) includes codes 
85021, 85009, and 84435. 
11. On or about December 1, 1987, DAVIS billed Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield of Illinois codes 85009 (manual differential), 80059 (liver profile), 80073 (renal 
profile), and 85021 (complete blood count) for services rendered to Wilcox. Billing 
separately for these services with these codes exacts higher fees because they 
should be rebundled to a single code. 
12. On or about January 15, 1988, Wilcox turned his left ankle and 
injured his foot. He immediately went in to see DAVIS without an appointment. 
DAVIS diagnosed him as having a sprained ankle and put on a half splint with ace 
wrapping. For this service DAVIS billed code 90580 (emergency care -
comprehensive service). The service provided was not "emergency care" as 
described in the code. DAVIS also billed codes 29505 (long leg splint) which 
means a thigh to ankle or toes cast, and 99070A (splint and casting material) when 
Wilcox only received a half leg splint with ace wrapping. 
13. On January 16, 1988, Wilcox was experiencing a great deal of 
pain in his ankle. DAVIS1 office had closed, so Wilcox waited until on or about, 
January 18. 1988, when he had an appointment. At that time, DAVIS took off the 
splint, looked at his ankle, put the splint back on and re-wrapped it. DAVIS billed 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois for services rendered to Wilcox on January 18, 
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1988. He billed code 90580 (emergency care - comprehensive service) althouqh 
this was not an "emergency" visit and the services did not reach the 
"comprehensive" level. DAVIS also billed code 73610 (ankle x-rays complete) 
although x-rays were not taken. DAVIS billed codes 29740 (cast wedging) and 
99070 (supplies and material) despite the fact that Wilcox was wearing a splint 
rather than a cast. DAVIS subsequently billed Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois a 
second time on January 29, 1988, for service rendered on January 18, 1989, for 
code 29740 (cast wedging). On the January 22, 1989, claim form Davis diagnosed 
"Fracture-Ankle/Medial Malleolus." On the January 29, 1988, claim form DAVIS 
identified the diagnosis as "Fracture-Fibula". DAVIS then submitted a third bill for 
these same services, minus the charge for case wedging, to Smith Administrators, 
the insurance carrier for Wilcox's wife. This claim form, dated February 29, 1988. 
represents Owen G. Reese as the provider of services, when he was not. 
14. On or about January 22, 1988, Wilcox returned to see DAVIS 
for a follow up visit. DAVIS examined at his ankle and put on a walking cast. For 
this service. DAVIS billed code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive 
service) as well as code 29345 (long leg cast) which is the application of a long leg 
cast, thigh to toes. The services provided did not reach the level of 
"comprehensive" services. Additionally, the service performed was putting on a 
walking cast rather than a long leg cast. 
15. On or about January 29, 1988, DAVIS billed Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield of Illinois code 90060 (established patient - intermediate service) for 
services rendered to Wilcox on January 26, 1988, for "Fracture - Ankle/Medial 
Malleolus". In addition, DAVIS caused another health insurance claim form to be 
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submitted to Smith Administrators on February 29, 1988, for service rendered to 
Wilcox on January 26, 1988, representing Owen G. Reese as the provider of 
services. 
16. On or about February 4, 1988, DAVIS caused a claim form to 
be submitted to Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois for services alleged to have been 
provided to Wilcox on January 30, 1988. DAVIS billed codes 90070 (established 
patient - extended service). Extended was not the level of service received by 
Wilcox. On or about February 22, 1988, DAVIS caused a duplicate claim for the 
alleged January 30, 1988, services to be submitted to Blue Cross/Blue Shield of 
Illinois. 
17. On or about February 3, 1988, Wilcox was dissatisfied with the 
cast and wanted a second opinion. DAVIS instructed Wilcox to come in and he 
would take the cast off and put him in a "Bledsoe Boot". For services rendered on 
February 3, 1988, DAVIS billed code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive 
service) and code 99070K (Bledsoe Boot/Fibula). The only service received by 
Wilcox was the placement of a Bledsoe Boot. DAVIS also billed code 29740 (cast 
wedging) which was not performed. 
18. On or about February 6, 1988, Wilcox returned to see DAVIS for 
follow-up care. For services rendered to Wilcox on February 6, 1988, DAVIS billed 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive 
service) which is not the level of service performed. DAVIS also billed codes 
85021 (complete blood count), 80073 (renal profile), 84132 (potassium and 
electrolytes), 80059 (liver profile) and 85009 (manual differential) which creates 
higher fees because they should be billed as a single panel. 
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19. On or about February 13, 1988, Wilcox received an allergy 
injection from DAVIS. Later, DAVIS billed Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois code 
95T55 (professional services allergies) and code 90080 (established patient -
comprehensive service). A "comprehensive" level of service is not warranted for 
an allergy injection. 
20. On or about March 23, 1988, Davis caused a billing to be 
submitted to Blue Cross/Blue Shield, for services rendered to David Wilcox on 
March 5, 1988. Included in the billing are the following services: Code 90580 
(Emergency Care-Corn), Code 86171 (Strep Screen), Code 85021 (CBC), Code 
85007 (Differential). Code 83715 (lipoprotein), Code 90782 (Injection), Code 9J1850 
Aristocort Injection), and Code 71020 (Chest X-Ray 2 views). A diagnosis of 
pneumonia is given on this date. Wilcox never consulted DAVIS for pneumonia nor 
was this diagnosis ever discussed with him. 
21. On or about December 16, 1987, Bonnie K. Wilcox (Bonnie) 
injured her thumb. Her father, David Wilcox, took her to Family Medical Center 
where she was seen by Dr. Owen G. Reese. DAVIS caused health insurance claim 
forms to be submitted to David Wilcox's Blue Cross/Blue Shield Insurance for 
medical services rendered to Bonnie. Included in billing for services rendered to 
Bonnie on December 16, 1987, DAVIS billed code 90520 (emergency care - new 
patient - comprehensive service). The patient was not seen in an emergency room 
as this code implies. The time spent and services rendered during this visit do not 
justify a "comprehensive" level of service. 
22. On or about December 19, 1987, Bonnie returned to Family 
Medical Center for a re-check of her thumb and was seen by DAVIS. DAVIS billed 
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Blue Cross/Blue Shield code 90080 (comprehensive - established patient). The 
level of services performed was not "comprehensive". DAVIS also billed code 
80053 (executive profile) in addition to codes 85021 (complete blood count), 85009 
(differential manual), 81000 (urinalysis), and 84439 (T-4), although they are all 
included in an "executive profile*. DAVIS also billed code 73130 (hand x-ray 
complete). DAVIS billed code 99070-A (splint and casting materials). The injury 
was not splinted or casted, but was merely taped and wrapped in an ace bandage 
by DAVIS. 
23. On or about December 28, 1987, Bonnie returned for, what her 
mother described as a fol low-up visit regarding her thumb fracture and was billed 
code 90080 (comprehensive - established patient). A "comprehensive" level of 
service was not performed. The billing form lists "hepatitis" as a diagnosis, 
although this diagnosis was never discussed with the patient's family. DAVIS also 
billed codes 82948 (blood sugar), 85021 (complete blood count). 85009 (differential 
manual). 80073 (renal profile), and 80059 (liver profile) which results in higher fees 
because they should be rebundled. DAVIS also billed code 73130 (hand x-ray 
complete). 
24. For services rendered to Bonnie on January 13, 1988. DAVIS 
again billed code 73130 (hand x-ray complete). In all, four complete hand x-rays 
were taken within one month for the thumb injury. He also billed code 90080 
(comprehensive - established patient) although a "comprehensive" level of service 
was not rendered. DAVIS billed codes 80059 (liver profile), 85009 (differential 
manual), 85021 (complete blood count), and 84132 (potassium and electrolytes) 
exacting higher fees when they should have been rebundled. 
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25. On or about January 16, 1988, Bonnie again returned for a 
fol low-up concerning the healing of her broken thumb. DAVIS billed 90080 
(comprehensive - established patient) which was not the level of service-provided. 
DAVIS also billed codes 85009 (differential manual) and 85021 (complete blood 
count) exacting higher fees because they can be rebundled. 
26. On or about January 28, 1988, Bonnie returned to have her 
thumb re-checked. While there her mother asked DAVIS about a rash on Bonnie's 
feet. DAVIS suggested that Bonnie stop taking sulpha pills he had prescribed the 
previous week for a urinary infection. She did and the rash went away. DAVIS 
caused a health insurance claim form in his own name, dated January 29, 1988, to 
be submitted to Blue Cross/Blue Shield charging codes 86422 (allergy panel -
RAST), 36415 (blood draw) and 99070 (allergy desensitization) for the January 28, 
1988, visit, although these tests were without her knowledge. 
27. DAVIS caused a health insurance claim form to be submitted to 
Smith Administrators, dated January 29, 1988, in the name of Owen G. Reese 
charging the same three codes for the same January 28, 1988, visit. DAVIS listed 
the diagnosis as "allergic reaction". The mother, however, says she only went in to 
get Bonnie's thumb examined. 
28. On or about January 30, 1988, DAVIS billed code 90080 
(comprehensive - established patient) after seeing Bonnie for another follow-up 
visit relative to the progress of her thumb's healing. The "comprehensive" level of 
service was not provided. DAVIS also billed 85021 (complete blood count) and 




29. On or about January 12, 1988, Glorame Rose Wilcox (Glorame) 
went in to see DAVIS because she had an ear infection. DAVIS drew blood for a 
pregnancy test, which she requested, and for allergy tests, which she did* not 
request. She told DAVIS she had allergy testing done by another doctor, but 
DAVIS said he would have to run them again. DAVIS looked into her ears and 
gave her a prescription for self-administered drops. For this service DAVIS billed 
Smith Administrators, Gloraine's insurance carrier, code 90020 (comprehensive -
new patient). The description of the visit by Gloraine does not support the 
characterization of a "comprehensive" evaluation. DAVIS also billed code 80053 
(executive profile) and in addition, codes 81000 (urinalysis), 85009 (differential 
manual). 85021 (complete blood count), 84439 (T-4). Codes 81000. 85009. 85021 
and 84439 are included in an executive profile (code 80053). Gloraine does not 
recall receiving a urinalysis (code 81000) or an arthritis panel (code 80072), 
although these billings are listed. The diagnoses of amenorrhea, and asthma, 
shown on the billing form, do not correlate with the patient's statement that the 
reason for the visit was an earache. These diagnoses were not discussed with the 
patient. 
30. On or about January 15, 1988, Gloraine returned to see DAVIS. 
He drew blood, pushed on her face, and took x-rays of her skull so he could see 
how much it was infected. Additionally he gave her a prescription for Keflex to 
combat her sinus infection and told her to stay home from work for three days. 
DAVIS then billed Gloraine's husband's insurance company Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 
code 90080 (comprehensive-est. patient). DAVIS also billed codes 85009 
(differential manual), 85021 (complete blood count), and 80059 (liver profile) which 
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exacts higher fees because they can all be combined into a common panel, CBC 
and multichannel chemistry. 
31. On or about Monday, January 18, 1988, Gloraine accompanied 
her husband to DAVIS' office while he received medical services. She had no 
appointment and received no services, however, DAVIS billed her husbands 
insurance company, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois, codes 90070 (established 
patient - extended service), 85009 (differential manual) and 85021 (complete blood 
count) for services ostensibly rendered to Gloraine. 
32. DAVIS billed Gloraine's insurance company, Smith 
Administrators, for medical services rendered on February 1, 1988, although. 
Gloraine did not receive medical services from DAVIS on this date. DAVIS billed 
code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service). DAVIS also billed code 
86171 "(strep screen)", code 85021 (complete blood count) and code 85009 
(differential manual). DAVIS caused these billings to be submitted to Smith 
Administrators identifying Owen G. Reese as the provider of services, although 
Reese did not provide services for Gloraine. 
33. DAVIS billed Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois code 90080 
(established patient - comprehensive service) for medical services provided to 
Gloraine on or about February 3, 1989. She did not visit DAVIS on this date. 
DAVIS also billed codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85009 (manual 
differential) on this date. 
34. DAVIS billed Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois code 90060 
(established patient - intermediate service) for medical services ostensibly 
received by Gloraine on or about February 23. 1988. She did not receive any 
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medical services on this date. Owen G. Reese is shown as the provider of 
services and his signature has been written on the billing. 
35. On or about January 13, 1988, Carla Gay Jacobson thought 
she had pneumonia and consulted DAVIS. Jacobson had health insurance through 
Republic Self Insured (Republic), administered by John Hancock Insurance, which 
was the company DAVIS billed for his services. For services rendered to 
Jacobson on January 13, 1988, DAVIS billed code 80053 (executive profile) and in 
addition billed separately code 84439 (T-4), 85009 (differential - manual), 85021 
(complete blood count), and 81000 (urinalysis) which are included in an executive 
profile (Code 80053). DAVIS billed code 90020 (comprehensive - new patient) 
when the level of service provided was less than a "comprehensive" evaluation. 
DAVIS also billed code 86171 "(strep screen)" which resulted in a higher fee than if 
the proper code used. 
36. On or about January 16, 1988, Jacobson returned for a follow-
up visit. DAVIS later billed code 90080 (comprehensive - established patient) 
which was not the level of service provided. DAVIS billed code 85009 (differential 
manual) and code 85021 (complete blood count) exacting higher fees when both 
should be rebundled. 
37. On January 30, 1988, DAVIS billed code 90080 
(comprehensive - established patient), although the return follow-up visit services 
did not warrant this level of evaluation. DAVIS also billed code 85021 (complete 
blood count) and code 85009 (differential manual) which results in higher fees 
because they should be rebundled. 
000047 
- 1 3 -
38. Diagnoses shown by DAVIS on the claim forms for Jacobson 
include pneumonia, melena, angina, anemia, sinusitis, and ulcerative colitis. DAVIS 
dicKnot discuss these diagnoses with Jacobson. The patient consulted another 
physician on March 16, 1988, and was informed she had neither anemia or 
ulcerative colitis. 
39. During 1987, Janice Lynn Cisneros experienced sharp pains in 
her lower abdomen. On one occasion she visited the emergency room at a local 
clinic. The doctor thought she might possibly have an ovarian cyst and advised 
her to consult an obstetrician/gynecologist. Her mother called Family Medical 
Center and asked if they had a gynecologist. She was told that they did and that 
an appointment would be set up with one of them. On or about January 29. 1988 
Janice saw DAVIS, explaining that she had seen a regular doctor who 
recommended she consult a gynecologist. She conveyed to DAVIS her 
assumption that he was a gynecology specialist and the necessity that she visit a 
specialist. DAVIS did not tell her he was not a gynecologist. 
40. Cisneros had health insurance coverage through Gem State 
Mutual of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah, which was the company DAVIS billed for his 
services. DAVIS also furnished copies of his records to Gem State for their 
evaluation of his claims. On or about January 29, 1988, DAVIS billed Gem State 
code 90020.52 (new patient - comprehensive) for services rendered to Cisneros, 
although it is clear from the records that this level of service was not rendered. 
DAVIS also billed code 80053.52 (executive profile) and codes 81000 (urinalysis). 
85021 (complete blood count) 85009 (differential manual) and 84439 (T-4). Codes 
81000, 85021. 85009 and 84439 are all included in an executive profile (80053.52) 
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Additionally, the patient records for Cisneros provided to Gem State by DAVIS do 
not document an executive profile. Instead, they show a CBC with differential 
(code 85022) and a dip stick urinalysis (code 81002). The billing resulted 7h higher 
fees than what would have been paid had the actual services been billed. 
41 . On or about February 2, 1988, Cisneros returned to see DAVIS 
for fol low-up care. DAVIS later billed code 90070.52 (established patient -
extended service). The exam described in the records provided to Gem State do 
not reach the 90070 level of service. DAVIS billed codes 85021 (complete blood 
count) and 85009 (differential manual) which exacts higher fees because they can 
be rebundled. DAVIS also billed code 81000 (urinalysis) when a code 81002 (dip 
stick urinalysis) is documented. 
42. On or about February 1, 1988, Kenneth Dean Wallace had a 
cold and thought his two children had strep throats. He made an appointment with 
Family Medical Center and took his wife and two children with him. Wallace had 
health insurance coverage through James Benefits, Salt Lake City, Utah, which is 
the company DAVIS billed for his services. DAVIS took throat cultures from all four 
members of the family and billed code 86171 (strep screen) for each. This is 
actually the code for a complement fixation test and exacts higher fees than if the 
proper code had been billed. 
43. For services rendered to Wallace on February 1, 1988, DAVIS 
billed code 80053.52 (executive profile) and m addition he billed codes 85021 
(complete blood count), 85009 (differential manual), 84439 (t-4) and 81000 
(urinalysis) which are all included in an executive profile (80053.52). 
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44. Wallace had made follow-up appointments with DAVIS for 
himself and his children for February 3, 1988, but missed it because they were 
feeling better. Davis's office then called and advised that it was important they 
return for their follow-up visit. Wallace was informed a previous urinalysis had 
shown sugar in Wallace's urine and additional tests were necessary to determine if 
he had diabetes. 
45. On or about February 4, 1988. Wallace returned to see DAVIS. 
Urine and blood were again drawn and tested. Wallace was told by DAVIS that he 
had a urinary tract infection and was prescribed antibiotics, although Wallace says 
he had not been suffering any symptoms of urinary tract infection. DAVIS billed 
codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85009 (differential manual) which results 
in higher fees because they can be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with 
differential). 
46. On or about February 9, 1988. Wallace returned to DAVIS' 
office for a follow up visit. DAVIS billed code 80059 (liver profile) in addition to 
codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (differential manual) resulting in 
higher fees because these can be combined with an 80059 into a common panel 
or can be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with differential). DAVIS rendered 
diagnoses of pyelonephritis, mononucleosis, and cystitis which does not correlate 
with Wallace's stated symptoms of a cold with no pain or significant problems. 
DAVIS did not discuss these diagnoses with Wallace. 
47. On the February 1, 1988, visit to DAVIS, a blood sample was 
obtained from Debbie Wallace (Ms. Wallace) by use of a finger prick. DAVIS took a 
throat culture from her, had one of his nurses take x-rays of her headt and gave 
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her a shot of penicillin. For these services, DAVIS billed code 90517.52 
(emergency care - extended service) which is not the level of service provided 
DAVIS also billed 85021 ( complete blood count) and 85009 (manual differential) 
which exacts higher fees as they can be rebundled. 
48. On or about February 9, 1988, Ms. Wallace accompanied her 
husband to see DAVIS, after an employee of DAVIS' asked her to return to see if 
she had caught her husband's urinary infection. They drew blood from Ms. 
Wallace, but DAVIS did not examine her. DAVIS said it wasnt necessary because 
the type of infection Kenneth had was not transferrable. Even though DAVIS spent 
very little time with Ms. Wallace, he billed code 90070.52 (established patient -
extended service). 
49. On or about February 22. 1988, to February 29, 1988. DAVIS 
caused eight (8) health insurance claim forms to be submitted to Wallace's health 
insurance carrier, James Benefits, Salt Lake City, Utah. These claim forms 
represented medical services rendered to the Wallace family as having been 
provided by Dr. Owen G. Reese, when they were provided by DAVIS. 
50. On or about February 8, 1988, Carol Ann Osier called the 
Family Medical Center and asked if she could bring in her son, Justin Clay 
Chesnut, who had symptoms of a common cold and the flu. DAVIS examined 
Justin's ears, nose, throat, chest and breathing. He ordered chest x-rays and had 
a nurse draw blood. DAVIS took a strep culture and told Osier the baby didn't 
have strep or ear infection but that the x-ray indicated there was something in his 
lungs. DAVIS had Justin given a penicillin shot and a prescription for an antibiotic. 
For services rendered to Justin on February 8, 1988, DAVIS subsequently billed 
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Osier's health insurance earner. Southland Life Insurance, Dallas, Texas, code 
90520.52 (emergency care - comprehensive service). "Comprehensive" is not the 
level of services provided to Justin. In addition DAVIS billed codes 85009 
(differentia! manual) and 85021 (complete blood count) resulting in higher fees 
because they can be rebundled to code 85022 (complete blood count with 
differential). DAVIS also billed code 86171 for a "strep screen". Code 86171 is 
the code for a complement fixation test and results in a higher fee than if the 
proper code is used. 
51. On or about February 10. 1988. Osier took Justin back to see 
DAVIS for a follow-up visit. Blood was drawn and another chest x-ray taken. The 
visit took approximately 5 minutes. As a result of services rendered to Justin on 
February 10, 1988, DAVIS billed code 90570.52 (emergency care - extended 
service). The level of service provided was neither "emergency" nor "extended". 
DAVIS also billed codes 85009 (differential manual) and 85021 (complete blood 
count) resulting in inflated fees Because they can be rebundled to code 85022 
(complete blood count with differential). 
52. On or about February 12. 1938. Osier returned to Family 
Medical Center with Justin. Justin had improved but Osier was sick with the same 
symptoms. Justin had an appointment, and Osier asked if DAVIS could see her as 
well. Both Osier and Justin went into the examining room. DAVIS spent no more 
than a few seconds with Justin and then examined Osier. He then billed for 
services provided to both patients. For services rendered Justin on this visit. 
DAVIS billed Osier's insurance company code 90080 (established patient -
comprehensive service). The level of service provided does not justify the 
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"comprehensive" coding. DAVIS also billed codes 85021 (complete blood count) 
and 85009 (differential manual) resulting in inflated fees because they can be 
rebundled to code 85022 (complete blood count with differential). 
53 On or about February 22, 1938, DAVIS caused health insurance 
claim forms to be submitted to Osier's health insurance carrier, Southland Life 
Insurance, Dallas, Texas, representing the provider of services to Justin on 
February 8, 1988, February 10, 1988 and February 12, 1988 as Dr. Owen G. 
Reese, who did not provide these services. 
54. As stated in paragraph 52.. on or about February 12, 1988, while 
at Family Medical Center with her son, Carol Ann Osier asked if DAVIS could see 
her also. DAVIS examined her ears, nose, throat, and said he wanted to run a few 
tests. They drew blood, requested a urine sample and took chest x-rays. DAVIS 
returned and told her she had a urinary tract infection. For this visit, DAVIS 
subsequently billed Osier's health insurance carrier code 90520 (emergency care -
new patient - comprehensive service). Neither "emergency" nor "comprehensive'' 
service was provided by DAVIS. DAVIS also billed code 81000 (urinalysis) although 
the service provided was 81002 (urinalysis routine without microscope). Code 
85009 (manual differential) was also billed by DAVIS for this visit when no 
differential count was done. He also billed code 87088 (urine culture), although no 
genitourinary symptoms were complained of. DAVIS billed codes 81000 
(urinalysis), 85021 (complete blood count), 85009 (manual differential), and 84439 
(T-4) in addition to code 80053 (executive profile). All of these tests are 
represented in an executive profile. DAVIS billed code 71020 (chest x-ray - 2 
views), although no chest x-ray report appears in the medical record. 
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55. The health insurance claim forms submitted to Osier's health 
insurance carrier identify Dr. Owen G. Reese as the provider on February 12, 1988. 
however, Osier never saw Dr. Reese. 
56. On or about February 9, 1988, Claudia B. Gibbins visited DAVIS 
at Family Medical Center and was treated by DAVIS. Gibbins was taken to an 
examination room where an assistant drew blood, took blood pressure, 
temperature, and obtained a urine sample. DAVIS came in and took a strep 
culture. DAVIS insisted Gibbins have an x-ray and an EKG. DAVIS informed 
Gibbins her strep test was positive, gave her two prescriptions and instructed her 
to make another appointment in two or three days. As a consequence of services 
rendered to Gibbons on February 9, 1988, DAVIS billed Gibbins' health insurance 
carrier, Southland Life Insurance, code 90020 (new patient - comprehensive 
service). ''Comprehensive" was not the level of service provided. 
57. For services ostensibly rendered to Gibbins on or about February 
9, 1988, DAVIS billed Southland for services which were not performed. DAVIS 
billed code 86171 "(strep screen)" although the test described in the records and 
by the patient is code 87082 "(culture)". DAVIS billed code 81000 (urinalysis), 
although records submitted to Southland by DAVIS report a dipstick urine without 
microscope, which is a code 81002 (urinalysis routine). DAVIS also billed Code 
80053 (executive profile), Codes 84439 (T-4) and 86008 (cold agglutinins), 
however, no lab results are noted in the records submitted by DAVIS for February 
9, 1988. DAVIS billed code 71020 (chest x-ray 2 views), however, no chest x-ray 
report appears in the records for this date. DAVIS also billed codes 85009 (manual 
differential) and 85021 (complete blood count) which results in higher fees because 
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they can be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with differential). DAVIS reported a 
diagnosis of pneumonia and angina, although there is little or no support for these 
diagnoses, based on the records. The health insurance claim forms submitted by 
DAVIS to Southland for services DAVIS rendered to Gibbins on February 9, 1988 
represent Owen G. Reese as the provider of services. 
58. On or about February 12, 1988, Gibbins returned to see DAVIS 
for a fol low-up appointment. As a consequence of services rendered to Gibbins. 
DAVIS billed code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service). No 
"comprehensive" services were described by Gibbins or contained in the typed 
records DAVIS furnished to Southland. DAVIS performed and billed code 93015 
(treadmill stress test), although Gibbins had no cardiac complaints and had a 
normal EKG on February 9, 1988. The following services were billed for but not 
performed on February 12, 1988: Code 81000 (urinalysis) - a dip stick urine 
without microscope was actually performed. Code 85009 (manual differential) was 
billed, however, no differential was done because no slide accompanied the 
sample. Code 71020 (chest x-ray 2 views), however, no chest x-ray report was 
included in the records submitted to Southland by DAVIS. A diagnoses of 
"hematuria" is based on a dipstick result which reported large quantities of blood 
in the urine of February 9, 1988. This was not confirmed by microscopic 
evaluation. The health insurance claim forms submitted by DAVIS for services he 
rendered to Gibbins on February 12, 1988 represent Owen G. Reese as the 
provider. 
59. On or about February 16, 1988, Gibbins returned to see DAVIS as 
instructed. DAVIS billed code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive 
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service), however "comprehensive" services are not described in the records 
submitted to Southland by DAVIS. DAVIS also billed codes 85021 (complete blood 
count) and 85009 (manual differential) which results in inflated costs because they 
can be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with differential). DAVIS billed code 80085 
(microcytic anemia panel) which was not reported on this date in the patient 
records submitted to Southland. The diagnosis of hyperthyroidism made by DAVIS 
on February 16. 1988, is not borne out by the laboratory results obtained. The 
health insurance claim forms submitted by DAVIS for services he rendered to 
Gibbins on February 16, 1988, represent Owen G. Reese as the provider. 
60. On or about March 30, 1988. Gibbins became sick again and 
went back to see DAVIS. As a result of services rendered. DAVIS billed Southland, 
code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service.) The records, however, 
do not reflect "comprehensive" services. DAVIS also billed code 71020 (chest x -
ray 2 views) although no chest x-ray report is noted in ttle records provided. 
DAVIS billed code 86171 "(strep screen)" which is the code for a complement 
fixation test and results in a higher fee than if the proper code is used. DAVIS also 
billed codes 85007 (manual differential) and 85021 (complete blood count) resulting 
in higher fees as they can be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with differential). 
DAVIS made a diagnosis of "allergic reaction" on March 30, 1988, but the 
diagnoses is not borne out by the records submitted. The health insurance claim 
forms submitted id for services rendered to Gibbins on March 
30, 1988 represent Owen G. Reese as the provider. 
61. On or about April 4, 1988, Gibbins returned to DAVIS for a 
follow-up visit. As a result of services rendered to Gibbs illed 
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Southland code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service) A lower 
level of service is described in the records DAVIS billed codes 85021 (complete 
blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) which exacts higher fees because 
they can be rebundled to code 80522 (CBC with differential) DAVIS also billed 
code 71020 (chest x-ray 2 views) when no chest x-ray report appears in the 
records he submitted to Southland. The health insurance claim forms submitted 
by DAVIS for services he rendered to Gibbms on April 4, 1988, represent Owen G 
Reese as the provider 
62 On or about April 27, 1988, Gibbms returned to Family Medical 
Center to see DAVIS DAVIS spent only a few minutes in the examining room and 
Gibbons was given an allergy shot As a result of services rendered to Gibbms 
DAVIS billed Southland code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service) 
The records do not reflect any service as having been performed by DAVIS. 
DAVIS also billed code 36415 (blood draw) 85021 (complete blood count), 85007 
(manual differential) and 80085 (microcytic anemia panel) None of these tests 
were performed The health insurance claim forms submitted by DAVIS for 
services rendered to Gibbms on April 27, 1988 represent Owen G Reese as the 
provider. 
63 On or about May 11,1988, May 1 3, 1988, M ay 16, 1988 and May 
19, 1988, Gibbms returni i to f irmly Medical Center irnl rpcvivprl ilfpiqpn "li is 
from a nurse. Although she never saw DAVIS again, DAVIS submitted health 
insurance claim forms to Southland Life Insurance Company charging code 95155 
(Professional services alter) with a diagnostic code of 995 3 "allergic reaction" on 
each occasion On each of these claim forms, DAVIS also represents these 
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services were provided by Owen G. Reese. The claim form for services rendered 
on May 16, 1988, and May 19, 1988, were submitted and ostensibly signed by 
Owen G. Reese on May 23, 1988, when in fact Reese left Family Medical-Center 
on May 18, 1988. 
64. On or about May 23, 1988, Gibbins returned to Family Medical 
Center to receive an allergen shot. DAVIS submitted a claim form to Southland. 
dated July 28, 1988, misrepresenting services rendered by billing code 90060 
(established patient - intermediate service) and 95125.52 (Professional services 
allergy). Gibbins did not see a physician and was in the office less than 5 minutes. 
DAVIS further represented the service was provided by Taira Fukushima although 
Fukushima was not working foi DAVIS in May. 1988. 
65. On or about March 5, 1988. Sharon Wil lette (Willette) took her 
t h r e e - y e a r - o l d daughter , Jamie, to Family Medical Center where she was seen by 
DAVIS. DAVIS took an x i ay, blood test and did a strep ci ilti n e I ie d iagnosed 
bronchial pneumonia and prescr ibed Augment in , an antibiotic. Jamie threw up 
each t ime she was given the medication and Wil lette discont inued its use. She 
took Jamie back to see DAVIS on March 7, 1988. DAVIS again ran a blood test 
and gave her a sample car ton of Septra which he instructed her to give Jamie 
together wi th the Augment in . The next morning (March 8, 1988), Wil lette took 
Jamie to a pediatr ician w h o told her Jamie did not have bronchial pneumonia. As a 
result of services i e i i ci e i e ci t c: I a i i i i e c • i i March 5. 1988, a i i d c i i 11 t e f o 11 o r* i i p v is i t 
on March 7, 1988, DAVIS billed Willette codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 
85009 (manual differential) resulting in higher fees because they should be 
rebundled to code 85022 (CBC < \ II differential). 
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1988, DAVIS billed Blevins' insurance carrier, Pacific Heritage Administration, Inc., 
Portland, Oregon, code 80053 (executive profile) as well as codes 85021 (complete 
blood count), 85007 (manual differential) and 84439 (T-4) although codesL85021, 
85007 and 84439 are included in an executive profile (code 80053). DAVIS also 
billed code 86171 "(strep screen)" which is the code for a complement fixation test 
and results in a higher fee than if the proper code is used. DAVIS caused health 
insurance claim forms to be submitted to Pacific Heritage Administration, Inc., 
representing services were provided on April 14, 1988, by Owen G. Reese, when 
they were not. 
71. On or about April 19, 1988, Blevins returned to Family Medical 
Center for a follow-up visit as instructed. As a consequence of services rendered 
to Blevins on April 19, 1988, DAVIS billed code 90080 (established patient -
comprehensive service). The patient did not receive this level of service. DAVIS 
billed code 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) which 
exacts higher fees because these can be rebundled as code 85022 (CBC with 
differential). DAVIS also charged code 93262 (24-hour holter monitor) which was 
not received by the patient. 
72. On or about April 22, 1988, Blevins returned to Family Medical 
Center to have her cholesterol checked. DAVIS billed code 90060 (established 
patient - intermediate service). "Intermediate" was not the level of service 
performed. 
73. On or about May 16, 1988, Blevins called DAVIS' office to ask 
DAVIS about a prescription. Blevins spoke with an assistant who represented that 
DAVIS agreed to call in the prescription. DAVIS thereafter caused a health 
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insurance claim form to be submitted to Pacific Heritage Administration, Inc. billing 
code 90050 (established patient - limited service). DAVIS also represented the 
sefvices rendered to Blevins on April 22, 1988 and May 16, 1988, as having been 
provided by Owen G. Reese, when they were not. 
74. On or about April 23, 1988, Blevins took her son, Martin, to see 
DAVIS for what she thought was a strep throat In connection with services 
rendered to Martin on April 23, 1988, DAVIS billed Smith Administrators, Murray. 
Utah code 86171 (strep screen). This code is incorrect for a strep screen and 
exacts higher fees than if the proper code is used. DAVIS also billed codes 85021 
(complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) which results in inflated 
fees because these should be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with differential). On 
the claim form submitted to Smith Administrators, DAVIS represented the services 
as having been provided by Owen G. Reese, when in fact they were provided by 
DAVIS. 
75. On or about April 21, 1988, Mildred Marie Martin cut her thumb 
and consulted DAVIS. DAVIS sutured her thumb and subsequently billed Martin's 
insurance company, Smith Administrators, codes 90517.52 (emergency care -
extended service) and 13132 (laceration repair - complex). 905 codes are 
designated for use in hospital emergency rooms. Code 13132 should include the 
cost of the office visit. Additionally, the procedures the patient described would 
not fall in the category of code 13132. 
76. During the course of suturing Martin's thumb on April 21, 1988 
DAVIS indicated he wanted to purchase a motorhome. Martin told him she had a 
motorhome for sale and DAVIS expressed an interest in it. On or about April 25. 
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1988, Martin drove her motorhome to DAVIS' office so DAVIS could drive it. She 
arrived early and waited in his office 10 to 15 minutes before he came out and 
toek the motorhome for a drive. DAVIS subsequently billed Smith Administrators, 
code 90060 (established patient - intermediate service) for services ostensibly 
rendered to Martin on April 25, 1988. DAVIS recorded "hiatal hernia" as the 
diagnosis for the alleged visit. Martin has never consulted DAVIS for a "hiatal 
hernia", nor has he discussed this diagnosis with her. DAVIS caused the claim 
form to be submitted representing Owen G. Reese as the provider of services. 
77. On or about May 16, 1988, Martin experienced a bladder infection 
and returned to see DAVIS. DAVIS did not see Martin, but instructed one of his 
assistants to obtain a urine specimen. Martin was unable to void urine and left the 
office without being seen by DAVIS. DAVIS subsequently billed Martin's health 
insurance carrier, Smith Administrators, Murray, Utah, code 90070 (established 
patient - extended service), 81000 (urinalysis), 85021 (complete blood count), 
85007 (manual differential) and 87088 (urine culture). DAVIS did not examine 
Martin on May 16. 1988 and she did not provide either blood or urine on that date 
DAVIS caused the claim form to be submitted representing Owen G. Reese as the 
provider of services. 
78. On or about April 22, 1988, Cary Wayne Patterson jarred his 
back. He sought treatment at Family Medical Center and was seen by DAVIS on 
April 25, 1988. As a result of services rendered to Patterson on April 25, 1988, 
DAVIS billed Patterson's health insurance carrier, U.B.I.T., Salt Lake City, Utah, 
code 90520.52 (emergency care - comprehensive services.) Patterson was not 
treated on an "emergency" basis, nor do the services reach the "comprehensive 
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level. The claim form submitted to U.B.I.T., Salt Lake City, Utah, by DAVIS also 
represented the services were provided by Owen G. Reese, when they were not. 
79. On or about April 25, 1988, Donald W. Stump sought services at 
Family Medical Center because he had a sore throat and was not feeling well. He 
was seen by Dr. Owen G. Reese. As a result of services rendered by Reese to 
Stump on April 25, 1988, DAVIS billed Gem State Mutual of Utah, Salt Lake City, 
Utah code 90017.52 (new patient - extended service), while the records of Owen 
G. Reese submitted by DAVIS to Gem State for evaluation show that this level of 
service was not given. Code 86171 (strep screen) was also billed. This is the 
code for a complement fixation test and results in a higher fee than if the proper 
code is used. Code 80053.52 (executive profile) was billed as well as codes 
85021 (complete blood count), 85007 (manual differential), and 84439 (T-4) 
although codes 85021, 85007 and 84439 are included in an 80053.52. 
80. On or about May 14, 1988, Stump returned to Family Medical 
Center for a follow-up visit, because DAVIS' office staff had represented to him 
that abnormal laboratory results were found on his first visit. As a consequence of 
services rendered to Stump on May 14, 1988, DAVIS billed Gem State code 90080 
(established patient - comprehensive service). This was not the level of service 
provided by DAVIS. The only service performed was the drawing of some blood. 
DAVIS billed codes 84132 (potassium and electrolytes), 82948 (blood sugar), and 
80059 (liver profile), which exacts higher fees because potassium, electrolytes, 
sugar, and liver profiles can all be combined into a single multi-channel chemistry 
code. DAVIS caused health insurance claim forms to be submitted to Gem State 
Mutual of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah, representing these services were provided by 
Owen G. Reese, when they were not. 
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81. On or about May 18, 1988, Mr. Stump accompanied his wife, 
Ester F. Stump (Ms. Stump) for a follow-up visit to see DAVIS because she was 
nojt feeling well. Stump mentioned that he was having trouble with impotgncy and 
DAVIS suggested they try a hormone shot. At this time, DAVIS gave Stump a 
hormone shot without examining him, and billed code 90060 (established patient -
intermediate service). Stump did not receive any service other than the shot. 
DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Gem State Mutual of Utah, Salt 
Lake City. Utah, representing these services were provided by Owen G. Reese, 
when they were not. 
82. On or about June 1, 1988. Stump returned to Family Medical 
Center for a hormone shot. Stump walked in. got the shot and left. DAVIS billed 
code 90060.52 (established patient - intermediate service). DAVIS caused the 
claim form to be submitted to Gem State Mutual of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
representing the services were provided by Owen G. Reese, when they were not. 
83. On or about April 25, 1988, Ms. Stump went to Family Medical 
Center for treatment of a strep throat and bronchitis. As a result of services 
rendered to Ms. Stump on April 25, 1988, DAVIS billed Gem State Mutual of Utah. 
Salt Lake City. Utah code 90020.52 (new patient - comprehensive service). 
Records submitted to Gem State by DAVIS for evaluation indicate that a lower 
level of service was provided. DAVIS billed code 86171 (strep screen) which 
results in higher fees than if the proper code is used. DAVIS billed code 80053.52 
(executive profile) and in addition he billed codes 85021 (complete blood count). 
85007 (manual differential) and 84439 (T-4) although codes 85021, 85007 and 
84439 are included in an 80053.52. DAVIS also billed code 71020 (chest x-ray 2 
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views), however, no chest x-ray report is found in the records DAVIS submitted to 
Gem State. DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Gem State Mutual of 
Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah representing these services were provided by Owen G. 
Reese, when they were not. 
84. On or about May 14, 1988, Ms. Stump returned to Family Medical 
Center because DAVIS' nurse had called and informed her there were problems 
with her tests and they needed to run more. DAVIS had his staff draw blood and 
take chest x-rays. In connection with services rendered to Ms. Stump on May 14, 
1988. DAVIS billed Gem State code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive 
service). The records and patient describe a lower level of service. DAVIS billed 
codes 82948 (blood sugar). 80073 (renal profile), and 80059 (liver profile) creating 
inflated fees because these can be combined into a simple multi-channel 
chemistry. DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Gem State Mutual of 
Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah representing services were provided by Owen G. Reese, 
when they were not. 
85. On or about May 18f 1988, Ms. Stump returned to see DAVIS 
after he contacted her and insisted he needed to check her blood again. As a 
result of services rendered to Ms. Stump on May 18. 1988, DAVIS billed Gem 
State code 94010.52 (pulmonary functions), however, pulmonary function tests 
were not done. DAVIS also billed codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 
(manual differential) resulting in inflated fees because they can be rebundled. 
DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Gem State Mutual of Utah, Salt 
Lake City, Utah representing these services were provided by Owen G. Reese, 
when they were not. The signature of Owen G. Reese on the claim forms is dated 
May 23, 1988, when in fact Reese left Family Medical Center on May 18, 1988. 
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86. On or about April 26. 1988, Connie J. Halcom's (Ms. Halcom) 
daughter, Bre, sustained a laceration on the top of her head. Ms. Halcom took her 
to-Family Medical Center during regular office hours where the assistants' cleaned 
and deadened the wound. DAVIS sutured the wound with stitches and told her to 
return in a week to have the stitches taken out. DAVIS billed Alta Health 
Strategies, Inc. (Alta), West Valley City, Utah, codes 90515.52 (emergency care -
intermediate service) and 13121 (laceration repair 2). The office visit and laceration 
repair are both covered by billing code 13121. The use of a code 905 is reserved 
for use in hospital emergency rooms. Code 13121 describes a complicated wound 
closure. DAVIS billed code 70250 (skull x-ray 1-3 views) although skull x-rays are 
not required for simple scalp lacerations. DAVIS caused health insurance claim 
forms to be submitted to Alta representing services were provided by Owen G. 
Reese, when they were not. 
87. On or about May 5, 1988, Bre returned to see DAVIS to have the 
stitches removed. For this service, DAVIS billed Alta codes 90060.52 (established 
patient - intermediate service) and 99070G (sterile surgical kit). Removal of 
stitches does not require "intermediate service" and a sterile surgical kit is not 
needed to remove stitches. A diagnosis of "cellulites" was rendered by DAVIS 
during this visit, although there is no clear basis for this diagnosis and the 
diagnosis was not discussed with the family. DAVIS caused a claim form to be 
submitted to Alta representing Owen G. Reese as the provider of these services, 
when in fact they were provided by DAVIS. 
88. On or about April 26, 1988, while at Family Medical Center with 
his daughter, Bre, James R. Halcom (James), decided to have an x-ray taken of 
0GC0G7 
- 33 -
his finger which he had injured a few weeks earlier. DAVIS billed Alta code 
90580.52 (emergency care - established patient - comprehensive service). The 
use of a 905 emergency room code is for use in a hospital emergency room. In 
addition the services provided did not reach the "comprehensive" level billed. 
DAVIS also billed code 99070 (supplies and materials) when supplies and materia's 
were not provided. DAVIS caused a claim form to be submitted to Alta 
representing Owen G. Reese as the provider of services, when in fact they were 
provided by DAVIS. 
89. Michelle Halcom hurt her shoulder and her mother called Family 
Medical Center and made an appointment with DAVIS for on or about June 10, 
1988. during regular business hours. DAVIS billed Alta code 90517.52 (emergency 
care - new patient - extended service). The 905 code is designated for use in 
hospital emergency rooms. DAVIS also billed code 90070A (splint and casting 
material), although only a cloth sling was provided. DAVIS caused a claim form to 
be submitted to Alta representing these services were rendered by Owen G. 
Reese, when they were not. 
90. On or about May 2, 1988, Ms. Halcom consulted DAVIS for 
treatment of a ganglion cyst on her left wrist. As a result of services rendered to 
Ms. Halcom on May 2, 1988, DAVIS billed Alta codes 85021 (complete blood count) 
and 85007 (manual differential). Charging these codes exacts higher fees because 
they should be combined into code 85022 (CBC with differential). DAVIS also 
billed code 20550 (trigger point injection) in addition to code 9J0810 (cortisone 
injection). Ms. Halcom claims no trigger point injection was administered. DAVIS 
caused a claim form to be submitted to Alta representing Owen G. Reese as the 
provider of services, when he was not. 
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91. On or about May 5, 1988, Ms. Halcom returned to see DAVIS for 
treatment of her ganglion cyst. In connection with this service, DAVIS billed Aita 
code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service.) The visit lasted 
approximately 5 minutes and consisted of a cortisone injection. DAVIS also billed 
codes 80053.52 (executive profile) as well as codes 84439 (T-4), and 81000 
(urinalysis). Codes 84439 and 81000 are included in an executive profile (code 
80053.52). DAVIS billed code 9J0810 (cortisone injection) and 20550 (trigger point 
injection), although only a cortisone injection was provided on this date. DAVIS 
caused claim forms to be submitted to Alta representing Owen G. Reese as the 
provider of services, when he was not. 
92. DAVIS billed Alta code 90070 (established patient - extended 
service) for services rendered to Ms. Halcom on May 13, 1988. The patient 
describes the visit as no more than five minutes. "Extended" was not the level of 
service provided. DAVIS also billed code 90060 (established patient - intermediate 
service) for services rendered to Ms. Halcom on May 20, 1988. and again on June 
2. 1988. although the patient describes the visits as no more than five minutes 
each. DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Alta representing Owen G. 
Reese as the provider of services on May 13. 1988, May 20. 1988 and June 2. 
1988, however, Reese left Family Medical Center on May 18, 1988. 
93. On or about May 5, 1988, Ms. Halcom took her daughter, Jaylene 
Hardman, to DAVIS because Jaylene was on Ritalin therapy and required a 
physician evaluation. DAVIS gave Jaylene a physical examination, found two warts 
and decided to treat them. DAVIS later billed Alta code 90020 (new patient -
comprehensive service). The "comprehensive" level of service was not provided. 
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DAVIS also billed code 80053.52 (executive profile) in addition to codes 81000 
(urinalysis), 85021 (complete blood count), 85007 (manual differential) and 84439 
(T-4). Codes 81000, 85021, 85007 and 84439 are included in an 80053.52. 
DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Alta representing Owen G. Reese as 
the provider of services, when he was not. 
94. On or about May 13, 1988, Jaylene returned to see DAVIS as 
instructed, for further treatment of her warts. DAVIS later billed Alta code 90070 
(established patient - extended service) and code 11420 (lesion removal 0.5 cm). 
DAVIS recorded the diagnosis for code 90070 as "hyperactivity" and the diagnosis 
for code 11420 as "lesion removal-hand". The diagnosis of "hyperactivity" was 
not discussed with the mother. Code 11420 is a non-asterisk code which implies 
coverage of the office call. DAVIS caused a claim form to be submitted to Alta 
representing Taira Fukushima as the provider of services, when he was not. 
95. On or about May 20, 1988, Ms. Halcom took Devin Hardman to 
DAVIS. In connection with services provided to Devin on May 20, 1988, DAVIS 
billed Alta code 80053 (executive profile) in addition to codes 81000 (urinalysis), 
85021 (complete blood count); 85007 (manual differential), and 84436 (T-4). Codes 
81000, 85021, 85007 and 84436 are included in an executive profile (code 80053). 
96. On or about May 23, 1988, Devin returned to see DAVIS for a 
fol low-up visit and DAVIS later billed Alta code 90060 (established patient -
intermediate service). A lower level of service was provided in the five minute visit 
DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Alta representing services rendered 
to Devin on May 20, 1988 and May 23, 1988 were provided by Owen G. Reese. 
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97. On or about June 2, 1988, Devin returned to see DAVIS for a 
fol low-up visit. DAVIS subsequent billed Alta code 90060 (established patient -
intermediate service), although DAVIS did not spend more than five minutes with 
Devin. DAVIS billed codes 85021 (complete blood count), and 85007 (manual 
differential) resulting in inflated fees because they can be rebundled to code 85022 
(CBC with differential). DAVIS also billed code 99070G (sterile surgical kit), which 
would be unnecessary for suture removal. DAVIS caused a claim form to be 
submitted to Alta representing services on June 2, 1988 were rendered by Owen 
G. Reese. 
98. On or about April 30. 1988, Vickilyn M. Patterson took her four 
year old daughter, Shalise. to see DAVIS because she had a sore throat. DAVIS 
examined Shalise, took a swab culture of Shalise's throat and gave her a 
prescription for an antibiotic. The strep culture was negative and DAVIS said 
Shalise had tonsillitis. DAVIS subsequently billed Patterson's insurance, Mail 
handlers, Rockville, Maryland, codes 36415 (blood draw), 85021 (complete blood 
count) and 85007 (manual differential) for services rendered to Shalise, although no 
blood was drawn. DAVIS also billed code 861 71.52 for a "strep screen". Code 
86171 is the code for a compliment fixation test and results in higher fees than if 
the proper code is used. These claim forms represented that services were 
rendered by Owen G. Reese, when they were not. 
99. On or about May 5, 1988, Pamela S. Whitlock (Whitlock) 
consulted DAVIS for treatment of a cough. He diagnosed her as having 
pneumonia. In connection with services rendered to Whitlock on May 5, 1988, 
DAVIS billed Equicor, Albuquerque, New Mexico, code 80053 (executive profile) in 
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addition to codes 85021 (complete blood count), 85007 (manual differential) and 
84439 (T-4). Codes 85021, 85007 and 84439 are included in an executive profile. 
code 80053. DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Equicor representing 
services rendered to Whitlock on May 5, 1988, were provided by Owen G. Reese 
when they were not. 
100. On or about May 7, 1988, Whitlock returned to see DAVIS for a 
follow-up visit. As a result of services rendered on May 7, 1988. DAVIS billed 
codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) which exacts 
higher fees because both can be combined into code 85022 (CBC with differential) 
DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Equicor representing services 
rendered to Whitlock on May 7, 1988, were performed by Owen G. Reese, when 
they were not. 
101. On or about June 2, 1988, Whitlock returned to see DAVIS for a 
fol low-up visit. As a consequence of services rendered on June 2, 1988, DAVIS 
billed codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) which 
exacts higher fees because both can be combined into code 85022 (CBC with 
differential). DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Equicor representing 
services rendered to Whitlock on June 2, 1988. were performed by Owen G. Reese 
and ostensibly signed by Owen G. Reese on June 7, 1988t although Reese no 
longer worked at the Family Medical Center. 
102. On or about May 17, 1988, Whitlock took her five year old 
daughter, Wendee, to DAVIS because she thought Wendee had an ear infection 
DAVIS examined Wendee's ears, took a swab for a strep screen, and one of his 
assistants pricked Wendee's finger for a glass straw blood sample. In connection 
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with services rendered to Wendee on May 17, 1988, DAVIS billed Equicor code 
90020 (new patient - comprehensive service). The level of service provided was 
not "comprehensive". DAVIS billed code 36415 (blood draw), this code number 
describes a "venepuncture" which is a different and more costly procedure. DAVIS 
also billed codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) 
which exacts higher fees because they should be combined together in code 
85022 (CBC with differential). DAVIS rendered a diagnosis of pneumonia, which he 
did not discuss with the mother. DAVIS submitted claim forms to Equicor 
representing services were provided to Wendee by Owen G. Reese, when they 
were not. 
103. Whitlock was instructed to bring Wendee back in two days, so 
she returned to see DAVIS on May 19? 1988, for a follow-up visit. DAVIS took 
another finger stick blood sample and looked into Wendee's ears. DAVIS also 
attempted to obtain a urine sample, which Wendee was unable to provide. As a 
result of services rendered to Wendee on May 19, 1988, DAVIS subsequently billed 
Equicor code 90070 (established patient - extended service). "Extended" service 
is a higher level than that which was provided. DAVIS billed code 36415 "(blood 
draw)", however, the mother described a finger stick blood sample and not a 
"venepuncture" as the billed code indicates. DAVIS billed codes 85021 (complete 
blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) which exacts higher fees because 
these codes should be combined as code 85022 (CBC with differential). DAVIS 
also billed code 81000 (urinalysis) which according to the mother was not done. 
DAVIS submitted a claim form to Equicor representing services were provided to 
Wendee on May 19, 1988, by Owen G. Reese, when they were not. 
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104. On or about May 12, 1988, Rolando I. Galano needed to obtain 
a blood test and made an appointment at Family Medical Center for that evening. 
When Galano went in, he filled out a family medical history and checked the box 
indicating genetic blood pressure runs in his family. A nurse drew blood before 
DAVIS came in. DAVIS asked if Galano was consulting a doctor and he said "no" 
A nurse took Galano's blood pressure, which was high. DAVIS wanted to do an 
EKG, treadmill and other tests but Galano refused. DAVIS gave Galano a booklet 
on blood pressure, a week's supply of Tenormin and instructed him to come back 
to obtain results of his blood test. Galano related DAVIS spent no more than five 
minutes with him In connection with services rendered to Galano on May 12, 
1988, DAVIS billed Educators Mutual. Murray, Utah, code 90020 (new patient -
comprehensive service). DAVIS billed code 80053.52 (executive profile) in addition 
to codes 81000 (urinalysis), 85021 (complete blood count), 85007 (manual 
differential), 86593 (VDRL) and 84439 (T-4), although codes 81000, 85021, 85007, 
86593 and 84439 are found in an executive profile. DAVIS caused claim forms to 
be submitted to Educators Mutual representing Owen G. Reese as the provider of 
services, when he was not. 
105. On or about May 17, 1988, Galano returned to see DAVIS. 
DAVIS gave him the results of his blood tests, which were normal. DAVIS wanted 
to draw more blood, claiming they made the mistake of sending the entire sample 
to the laboratory, when they usually keep some in their office for their own 
analysis. Galano let them draw more blood. His blood pressure was still high and 
DAVIS insisted on doing an EKG which was apparently normal. Galano said the 
Tenormin made him sick and DAVIS gave him another type of drug. DAVIS spent 
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approximately ten minutes with him. DAVIS billed Educators Mutual code 90070 
(established patient - extended service). The records DAVIS submitted to 
Edjjcators Mutual do not show services to justify an "extended" level of service. 
DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Educators Mutual representing 
Owen G. Reese as the provider of services, when he was not. 
106. On or about June 1, 1988, Galano returned to see DAVIS. 
DAVIS billed Educators Mutual code 90070 (established patient - extended 
service) for the visit. The service described in the progress notes submitted by 
DAVIS to Educators Mutual describe a lower level of service. DAVIS also billed 
code 80059 (hepatitis panel) which should be found in the executive profile (code 
80053) done on May 12, 1988. DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to 
Educators Mutual representing Owen G. Reese as the provider of services on June 
1, 1988. 
107. On or about August 15, 1988, Linda H. Henline (Henline) took 
her 18 year old son, Robert, to DAVIS, because Robert was leaving for college and 
had experienced a stomach ache all summer. DAVIS drew blood, took urine and 
stool samples and x-rays of Robert's chest and stomach. DAVIS diagnosed 
Robert as having either cancer or tuberculosis. DAVIS gave Robert a prescription 
for Septra saying Robert's problem could possibly be a parasite, but he didn't 
think so. Henline became upset and sought a second opinion. Three days later, 
August 18, 1988, a second physician ran tests similar to those run by DAVIS and 
reported a perfectly normal examination. The second doctor diagnosed Robert as 
having a spastic colon. 
000075 
- 4 1 -
108. On or about August 18, 1988, Sheri Murray (Murray) consulted 
DAVIS for treatment of hay fever. DAVIS took sinus x-rays, six tubes of blood, ran 
a BAST test and checked her rectum. As a result of services rendered to Murray 
on August 18, 1988, DAVIS billed her insurance carrier, Value Care, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, code 90020 (new patient - comprehensive service). DAVIS subsequently 
provided Value Care with typewritten records for their evaluation of the claim. The 
notes provided by DAVIS describe a lower level of service. The rectal examination 
is not noted in DAVIS' progress notes. DAVIS billed codes 85021 (complete blood 
count) and 85007 (manual differential) which creates higher fees because they 
should be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with differential). DAVIS billed code 
80053 (executive profile) in addition to codes 81000 (urinalysis), 85021 (complete 
blood count), 85007 (manual differential), and 84439 (T-4). An executive profile 
(80053) includes codes 81000, 85021, 85007 and 84439. 
109. On or about August 23, 1988, Murray returned so DAVIS could 
recheck her sinuses. DAVIS took more x-rays, drew more blood and checked her 
rectum. For services rendered on August 23, 1988, DAVIS billed Value Care code 
70210 (sinus x-ray). The need for a second set of sinus x-rays following the ones 
taken on August 18, 1988, is not documented. DAVIS also billed code 90080 
(established patient - comprehensive service). A lower level of service is 
described in the records submitted with the claim. DAVIS billed codes 85021 
(complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential), this causes higher costs 
because they should be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with differential). 
110. On or about August 26, 1988, Murray returned to see DAVIS. 
According to Murray, she returned to receive a shot of cortisone and to see if she 
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had gout as DAVIS had claimed on her previous visit. Blood was drawn and 
DAVIS performed another rectal examination. DAVIS pushed on her face and aave 
her a laxative. He again billed Value Care code 90080 (established patient-
comprehensive service). Records indicate a lower level of service was performed 
DAVIS billed codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) 
which creates inflated fees because they should be rebundled. 
111. On or about September 8, 1988. Murray returned to see DAVIS 
She was given a shot of cortisone for her allergies and an assistant attempted to 
obtain more blood. Murray questioned the necessity of drawing more blood and 
none was taken. DAVIS gave Murray prescriptions for Prednisone, Nolamine and 
Fionnal. For services rendered, DAVIS billed Value Care code 90080 (established 
patient - comprehensive service). The contact described by the patient would not 
be consistent with a "comprehensive" level of service. 
112. On or about September 22, 1988. Murray returned to see DAVIS 
for follow-up care. DAVIS later billed Value Care for a number of blood tests 
including renal profile, liver profile. CBC and differential although none of these 
tests were performed. The codes used on this billing 85021 (complete blood 
count), 85007 (manual differential). 80073 (renal profile). 80058 (liver profile) should 
have been done as a panel of tests. 
113. On or about October 5, 1988, DAVIS billed Value Care code 
90070 (established patient - extended service) for a return visit Murray made on 
September 24, 1988, to be informed of the results of a CAT scan she had taken at 
St. Marks Hospital. The CAT scan results were not back so DAVIS called and got 
them. DAVIS wanted to do other tests and ultrasound but Murray refused. The 
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records describe a lower level of service than the "extended service" that was 
billed for. DAVIS also rendered a diagnosis of "hepatitis" which is not documented 
in the records and was not discussed with Murray. 
114. On or about October 10, 1988, Murray returned to Family 
Medical Center to receive her first allergy shot. She had been walking as an 
exercise and her foot was hurting. She asked DAVIS why her foot was hurting ana 
he insisted on taking x-rays. For services rendered on October 10. 1988. DAVIS 
billed Value Care code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service) for a 
visit described by the patient as taking approximately 10 minutes. The level of 
service billed for is higher than the level described in typed records DAVIS 
submitted to Value Care for that date. The patient denies blood was drawn, 
however, laboratory tests appear in the billing as codes 85021 (complete blood 
count) and 85007 (manual differential) which, if done, should be combined into a 
simple code 85022 (CBC with differential). The patient was not cast, yet a bill for 
splint and casting material is noted (code 99070A). DAVIS billed code 29540 
(strapping - ankle), which should preclude the use of a code 90080 (established 
patient - comprehensive service) charge because it includes the cost of the office 
visit. DAVIS billed codes 73620 (foot x-ray 2 views) and 73620.26 (foot x-ray 
interpretation), although the reading of an x-ray 73620.26 is included in code 
73620. DAVIS billed code 95125.52 (professional services allergy) for giving a 
simple allergy shot. 
115. On or about October 13, 1988, Murray returned to Family 
Medical Center for an allergy shot only. DAVIS billed code 90060 (established 
patient - intermediate service) for services rendered on October 13, 1988, despite 
the fact that Murray did not see DAVIS and no actual examination was performed 
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116. On or about October 17, 1988, October 20, 1988, October 24, 
1988, October 27, 1988, November 1, 1988, November 4, 1988 and November 7, 
1988, DAVIS billed Value Care code 90060.52 (established patient - reduced 
intermediate service) for services rendered to Murray with a diagnosis of 
''bronchitis" and "allergic reactions". These diagnoses are not consistent with the 
description of the case in the physician's notes. These diagnoses were not 
discussed with the patient. Murray relates she simply returned for allergy shots 
which were administered by office personnel. There is no evidence for a code 
90060.52 in addition to code 95125.52 (immunotherapy - allergen) service filled on 
these dates. Records from the physician describe injections, vital signs, and time 
spent in the physician's office waiting for reactions to occur on October 17. 1988 
and October 20, 1988. This is inconsistent with Murray's memory. 
117. For services rendered to Murray on or about November 10. 
1988, DAVIS billed Value Care two code 90060.52 (established patient - reduced 
intermediate service) charges in addition to a code 95125.52 (immunotherapy -
allergan) charge. This is inconsistent with information provided by the patient who 
only received one allergy injection. 
118. On or about November 14, 1988, Murray received an allergy 
injection administered by a staff person and DAVIS billed Value Care for code 
95125.52 (immunotherapy - allergan). Physicians notes describes the injection, 
vital signs and waiting for allergic reactions to occur. Murray did not see DAVIS 
that day. 
119. For services rendered to Murray on or about November 17, 
1988, DAVIS billed Value Care code 90060.52 (established patient - reduced 
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intermediate service). However, Murray states she was there for an allergy shot 
only and did not see DAVIS. 
120. For services rendered to Murray on or about November 21, 
1988, DAVIS billed Value Care code 90060.52 (established patient - reduced 
intermediate service) in addition to two billings for code 95125.52 
(immunotherapy - allergan). Murray only received one injection in this visit. DAVIS' 
notes do not indicate receipt of a 90060 level of service or two injections. 
121. For services rendered to Murray on or about November 25, 
1988, November 28, 1988, December 1, 1988. December 5, 1988, December 8. 
1988, December 13, 1988, December 15. 1988 and December 19, 1988. DAVIS 
billed Value Care for both 95125.52 (immunotherapy - allergan) and 90060.52 
(established patient - reduced intermediate service) when in fact Murray did not 
see DAVIS on any of these dates. 
122. On or about October 8, 1988, Sharon Louise Grennan (Grennan) 
became ill and sought treatment at Family Medical Center. She made an 
appointment and went in and saw DAVIS the same day. She complained of 
weakness, tiredness and nausea. She related background information explaining 
she had been on Synthroid .15 mg for ten years for "hereditary thyroid disease". 
As a result of services rendered to Grennan on October 8, 1988, DAVIS billed her 
insurance company, Gem State Mutual of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah code 90020 
(new patient - comprehensive service). Later DAVIS provided records to Gem 
State concerning his claim. In these records, DAVIS claimed the patient 
complained of chronic upper respiratory tract infection, had a sore throat, swollen 
glands, congestion, runny nose and earache. Grennan denies that she was 
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suffering from these symptoms. Her physical examination included "lungs, some 
rhondis". The typewritten evaluation DAVIS provided does not show services that 
meet the definition of a "comprehensive" initial new patient evaluation. DAVIS also 
billed codes 84439 (T-4), 80053.52 (executive profile) 86300 (monospot), 86006 
(cold agglutinins) and 82270 (hemocult), however, none of these laboratory studies 
are documented in the records submitted as having been done on that date. The 
laboratory test that are documented as having been done on that day include a 
CBC with differential and urinalysis. DAVIS billed code 85021 (complete blood 
count) and code 85007 (manual differential) which exacts higher fees because they 
should be rebundled. DAVIS billed codes 71020 (chest x-ray 2 views) and 
71020.26 (chest x-ray - interpretation) resulting in double billing because the chest 
x-ray charge (71020) includes the charge for interpretation (71020.26). There is no 
chest x-ray recorded although it is mentioned in the plan. In addition the chest x -
ray reading (71020.26) is not apparent in the records. DAVIS made a diagnosis of 
"pneumonia", although he did not discuss this diagnosis with the patient. 
123. On or about October 11, 1988, Grennan returned to see DAVIS, 
as instructed, for a follow-up visit. As a result of services rendered to Grennan on 
October 11, 1988. DAVIS billed Gem State code 90070.52 (established patient -
extended service). The patient states the examination lasted only a minute. 
Additionally, the typed records submitted by DAVIS are not consistent with an 
"extended" level of service. DAVIS billed codes 71020 (chest x-ray 2 views) and 
71020.26 (chest x-ray interpretation). Code 71020.26 is included in a code 70120 
billed the same date. In addition, there is no formal x-ray report included in the 
records. DAVIS also billed the following laboratory tests: 85021 (complete blood 
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count), 85007 (manual differential), 84132.52 (potassium and electrolytes), 
84479.52 (T-3), 84439.52 (T-4), 84443.52 (TSH) and 84480.52 (TT-3) which can a'! 
be rebundled. 
124. On or about October 14, 1988, Grennan returned to see DAVIS 
for a fol low-up visit. As a result of services rendered to Grennan on October 14 
1988, DAVIS billed code 90070.52 (established patient - extended service). The 
patient states the exam took approximately two minutes, which would not 
constitute "extended" service. Office notes submitted to Gem State also reflect a 
lower level of service. DAVIS billed codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 
85007 (manual differential) exacting higher fees because they should be rebundled 
DAVIS billed codes 87088 (urine culture) which was unnecessary in light of 
negative nitrites noted in urinalysis and only 1-3 white cells noted on microscopic 
Additionally, there were no genitourinary symptoms. DAVIS also billed code 84122 
(potassium and electrolytes) but electrolytes are not documented in the records as 
having been done. 
125. On or about December 7, 1988, David Gallegos hurt his 
shoulder at his place of employment, Southwire Company (Southwire), West 
Jordan, Utah. Gallegos went to DAVIS for treatment that same evening. DAVIS 
took three x-rays, drew some blood, took a urine sample, gave Gallegos 
ultrasound and diathermy therapy on his shoulder and advised him he had a "roto-
cuff injury". DAVIS gave Gallegos prescriptions for Tolectin and Prednisone, put 
his arm in a cloth sling and instructed him to return every day for a week to 
receive ultrasound and diathermy therapy. In connection with services rendered. 
DAVIS billed Southwire code 90020 (new patient - comprehensive service). The 
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services described do not reach the level of "comprehensive." DAVIS billed code 
80053 (executive profile) in addition to codes 81000 (urinalysis), 85021 (complete 
blood count), 85007 (manual differential), and 84439 (T-4). An executive ^profile 
(code 80053) includes codes 81000, 85021, 85007, and 84439. DAVIS billed code 
99070A (splint and casting material), although no splint or cast was applied. 
DAVIS billed codes 73030 (shoulder x-ray 2 views) and 73030.26 (shoulder x-ray 
interpretation). Code 73030 includes the charges for reading the film (code 
73030.26). DAVIS caused claim forms to be submitted to Southwire representing 
services were rendered by Taira Fukushima, when they were not. 
126 On or about December 8, 1988, Gallegos returned to Family 
Medical Center for therapy. DAVIS subsequently billed code 90070 (established 
patient - extended service). The patient, however, states he was not examined by 
DAVIS on December 8, 1988. 
127. On or about the following dates Gallegos returned as instructed 
by DAVIS for ultrasound and diathermy treatments: December 9, 1988. December 
12, 1988, December 13, 1988, December 14, 1988. December 15, 1988, December 
16, 1988, December 17, 1988, December 19, 1988, December 20, 1988, December 
22, 1988, December 26, 1988 and December 27, 1988. DAVIS later billed 
Southwire codes 90060 (established patient - intermediate service), 97128 
(ultrasound therapy) and 97024 (diathermy therapy) for each visit. According to 
Gallegos, DAVIS only re-examined him on one of these occasions and he did not 
see DAVIS on the eleven other visits. The diathermy and ultrasound were 
performed by office personnel. On each of the above occasions, DAVIS caused 
claim forms to be submitted to Southwire representing Taira Fukushima as the 
provider of services, when he was not. 
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128. On a December 10, 1988, visit, Gallegos was told by DAVIS that 
there was a problem with his blood, his thyroid count was too high. As a 
coosequence of services rendered on December 10, 1988, DAVIS billed Southwire 
code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service). Discussing blood test 
results does not warrant a "comprehensive" level of service. DAVIS billed codes 
80073 (renal profile) and 80058 (liver profile) exacting higher fees because these 
tests should be combined into a panel such as a multi-channel chemistry and are 
not billed separately. DAVIS also billed codes 84480 (TT-3 RIA), 84443 (TSH), 
84479 (T-3) and 84439 (T-4) which also results in inflated fees because these 
codes should be combined into one or two thyroid panels. DAVIS caused claim 
forms to be submitted to Southwire representing Taira Fukushima as the provider 
of services. 
129. On or about December 19, 1988, DAVIS billed Southwire code 
99070 (supplies and materials) for services allegedly rendered to Gallegos. The 
patient denies having ever received supplies on that date. 
130. On or about December 21, 1988, Davis billed Southwire code 
90070 (established patient - extended service) for services allegedly rendered to 
Gallegos. The patient did not see DAVIS on that date and the diathermy and 
ultrasound were performed by office personnel. 
131. For services rendered to Gallegos on or about December 16, 
1988, December 21, 1988, December, 27, 1988, December 28, 1988 and 
December 30, 1988, DAVIS submitted claim forms to Southwire claiming a 
diagnosis of "peptic ulcer disease". Gallegos did not suffer from a peptic ulcer 
and this diagnosis was not discussed with him. Gallegos also states a number of 
occoe4 
- 50 -
other inaccurate diagnosis were submitted on claim forms sent to his employer by 
DAVIS including "cruciate ligament tear" which appears on claim forms for services 
rendered on December 15, 1988 and December 30, 1988; "leg injury" which 
appears on claim forms for services rendered December 16, 1988; "hepatitis" 
which appears on claim forms for services rendered December 10, 1988; and 
"hyperthyroidism" which appears on claim forms for services rendered December 
7, 1988, and December 10, 1988. Gallegos has never had a "cruciate ligament 
tear", a "leg injury", "hepatitis", or "hyperthyroidism" and DAVIS never discussed 
these diagnosis with him. 
132. On or about December 12. 1988, Robin L Snyder experienced 
pain in her right shoulder and consulted DAVIS. For services rendered to Snyder 
on December 12, 1988, DAVIS billed her husband's insurance carrier, Western 
Teamsters Welfare (Teamsters), Salt Lake City, Utah code 90020 (comprehensive 
service - new patient). The patient claims DAVIS spent only a short period of time 
with her which would indicate a lower level of service. DAVIS listed "asthma" as 
the diagnosis when the patient went in for shoulder pain. DAVIS also billed code 
86422 (Allergy Panel - RAST) when the patient was not complaining of allergies or 
asthma and did not authorize a RAST test. DAVIS billed codes 99000 (handling 
fee) and 36415 (blood draw). Code 99000 includes a 36415 (blood draw). DAVIS 
billed codes 90782 (injection) and 9J0420 (aristocort injection), but the patient 
denies having received an injection. DAVIS billed code 81000 (urinalysis), but the 
patient denies having given a urine specimen. DAVIS billed code 90070P (sterile 
pelvic tray) when a pelvic tray is included in the price of an office visit. Code 
80053 (executive profile) was billed in addition to codes 85021 (complete blood 
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count), 85007 (manual differential) and 84439 (T-4) which are included in an 
executive profile. DAVIS billed code 72110 (lumbrosacral x-ray complete) which, 
according to the patient was not done. In addition, DAVIS billed code 72110.26 
(lumbrosacral x-ray interpretation) when interpretation is included in the price of 
code 72110 previously billed. DAVIS billed codes 73030 (shoulder x-ray 2 views) 
and 73120 (hand x-ray 2 views) in addition to codes 73030.26 (shoulder x-ray 
interpretation) and 73120.26 (hand x-ray interpretation). Reading fees are included 
in the procedure code for the x-rays (73030 and 73120). The claim forms 
submitted to Teamsters by DAVIS for services rendered to Snyder on December 
12. 1988 represent Taira Fukushima as the provider of services, when he was not. 
133. On or about December 15, 1988, Snyder returned to see DAVIS, 
who informed her of the results of a CAT scan and mammogram she obtained at 
Park View Radiology on December 14, 1988. DAVIS did not examine her and 
spent very little time with her. He instructed a nurse where to apply heat and for 
how long. He then billed Teamsters code 90070 (established patient - extended 
service). The claim forms submitted by DAVIS to Teamsters for services rendered 
to Snyder on December 15, 1988, represent Taira Fukushima as the provider of 
services, when he was not. 
134. On or about December 16, 1988, Snyder returned to Family 
Medical Center where a nurse performed therapy on her back. DAVIS had Snyder 
fitted into a back brace, by telling his nurse what to do. The nurse followed 
DAVIS' instructions and DAVIS returned to check when the nurse was finished. 
DAVIS billed Teamsters code 90070 (established patient - extended service) which 
is a higher level than that described. The claim forms submitted to Teamsters by 
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DAVIS for services, rendered to Snyder on December 16, 1988 represent Taira 
Fukushima as the provider of services when he was not. 
135. On or about December 18, 1988, Snyder fell on the stairs in her 
house and injured the ball of her foot. On December 19, 1988, she saw DAVIS for 
treatment of the injury. He billed Teamsters code 90080 (established patient -
comprehensive service). "Comprehensive" was not the level of service provided 
DAVIS also billed codes 97128 (ultrasound therapy), 97024 (diathermy therapy), 
and 97145 (ultrasound - additional). The patient denies receiving either ultrasound 
or diathermy on this date. DAVIS billed codes 73630 (foot x-ray complete) and 
73630.26 (foot x-ray interpretation), although the reading fee (73630.26) is included 
in the code for the x-ray (73630). The claim forms submitted to Teamsters by 
DAVIS for services rendered to Snyder on December 19, 1988, represent Taira 
Fukushima as the provider of services, when he was not. 
136. On or about December 21,1988, Snyder returned to Family 
Medical Center and received ultrasound and diathermy therapy from a nurse. 
DAVIS asked how she was feeling. He then charged code 90080 (established 
patient - comprehensive service). The claim forms submitted by DAVIS to 
Teamsters for services rendered to Snyder on December 21, 1988, represent Tatra 
Fukushima as the provider of services, when he was not. 
137. On or about January 20, 1989, Snyder took her son, Reese, to 
see DAVIS. DAVIS drew blood, looked at Reese's throat and ears and said he had 
a bad ear infection which was draining and spreading down his throat. On the 
claim form submitted to Teamsters for his service, DAVIS recorded the diagnosis 
as "peritonsillar abscess". The diagnosis of tonsilor abscess is not consistent with 
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the services provided. For services rendered to Reese on January 20, 1989, 
DAVIS billed Teamsters code 90015 (new patient - intermediate service), although 
the description of the visit would not justify an "intermediate" level of secvice. 
DAVIS billed code 81000 (urinalysis), although Reese was not requested to and did 
not provide a urine specimen. DAVIS also billed code 86317 (strep test -
immunoassay) which exacts a higher fee than the proper code. DAVIS billed codes 
85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) exacting higher fees 
because they should be rebundled. The claim forms submitted to Teamsters by 
DAVIS for services rendered to Reese on January 20, 1989 represent Taira 
Fukushima as the provider of services, when he was not. 
138. On or about February 6, 1989, Bart L Coverstone consulted 
DAVIS at Family Medical Center for a sore throat. An assistant took his 
temperature, blood pressure and drew three vials of blood. He gave the assistant 
a urine specimen and he was given an x-ray. DAVIS listened to his breathing with 
a stethoscope, through his shirt, and told him he sounded terrible. DAVIS took a 
throat culture and talked with him about his family medical history. Although 
Coverstone was in the room three hours, DAVIS spent a total of only approximately 
15 minutes with him. As a result of services rendered to Coverstone on February 
6, 1989, DAVIS billed Coverstone's insurance carrier, Value Care, Salt Lake City, 
Utah code 90020 (new patient - comprehensive service). Medical records 
submitted by DAVIS to Value Care show the history is brief, the physical 
examination is not complete, and the services provided do not justify a 
"comprehensive" level of service. DAVIS also billed code 80053 (executive profile) 
in addition to codes 81000, 84439, 85021 and 85007 which are included in an 
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executive profile (code 80053). DAVIS billed code 86317 (strep test - immunoa). 
This is an immunoassay performed on serum and not a throat culture as is 
described in the records. DAVIS billed for code 71020.26 (chest x-ray ~ 
interpretation) in addition to code 71020 (chest x-ray 2 views) although code 
71020.26 is included in code 71020. There is no x-ray report included in the 
records. DAVIS submitted a diagnosis of "abdominal pain" and "pneumonia". 
Coverstone denies he made any complaint about abdominal pam and DAVIS never 
discussed "abdominal pain" or "pneumonia" with him. 
139. On or about February 8, 1989, Coverstone returned to see 
DAVIS for a follow-up visit. An assistant took his temperature, blood pressure 
and drew three vials of blood. When DAVIS came in, Coverstone told DAVIS about 
his brother, who had experienced a prolonged sore throat and subsequently died 
of cancer. After looking at a chart, DAVIS told Coverstone he did not have cancer 
because it would have shown up in his blood. DAVIS informed Coverstone his 
blood sugar was positive and gave him a prescription for Micronase. DAVIS again 
checked Coverstone's lungs through his shirt and said they sounded better. 
DAVIS subsequently billed Value Care for services rendered to Coverstone on 
February 8, 1989, wherein he recorded diagnoses of "diabetes" and "pneumonia", 
"hyperbilirubinemia", and "hyperlipidemia". Coverstone contends DAVIS never said 
a word to him about "pneumonia", "hyperlipidemia" or "hyperbilirubinemia". DAVIS 
billed code 90070 (established patient - extended service) which level of service is 
not confirmed by the records submitted to Value Care. DAVIS also billed codes 
85021 (complete blood count), 80073 (renal profile), 80058 (liver profile) and 83715 
(lipoprotein). These tests are not confirmed in the records submitted. 
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140. DAVIS submitted claim forms to Value Care for services 
rendered to Coverstone on February 8, 1989, Coverstone, however, claims he did 
not see DAVIS on one of these days. DAVIS billed codes 90080 (established 
patient - comprehensive service), 80058 (liver profile), 36415 (blood draw), 82948 
(blood sugar), 80073 (renal profile) and 83715 (lipoprotein). Codes 80058, 80073 
and 83715 are all part of a multi-channel test that should have been identified with 
a single code. The test is confirmed in the records submitted, but fails to confirm 
a diagnosis of "hyperlipidemia". The blood sugar test (code 82948) was not 
confirmed in the records submitted to Value Care. The progress notes submitted 
by DAVIS to Value Care for February 9, 1989, are an exact duplicate of those 
submitted by DAVIS for February 8, 1989, with the exception of the date. 
141. On or about February 14, 1989, Coverstone returned to see 
DAVIS, after having fasted in order to obtain an accurate blood sugar reading. An 
assistant took his temperature, blood pressure and drew three vials of blood. 
DAVIS spent 5 to 10 minutes with Coverstone and reported his blood sugar and 
cholesterol were high and instructed him to continue the medication. As a result of 
services rendered to Coverstone on February 14, 1989, DAVIS billed Value Care 
code 90070 (established patient - extended service) and listed his diagnoses as 
"diabetes", "hyperbilirubinemia", "hyperlipidemia", and "gout". The records 
submitted to Value Care for this visit describe a follow-up type of visit, which is 
limited in scope. The recorded blood sugar of 54 fails to confirm the diagnosis 
of'diabetes". DAVIS did not say anything to Coverstone about the possibility of 
"gout". DAVIS also billed codes 80058 (liver profile), 84550 (uric acid) and 83715 
(lipoprotein) which are all part of multi-channel chemistry and should have been 
billed as one code. 
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142. On or about February 21, 1989, Coverstone returned to see 
DAVIS. The assistant took his temperature, blood pressure and drew three vials of 
blood. For services rendered to Coverstone on February 21, 1989, DAVIS billed 
Value Care code 90070 (established patient - extended service) which is not the 
level of service described by Coverstone. DAVIS also billed codes 36415 (blood 
draw), 82948 (blood sugar), 83715 (lipoprotein), 85007 (manual differential), 80072 
(arthritis panel), 80073 (renal profile) and 80058 (liver profile) there were, however, 
no physician records submitted by DAVIS to indicate these studies were done. 
DAVIS again listed his diagnoses for Coverstone as "diabetes" and "polycythemia". 
Coverstone, however, tested for diabetes by using a glucose reflectance meter 
and discovered his blood sugar was in normal range, even after he discontinued 
his medication. DAVIS' records do not show blood sugar over 140. 
143. On or about March 13, 1989, Michelle S. Coverstone (Michelle) 
consulted DAVIS because she was experiencing stomach cramps. DAVIS had her 
give a urine specimen and three vials of blood. DAVIS felt her stomach, gave her 
a pelvic examination, took a pap smear and checked her rectum. Following the 
examination, DAVIS said she had "pelvic inflammatory disease" or an "ulcer" and 
gave her a prescription for Septra. For services rendered to Michelle on March 13, 
1989, DAVIS billed Value Care code 90020 (new patient - comprehensive service). 
This level is inconsistent with the examination described by the patient. DAVIS 
also billed code 80053 (executive profile) in addition to codes 81000 (urinalysis), 
85021 (complete blood count), 85007 (manual differential) and 84439 (T-4). Codes 
81000, 85021, 85007 and 84439 are all included in code 80053. DAVIS also billed 
code 99070-P (sterile pelvic tray) which should be included in the office visit code. 
v vJ \J U v^  L 
- 57 -
144. On or about Wednesday, March 15, 1989, Michelle drove to a 
radiologist for an upper Gl series which DAVIS had arranged. DAVIS subsequently 
billed Value Care codes 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service). 
81000 (urinalysis), 85021 (complete blood count), 85007 (manual differential), and 
87088 (urine culture) for services he claimed were rendered to Michelle on Marcn 
15, 1989, although she did not see him that day. 
145. On or about February 24, 1989, Audrey D. Callister was in 
DAVIS' office accompanied by her mother, Mildred Bailey, and daughter, Brooke. 
DAVIS had checked Callister when she asked him if Brooke could have her last 
immunization. DAVIS said Brooke had everything except the TB tine and he 
administered the shot. DAVIS subsequently billed Value Care codes 90060 
(established patient - intermediate service) and 86585 (TB tine test) for services 
allegedly provided to Callister on February 24, 1989. DAVIS also billed Value Care 
codes 90060 (established patient - intermediate service) and 86585 (TB tine test) 
for services allegedly provided to Brooke on February 24, 1989. DAVIS provided 
Value Care with typewritten progress notes outlining a physical examination for 
Brooke on February 24, 1989. Callister denies DAVIS examined Brooke and DAVIS 
did not administer any shot to Callister on February 24, 1989. 
146. On or about April 12, 1989, Timothy Davis (Timothy) had a 
cough and a runny nose. He made an appointment with Family Medical Center 
and consulted with DAVIS. After Timothy completed medical and personal history 
forms, a nurse took him to an examination room where she took his temperature, 
blood pressure, and drew blood. DAVIS came in and obtained a strep culture from 
Timothy's throat and had him provide a urine sample. DAVIS returned, listened to 
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his lungs and had a staff person take x-rays. DAVIS told Timothy he had 
"bronchial pneumonia", wrote a prescription and told the receptionist he needed to 
se"e Timothy in two days. Timothy states DAVIS spent only a few minutes with 
him. As a result of services rendered to Timothy on April 12, 1989, DAVIS billed 
Western Paper, Salt Lake City, Utah code 90020 (new patient - comprehensive 
service.) DAVIS billed codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (manual 
differential) resulting in higher fees because they should be rebundled to code 
85022 (CBC with differential). DAVIS billed code 80053 (executive profile) in 
addition to codes 84439 (T-4), 85021 (complete blood count), and 85007 (manual 
differential) Codes 84439, 85021, and 85007 are included in code 80053. DAVIS 
billed code 71020.26 (chest x-ray interpretation) in addition to code 71020 (chest 
x-ray 2 views), although reading is included in code 71020. 
147. On or about April 14, 1989, Timothy returned to see DAVIS for a 
fol low-up visit as instructed. As a result of services rendered, DAVIS billed 
Western Paper code 90080 (established patient - comprehensive service) which is 
inconsistent with the estimated examination time made by the patient. DAVIS 
billed codes 85021 (complete blood count) and 85007 (manual differential) resultma 
in higher fees because they should be rebundled to code 85022 (CBC with 
differential). DAVIS billed code 71020.26 (chest x-ray interpretation) in addition to 
code 71020 (chest x-ray 2 views). Code 71020.26 is included in code 71020. 
DAVIS also billed codes 85021 (complete blood count), 85007 (manual differential-
80073 (renal profile), 80058 (liver profile) 84550 (uric acid), 83715 (lipoprotein) ana 
81000 (urinalysis) which results in higher fees as they are included in the 
"executive profile" (code 80053). 
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148. On or about May 8, 1989, George Ray Lewis experienced lower 
abdominal pain and consulted DAVIS. As a result of services rendered to Lewis on 
May 8, 1989, DAVIS billed Lewis' insurance carrier, Value Care, Salt Lake City, 
Utah code 80053 (executive profile) and in addition billed codes 81000 (urinalysis). 
85021 (complete blood count), 85007 (manual differential), and 84439 (T-4), 
although codes 81000, 85021, 85007 and 84439 are included in code 80053. 
DAVIS also billed Value Care code 71020 (chest x-ray 2 views) in addition to code 
71020.26 (chest x-ray interpretation), although code 71020 includes code 
71020.26. 
149. During the course of his treatment, Lewis mentioned to DAVIS 
his back and hip problems. DAVIS had a CAT scan done on Lewis at Jordan 
Valley Holy Cross Hospital on June 6, 1989, and reported the results to Lewis on 
June 8, 1989. Davis informed Lewis that he had a herniated disc and gave him an 
ultrasound treatment. DAVIS also set up a series of ultrasound and diathermy 
therapy for June 9, 10, 12, 14, and 16, 1989. Lewis did not see DAVIS on June 
12, 1989. but did receive an ultrasound treatment from an office assistant. DAVIS, 
however, billed Value Care code 90060 (established patient - intermediate service) 
and also submitted typed notes to Value Care claiming he performed an 
examination of Lewis on June 12, 1989. 
150. On or about July 27, 1987, T. P. visited DAVIS concerning an 
anxiety attack. Davis examined T. P. and informed her that she was having a 
"conversion breakdown" and suffering from anxiety and stress. He provided her 
with several sample bottles of Tranxene, a schedule IV controlled substance. T.P. 
became depressed and suicidal while taking the Traxene. She visited DAVIS 
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approximately four times in the next two weeks. On each visit DAVIS advised T.P. 
that she needed to "get herself laid". He provided T.P. with a card for his private 
club and gave T.P. a package of birth control pills which he suggested she start 
taking right away. 
151. On or about August 3, 1989, DAVIS saw T.P. outside of the 
office setting and coerced her to have a sexual relationship with him. DAVIS 
threatened T.P. to keep her from disclosing the relationship he had coerced her 
into. 
152. On or about the summer 1987, T.S. consulted DAVIS concerning 
her medical problems. During an office visit DAVIS asked T.S. out to dinner. 
Davis attempted to force his physical attention on T.S. against her will and then 
told her not to tell anyone because he was not supposed to go out with his 
patients. 
153. During the period of time he treated T.S., DAVIS prescribed 
Xanax, a highly addictive substance, for her to the point where she became drug 
dependent. DAVIS continued to prescribe Xanax for T.S., even after he was aware 
she had become drug dependant. 
154. On or about August 1, 1989, A.C., a file clerk at Family Medical 
Center, resigned her employment with DAVIS due to his sexual inappropriate 
behavior towards her. 
155. On or about September 27, 1989, C M . was employed by 
DAVIS. During her employment DAVIS's behavior toward her was sexually 
inappropriate. When C M . confronted DAVIS about his office practices and 
treatment of patients DAVIS struck her and threatened to fire her. 
00005)5 
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COUNT I 
4. The Division re-alleges and incorporates by reference the 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 3 above as if fully set out herein. 
5. Section 58-12-35(1 )(a), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, 
provides that the Division may revoke, suspend or place on probation the license if 
the holder is guilty of unprofessional conduct. 
6. Section 58-12-36 , Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, defines 
unprofessional conduct to include: 
(7) refusing to divulge to the division upon demand the 
means, methods, device or instrumentality used in 
the treatment of a disease, injury, ailment or 
infirmity; 
(14) the use of false or fraudulent statements in any 
document connected with the practice of medicine; 
(15) any conduct or practice, contrary to the recognized 
standards of ethics of the medical profession, or 
any conduct or practice which does or might 
constitute a danger to the health, welfare or 
safety of the patient or the public, or any 
conduct, practice or condition which does or might 
impair the license holder's ability to practice 
medicine safely and skillfully; 
(18) willfully and intentionally making any false 
statement or entry in any hospital records, medical 
records or reports; or 
(19) willfully and intentionally making any false 
statement in reports or claim forms to governmental 
agencies or insurance companies with the intent to 
secure payment not rightfully due. 
7. Because he violated the Division's Order regarding his probation, 
overutilized and overprescribed medical services, submitted false claims to secure 
insurance payments, made false diagnosis, failed to discuss diagnosis of diseases 
with patients, failed to provide patient records to the Division, was sexually 
inappropriate with patients and staff, prescribed addictive drugs to a patient to the 
O00GC6 
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point the patient became drug dependant, and then continued to prescribe the 
drug, ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS has violated the provisions of Section 5 8 - 1 2 -
36(7). (14), (15), (18) and (19), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, constituting 
grounds for imposing an appropriate sanction against his licenses under the 
provisions of Section 58-12-35(1 )(a), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended. 
COUNT II 
8. The Division re-alleges and incorporates by reference the 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 7 above as if fully set out herein. 
9. Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(iv), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended 
makes it unlawful: 
(iv) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled substance in 
excess of medically recognized quantities necessarily to treat the ailment, malady 
or condition of the ultimate user. 
10. Section 58-12-36, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, 
defines unprofessional conduct to include: 
(11) knowingly prescribing, selling, giving away, or 
administering, directly or indirectly, or offering to 
prescribe, sell, furnish, give away or administer any of 
the drugs or compounds mentioned in Subsection (10) to 
a drug dependant person, as defined in Subsection 58-
37-2(14) unless permitted by law. 
10. Because he prescribed controlled substances for a patient after 
he was aware she had become dependant as described in paragraph number 3 
above, Robert Charles Davis has violated the provisions of Section 58-37-8(2) ana 
58-12-36, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, constituting grounds for imposing 
an appropriate sanction against his licences under the provisions of Section 58-
12-35(1 )(a), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended. 
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WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief: 
1 That ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS be adjudged and decreed to ha:e 
engaged in the acts alleged herein. 
2. That by engaging in the above acts, ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS oe 
adjudged and decreed to have violated the provisions of the Medical Practice Act 
3. That an Order be issued imposing an appropriate sanction agams: 
the licenses of ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS to practice medicine and to administer 
and prescribe controlled substances. 
DATED this 7 ^ day of December, I989. 
CAA K A~\ 
Divisioryof Occupational & 
Professional Licensing 
Department of Commerce • 
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STATE OF UTAH 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Qnth^ 1V\ dav of i<[\'\V-\'r 1989, personally appeared 
before me Golden Perrett, and after being duly sworn, deposes and says; that he 
has read the foreg£in9 Petition and knows the contents thereof; and the same is 
true to the best of h»s knowledge except as to matters stated on information and 
belief, and that as to those matters he believes it to be true. 
LjjcL L A—A 
Investigator 
Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED to before me this _[iii_day of 1989. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
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Suite 1200, Kennecott Building DEPUTY CLERK 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DIVISION, DISTRICT OF UTAH 
R03ERT C. DAVIS, : COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE 
AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 
Plaintiff, : 
vs . : 
DAVID E. ROBINSON, IN HIS : 
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR 
OF THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL : 
AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS : Civil No. 
REGULATION, and THE DIVISION 
OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL: 
LICENSING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
BUSINESS REGULATION, STATE OF : 
UTAH, 
Defendants. 
Robert C. Davis, M.D., plaintiff, complains of David E. 
Robinson in his individual capacity as the director of the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the 
Department of Business Regulation, and the Division of Occupa-
tional and Professional Licensing of the Department of Business 
Regulation, State of Utah, ("Defendants"), as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND THE PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff is a physician duly licensed to practice 
medicine in the State of Utah, with his principal place of 
practice in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. Defendant David E. Robinson ("Robinson"), is the 
director of the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing of the Department of Business Regulation, State of 
Utah. 
3. Defendant Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing of the Department of Business Regulation, State of 
Utah ("'The Division1'), is an agency of the State of Utah which 
has specific duties for the licensing and regulation of profes-
sionals, such as physicians, in the State of Utah under Utah 
Code Ann., § 51-1-1, et seq. and § 58-12-26 to 39. 
4. Jurisdiction is proper in this court under 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1331(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as it involves the violation of 
plaintiff's rights arising under the Constitution of the United 
States. 
5. Venue is proper in this district because plaintiff 
is a resident of the State of Utah, and defendant is a govern-
mental division of the State of Utah. 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
6. This is an action for declaratory and injunctive 
relief, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §5 1983; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 
2202, and Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendants from bringing an 
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administrative proceeding under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-1 , et 
seq. (Administrative Procedures Act), Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-16 
(Occupational and Professional Licensing Act), and Utah Code 
Ann. §58-12-26 (Medical Practice Act). The Division has violat-
ed plaintiff's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the Constitution of the United States, as alleged below. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
7. Plaintiff's license, allowing him to practice 
medicine in the State of Utah, is a property right protected by 
the due process provisions of the United States Constitution. 
8. For over the past two years, the defendants have, 
been engaged in a surreptitious yet intense investigation of 
plaintiff. 
9. The defendants1 investigation has included the use 
of illegal and improper subpoenas issued without authority of 
statute, rule of procecure or court or administrative order, and 
unconscionable and unethical investigative procedures. 
10. In the course of such investigations, plaintiff has 
been continually approached and harassed by the media wich 
questions based on information gathered by the State in its 
investigative process• 
11. Plaintiff's business has suffered as a result of 
the State's investigation and will continue to suffer and be 
damaged if the State is permitted to proceed with such 
investigation. 
12. The defendants have filed or intend to file n^ 
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administrative petition under the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act, Utah Code Ann., § 63-^6b-l, et seq.; the Occupational and 
Professional Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann., § 58-1-16, et seq.; 
and, the Utah Medical Protective Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-26 
et seq., seeking to suspend or revoke plaintiff's license to 
practice medicine in the State of Utah. 
13. The factual basis for the defendant's petition was 
obtained by the issuance of unlawful investigative subpoenas by 
defendants, issued before any petition, administrative action or 
court proceeding was filed by the Division. 
14. Additionally, the defendants did not comply with 
the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l, et seq. and Rule 
45 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in issuing such 
subpoenas. 
15. The issuance of investigative subpoenas by the 
defendants without notice to plaintiff, and prior to the time of 
any proceeding being instituted against the plaintiff is not 
authorized by the Administrative Procedures Act, the Occupa-
tional and Professional Licensing Act, nor the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
16. There was no statutory or other basis for the 
issuance of the investigative subpoenas, therefore, they are 
unreasonable searches, violative of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, as well as Utah law. 
17. The violation of the Fourth Amendment and Utah Law 
in obtaining evidence and information through unlawful means 
- U .-
employed by defendants, also violates plaintiff's due process 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution in that his property right (his license) may be 
taken, or substantially impaired without due process of law. 
18. Because plaintiff had no notice of the unlawful 
subpoena he could not challenge their prooriety or determine if 
the subpoenas sought to obtain privileged information. 
19. Defendants may attempt to immediately suspend 
plaintiff's license to practice medicine in the State of Utah, 
without a hearing, in clear violation of plaintiff's due process 
rights under the United States Constitution. 
20. Plaintiff is currently on probation as established 
by the division at a prior hearing. 
21. Defendants did not inform plaintiff of any 
violations of his pending probation except to inform him that a 
second petition was about to be filed against him. 
22. Defendants have refused to advise plaintiff of anv 
specific allegation giving rise to the second petition and hav-
refused to discuss the nature of the petition. 
23. Plaintiff's rights will be far more seriously 
impaired under this procedure than if he were informed through 
proper probationary contacts. 
24. Defendant Robinson, as Director of the Division, 
statutorily vested with sole authority to make the ultimate 
decision whether or not plaintiff's license is revoked, 
suspended or what other action should be taken under Utah Coo 
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Ann. § 58-12-35. He also supervises discovery, che 
investigation of claims by the Division, directs any hearings 
before the Division, and is closely involved with each claim 
from its inception until he makes the ultimate decision. 
25. Plaintiff has been investigated on at least two 
previous occasions, at the direction of defendant Robinson. 
26. As a result of alleged wrongful acts done bv the 
Division during one of these investigations, in August of 1983 
plaintiff filed a claim with the Division, with the intent to 
file legal procedings under the procedure outlined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq. A copy of Plaintiff's previous notice is 
attached as Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof. Plaintiff's 
claim was denied by the Division. 
27. Plaintiff believes that defendants have allowed 
confidential information within their control regarding plain-
tiff to be disclosed to public media sources and to third 
parties unrelated to any investigation in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-2-85.4 and § 67-16-4, resulting in substantial harm 
to Plaintiff's reputation and business. 
28. The defendants are unduly biased against plaintiff 
because of their past involvement with plaintiff, their direct 
involvement in this current investigation and petition, and 
their involvement with claims made against them by piaintitf. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Illegal Subpoenas) 
29. Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs 1 through 
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2 4 a b o v e . 
30. The major factual basis for the Petition filed or 
to be filed by defendants has as its basis information obtained 
through the use of illegal subpoenas, and was hence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Cons titution. 
31. As the factual basis of the petition was improperly 
obtained the Division should be permanently enjoined from 
pursuing its administrative petition to revoke or suspend the 
license of the plaintiff based on the improperly obtained 
evidence or from ever using the improperly obtained evidence for 
any purpose. 
32. If defendants are allowed to continue their admin-
istrative petition proceeding, plaintiff's rights will be 
immediately and irreparably injured or lost. 
33. Plaintiff is entitled to immediate injunctive 
relief, under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
enjoining the Division from proceeding further with its 
administrative petition. 
WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for judgment below. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Violation of Due Process, Illegal Subpoenas, Biased 
Administrative Process) 
34. Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs 1 throueh 
33 above. 
35. The defendants are attempting to take or 
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substantially impair plaintiff's property right without due 
process of law through the use of evidence obtained by che use 
of unlawful investigative subpoenas, without proper notification 
to plaintiff. 
36. Plaintiff has never been given the opportunity to 
challenge the subpoenas or to assert any privilege he may have 
relating to the information sought to be obtained by the 
subpoenas. 
37. Plaintiff is further being denied due process by 
the failure to have his petition and property right reviewed and 
determined by an unbiased tribunal. The defendant Pvcbinson has 
become so involved in this process, and in litigation with 
plaintiff that he cannot be unbiased nor fairly weigh evidence 
and render a just decision. 
38. The procedure under Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35(1) as 
applied in these circumstances is a violation of due process and 
the Fourteenth Amendment, in that the decision maker is so 
interwined in the claims investigation, discovery and hearing 
process that he can not possibly be unbiased and fair. 
39. The Division should be enjoined from continuing its 
petition to suspend or revoke plaintiff's license to practice 
medicine in Che State of Utah based on its violation of plain-
tiff's due process rights. 
IvTIEP.EFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment below. 
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Statute Unconstitutional) 
40. Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs 1-39 
above. 
41. Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 empowers the Director 
of the Division with the authority to administer oaths, certify 
to official acts and records of the Division, issue subpoenas, 
compel production of documents, and otherwise oversee and direct 
the investigation. 
42. In addition, § 53-12-35.1 vests in the Director the 
sole discretion in meting out the appropriate penalty for 
violations of the Act, including public or private reprimand; 
suspension or restriction of license; revocation of license; 
requiring licenseholder to submit to care, counseling or 
treatment; requiring participation of licenseholder in education 
program; or, assigning licenseholder to the direction of another 
physician. 
43. Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 vests in one person, 
the Director, the authority to investigate, issue subpoenas, 
adjudicate and rule in cases of alleged violations of the 
Medical Practices Act. 
44. As applied in this case, the section vests such 
authority in a person who has had a lens-running bias against 
the plaintiff and has been involved in protracted prior 
investigations of plaintiff culminating in the filing by 
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pLaintirf or a notice of suit against him for alleged 
wrong-doings in prior investigations. 
45. Plaintiff will be irreparably damaged by the 
statute and as it is intended to by applied in these 
circumstances. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment below. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Violation of Due Process - Pending Administrative Proceeding) 
46. Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs 1 through 
45 above. 
47. Defendants have violated plaintiffs1 due process 
rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution by filing a new petition while plaintiff had the 
expectation, because of his probation, of being informed by 
defendants of any claimed violation of the Utah Medical Practice 
Act. 
48. The filing of a new petition has injured or will 
injure plaintiff's property right in his license to practice 
medicine by harming his reputation with his patients and profes-
sional colleagues. This would not occur if defendants followed 
proper due process procedures to protect plaintiff's property 
rights within the course of the pending probation. 
49. Defendants should be enjoined from further pursui. r 
this petition for violation of plaintiffs constitutional ri^ :.* 
to due process. 
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment below. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Disclosure of Confidential Information) 
50. Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs 1-49 
above. 
51. Defendants have not complied with Utah law in 
improperly issuing subpoenas and obtaining information without 
specific statutory authorization to do so under the Division cf 
Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, the Administrative 
Procedures Act, cr Che Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
52. Defendants have disclosed confidential information 
obtained from an official investigation of plaintiff, to the 
public media and other third parties unrelated to the 
investigation in violation of Utah Law. 
53. Defendants should be permanently enjoined from 
continuing to pursue its administrative petition attempting to 
suspend or revoke plaintiff's license to practice medicine iv 
the State of Utah because of its violation cf Utah State Law in 
connection therewith. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
1. For a judgment declaring chat defendants, through 
the improper issuance of investigative subpoenas, has violated 
plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights under the United States 
Constitution. 
2. For a judgment declaring thac defendants have, 
1 i 
t h r o u g h the i s s u a n c e of un lawfu l i n v e s t i g a t i v e subpoenas , 
v i o l a t e d p l a i n c i f f ' s cue . es 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
3 . / >r ui ' .jrder or t k i * d*-:-* immedia te ly e n j o i n i n g 
d e r e n d a n t s , . : c i n e or seen to be 
p e n d i n g A d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e e d i n g a t t e m p t i n g to suspend or 
r e v o k e the l i c e n s e of t h e p l a i n t i f f to p r a c t i c e medi ci ne : : i t he 
S t a t e o f I J 
4. )r an order of this Court permanentlv en;oiuin^ 
defendants irom issuing upl >wnil " • -PS r.i .; i n: "»k nhooLji a . , i ts 
errorts to si ispend or revoke plaintiff1 > license to practice 
medicine in the State of 1 Jtah 
5 •:.,.:;.- .. pnininins 
, L: io i_n^  i;,v evidence obtained throucfn th or defendants 
unlawfi il suhooems • ^  '-ny proceeding ^ urt case c 
«*r restrains ,, .,• pendants f.om releasing 






an nrd^r comnel! .."Annrr 
l e^ed " ' - u u : o n s th rough 
p l a i n t i f f s p r o b a t 
n ) • : r *" >\i\i. 
h e r e : n . 
fees i n c u r r e d hv 
u n t i f f mav shc^ 
himself encicled, or che Court cieeas proper under che circum-
s cances. 
DATKI) ',i ; [l day ..-: December, 1939. 
McKAY, £^PT' •; -: /rdUPJ-L-lN 
DAVIS 
BY: \/IJ<^A}\J' 
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Jay W. Butler #526 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Melissa M. Hubbell #5090 




115 State Capital Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 1 4 
Telephone: 










IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
ROBERT C. DAVIS, 
P I LI in Li L L , 
V. 
DAVID E. ROBINSON, et d i M 
Defendants. 
) ORDER GRANTING 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I"' ! 1 I'M U'J-i' - I ihj n \ 
Judge J. Thomas Greene 
Defendants r "Motio 
in'ma r~v J" • y ' w 3 ' ' * cuiue i 
v^iw f o r 
he 
; : c^ 
L e f e n d a n t s ' yor,'r> *M > g i v e n pa r sua r . * .•'/^ -"-> 
FEDERAL RULES ' V CIVIL PROCr 
>morandiim i n S u p p o r t o l I U J Mot ion t o D i s m i s s and 
• . e r n a t i v e i y r ^ r :-ummary Judgment , P l a i n t i f f ' s Memorandum of 
Points and Auth~-i •-i ~3 : 
Defendants' F*^1 v ~~ ^ i 1 : 1 ^ 
\ * ' ,"-, 0 o r x >: ; i t i o n r J 1 e f o nd a n" 
Memorandum Oone. .* "* 
^ - it- rtn^r appe 
H «- v, ., , tnat ihor^ ::• - j -jeruiLn^  issue as l, J : mater:, il r^ot, ana .^;^ c 
Defendants are entitled to Summary Judgment as a mai 
therefore 
"^ Tf> HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for 
S;ummary Judgm^"* * "-anted. 
ci a y• o t J a n u a ry, 19 91. 
J. /^ TrfOMAS GREENE { 
Unated States District Judge 
Peter Stirba 
Benson Hathaway 
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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for th G 
District of Utah 
January 31, 199 1 
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1 I; THE COURT: And if there is going to be stay of ; 
jj • ^ • : 
2 jjanything it could be just as well obtained there, couldn't it?1 
3 MR. HATHAWAY: Yes it could, Your Honor. Within thej 
I j 
4 administrative enactment that we're attacking there are those i 
I 
5 provisions but they also likewise require that exhaustion. J 
i 
I 
6 THE COURT: Well then, after all of that happens, j 
' i * 
i 
7 you really feel aggrieved, you come back here. j 
8 MR. HATHAWAY: And we'll be several years down the ! 
i 
! 
9 road and several decisions later, that's true Your Honor. We • 
! 
10 hope to preempt that in light of the evidence that we obtained; 
I 
i 
11 to date that we intend to put on before this court, again in j 
i 
12 the interests of economy, and in the interests of getting thisj 
j 
13 matter resolved. i 
14 We sought to do in this proceeding initially rather I 
15 than to wait until several hearings are held, several dollars :, 
i 
16 are spent and reputations are impacted. , 
17 THE COURT: Well, I'm sensitive to what you're \ 
18 saying on that but it does seem to me that in comity as veil 
19 as the doctrine of exhaustion you ought to be proceeding in 
20 State Court and that's what I'm going to rule. 
21 The case is dismissed for further proceedings in 
22 State Court. 
2 3 MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: You can prepare an order to that etr-:". 
25 Thank you. 
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBT, Circuit Judges. 
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 
three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 
would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 
cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 
This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 
not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 
except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 
the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 
36.3. 
Plaintiff ' I'hys ic Lan ;• :; : •j : . — * • ;:- ::*•'• t. 
Physician, licensed und-r Utah 1 iw bi --l ^ i ^  complain1, \r"^ n 
J ^  - Ho - - ;s 
, . *e: . '. .jjLinj v.^na^^L M.i inter, i *_o i: *. e an 
administrative a-:t. HI against t;ira t- : ..ipenl or revoke his 
license. His :;ompl*ir.t further -11 ••* - * i 
. -- . ^ -.^.e .1 i;\e allegations 
against ii±m; are collecting evidence in vio-itio*: * Utah law; are 
leaking confident! - T format :*'>,% nu a n ot 
t . ss. Pbysicx^ , aoK r 
declaratory itiia'L (Utah Code An 53-12-35(1} is 
unconstitutional c^s it vests toe* much power in tue uxrector 
in junctive r •* 1 i *«f | «I j .. -et 11, i. | «,| . 
Defendants filed i n - * -•-> .i'smiss * *^ r fa: !*:n * ~4ite a 
r] ui di' - i^ ->- 'he 
t . - • . :t courL ^^ aiiL ,u ^eiendanr^ muii::; i summary judgment ir * 
.. r. c-Lp.g ,• i stated s imply jumitv as well as th^ io"*r :•".•-
of exhaustion * * . . . . .
 tl ; t, 
v . -. parties attemp * . .H-L the issue 
presenter: t whether or not •• * IlH3 plaintiff must 
exhaust niii state judicial .-uiU administrative remedies. 
Sent i -M-1- oart as follows: 
t diiecLui, upon tne written recommendation 
the *rH sha"1' *i":rd:ne a j;> vsician licensed 
-2-
We oh "ira^r^ri z ^  f h^ dxstri * • ! ****: ) 
••J-.;C-J^.-:. _ , , oased, *^ .-JJJL L:; j.ii't , '.rui; 111• i principles 
of comity. 
rhyonjjiii I I I In iKstrict court ^^ M l t **.r ongoing 
investigation i pending state licensing proceeding claiming bis 
ice process rights were beinq tr.irr M* - ' > -
i*** ** i * ' . .^^..jt^jLi.'e -jiiUrcemeriL 
t,rcceeciin njoin or sidetrack that. proceeding by 
resorting to •. \ !?M irt'/^ * n federal ——•-*- v jore v j^m^ , 
Juidice v . Vai. : ' Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., * 
Ordinarily a federal court is not free to decline accept 
jurisdiction I ' federal c-yj,
 t*t i f i ed dec 1 in: no 
jurisdict:~" *• ' . ... 
Se^ LumrdQO Kiver water Const. jii Dist. v. United States, 4.: 4 
t * ' 1 9 ~ 6 ; A. a:/ama Pub. Serv, Co.mm#n v. Southern Rv. Co. , 
341 i5 S. J4X, ^ 438-56 (195'' -urford v. , ^  ^ • , 
( 
The c a s e b e f o r e u^ w.« ^ wrought t^ ^ ^ f o r c e fedo i" 
r i a w t s . h - * . t cep ted j ^ r u J i v - t i j i 
w:'u. 1 - (' p r ec iua t ; c i e s t a t e r rum deve lop ing complex f a c t s :• , 
d i v e s 1 , t a t e s p e c i a l i z e d t r i b u ^ * 1 from e x e r c . 
j a i i b a i c i i G . merest * 
- 3 -
regulati daries; and 
(4) quiCiw- generate intense friction DO twee r. : ne state and 
federal government * erhaps most importantly ' t«*h -:w provides 
*"
x
r *~ -» Equate st • , - it and 
2 _^ .. ^ssert-wd federal i ignt - * . . . dearly oe preserved as 
tne actions of Utah courts ma-, -timately be appealed to the 
Supreme Court o 
We therefore nol : „i ;. •- tacts nt 'Pis case * ne district 
'our*" proper1-* i - * --^  - , n. We 
* i.» . Jii>L:^, ^:t ofiuuid i , JV^ granted final 
judgment t^  this wot I 1 preclude Physician fr >m the possibility d 
pursuino ^ v remea *> \ • i 
hen pei.;.. LO,';I coarse * lot.;:):1, 
v ,Ua. : nave L* •«-••. -*t**v tu- proceeding or dismiss the action 
without prejudice. 
We REMAND this case to the district cour't with instructions 
to vacate the ~um,\ -udgment and to dismiss the iv:tioh w i I h- -ut 
pre ": * ' * " : t:l: v 
Entered for the Court: 
:.:•:•: imoRiiY 
.._ted States Circuit Judge 
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P E T E R STIRBA (Bar No. 3118) 
STIRBA AND H A T H A W A Y 
Attorneys for Dr. Robert Davis 
215 South State, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
BEFORE THE DIVISION O F O C ' " 7 ' ^ * ' * P R O ' [ N M * \ \ w - ^ c i \ r } 
OF THE DEPARTMEN 1' OF COMMERCE 
ST \ TE OF 
Mill i r : Case N<t OIM S1* 7^ 
ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS : ..'k ; W I S MOTION TO 
: \« '• N S T 1 "i* * v* *. i 
. • •• < u i ) - \ . \ N : ?- 12-35.1 
Dr. Davis, b> a nd thi on igh his attoi ney Peter Stirba. respectfi lib si ibi in lits 1 lis K lotioi i to 
Dismiss Based on the Unconstitutionality of U'tah. Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1 Dr. Davis bases his 
and Professional Licensing is empowered violates the due process rights of physicians by 
Director Mr. Robinson. This concentration of f unctions is unconstitutional on its face. 
Ii i addi* »"  •' !|" ,HI ite i a;; 1:1 ne stati itoi ) s :::! lei i ic 1 vas applied v » t,|: " • ' » ^ • , iolates Dili: Da \ is' di le 
process rights, Director Robinson is so extensively involved am: prejudiced in this case that it 
" -
r
 * ' : M / ' ' • • l"""i him l ,KI a:1', J II uli.i! .md detached iiiuin ni laet. 
This Motion is supported by a Memorandum of law, filed and served herewith. 
DATED th 




Attorneys for Dr. Robert Davis 
*
T
 n r S P R V I C ' E 
I hereby certify that on the L^ 
•"•^szoing document, postage ?; 
August, iW., . •.-.aiicd a true and correct copy 
• h , » t*i^!lr 
Melissa M. Hubbell 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State, #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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PETER STIRBA (Bar No. 3118) 
STIRBA AND HATHAWAY 
Attorneys for Dr. Robert Davis 
215 South State, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of: : Case No. OPL-89-73 
ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS : DR. DAVIS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION TO 
: DISMISS BASED ON THE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
: UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-35.1 
Dr. Davis, by and through his attorney Peter Stirba, respectfully submits his 
Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Dismiss Based on the Unconstitutionality of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-12-35.1. Dr. Davis challenges the constitutionality of the statutory scheme on 
its face and as applied. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-35.1 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
ON ITS FACE 
A. Utah's Statutory Scheme Improperly Allows Investigatory, Prosecutorial and 
Adjudicatory Power to be Concentrated in a Single Individual. 
1. Utah's Statutory Scheme 
Utah's Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("Division'') is created under 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-1 et seq. (1985). It has a Director, presently David E. Robinson, and 
a five member board. When the Division investigates a physician, Robinson administers oaths, 
issues subpoenas and compels discovery. Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35.l(2)(b) (1987). A 
hearing is conducted before the board, over which the director presides. After the board's 
conclusions, the director has the authority to consider the evidence and make a decision. The 
final determination is made by the director, Mr. Robinson, and him alone. Utah Code Ann. § 
58-12-35.1(3) (1987). 
This statutory scheme consolidates an constitutionally intolerable amount of investigatory, 
prosecutorial and adjudicative power in one individual. Mr. Robinson in this case instituted, 
zealously promoted and relentlessly pursued the allegations against Dr. Davis. Mr. Robinson 
now holds the exclusive power to decide the final disposition of Dr. Davis' license to practice 
medicine. 
2. Statutory Schemes of Other States 
Other states have medical license revocation procedures which, unlike Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-12-35.1 (1987), protect the integrity of the truth seeking process and protect the due 
process rights of the physicians. Nevada, Colorado and New York are examples of states who 
have schemes which do not violate the constitutional rights of physicians investigated by their 
state licensing bureaus. 
In Nevada different committees, who are made up of members of the licensing board, 
conduct the investigation. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 630.311(1) (1987). After the investigation is 
completed, the board reviews the committee's findings, "but no member or advisory member 
of the board who participated in the investigation may participate in this review or in any 
2 
subsequent hearing or action taken by the board/ Nev. Rev. Stat. § 630.311(2) (1987). 
Colorado provides for a licensing board with two panels. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-36-
118(1) (1989). Each is empowered to act as both an inquiry panel and a hearings panel. H[I]n 
no event shall the president or any other member who has considered a complaint as a member 
of one panel acting as an inquiry panel take part whatever in the consideration of a formal 
complaint involving the same matter." Id. "All matters referred to one panel for investigation 
shall be heard, if referred for formal hearing, by the other panel or a committee thereof." Id. 
New York's State Board of Medical Conduct has three tiers: (1) a committee who 
investigates; (2) a Commissioner who studies the committees' reports and issues an 
recommendation; and (3) a Board of Regents, elected by the legislature, who makes the final 
decision. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230 et seq. (McKinney 1989). By comparing other 
states' statutes with Utah's, the potential for abuse inherent in Utah's scheme and its violative 
procedures is demonstrated. 
3. Dr. Davis Has a Property Interest In His License to Practice Medicine Which is 
Protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Dr. Davis has a property interest in his license to practice medicine. Bell v. Burson, 402 
U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Beauchamp v. DeAbadia, 779 F.2d 773, 775 (1st Cir. 1985) ("A clearer 
example of 'new property' is not easily imagined."); see Fleury v. Clayton, 847 F.2d 1229, 1233 
(7th Cir. 1988); Domino v. O'Neill, 702 F.Supp. 949, 952 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). Property 
"interests attain . . . constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially 
recognized and protected by state law, and we have repeatedly ruled that the procedural 
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment apply whenever the State seeks to remove or 
significantly alter that protected status." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1976). 
3 
Dr. Davis may not be deprived of a protected property interest without due process of 
law. U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Schware v. Bd of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957). 
Due process has three basic elements: (a) notice of the charges; (2) the opportunity to be 
heard; and (c) the process used must be reasonably calculated to protect the person's property 
interest. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971). "A fair trial in a fair tribunal 
is a basic requirement of due process." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1954). 
An unbiased decision-maker is a fundamental part of a fair trial. These principles apply 
to adjudicating administrative agencies as well as to courts. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 
579 (1973). "[E]very procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man 
as a judge . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, 
denies the latter due process of law/ Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). 
4. The Concentration of Adjudicatory, Prosecutorial and Investigative Functions in 
One Body Violates Dr. Davis' Due Process Rights. 
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that there be a separation 
between the adjudicator, prosecutor and investigator. There are dangers associated with 
combining these functions within a single entity. A judge who is not neutral, detached and 
disinterested cannot properly serve his function. "A genuinely impartial hearing, conducted with 
critical detachment, is psychologically improbable if not impossible, when the presiding officer 
has at once the responsibility of appraising the strength of the case and of seeking to make it as 
strong as possible." Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 44 (1949); e.g. In re 
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1954) see also Hoberman v. Lock Haven Hosp., 377 F.Supp. 
1178 (M.D.Penn. 1974) (loss of medical staff privileges; "It is well settled that a tribunal which 
combines the functions of prosecutor and judge into one body does not meet the due process 
4 
requirement of basic fairness."). "Fair trials are too important a part of our free society to let 
prosecuting judges be trial judges of the charges they prefer." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 
137 (1954). 
We value the very appearance of fairness in our courts and tribunals. 
It is not accidental that many of the specific provisions of the original constitution 
and the Bill of Rights are procedural. The only way we know when the 
government is behaving within its limits is when it goes through each step that we 
require of it. Those are not silly technicalities, but they are the essence of 
ordered liberty. 
Ramirez v. Ahn, 686 F.Supp. 590, 591 (S.D.Tex. 1987) (Procedural irregularities resulted in 
a denial of due process in a physician's license revocation proceeding.) "To perform its high 
function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."* In re Murchison, 349 
U.S. 133, 136 (1954) (quoting Offutt v. United States 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). 
Mere combination of adjudicative and prosecutorial functions within the same 
administrative agency without more, will not violate due process. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 
35, 58 (1974). Withrow is factually distinguishable from this case. It discusses the combination 
of functions in a single agency. The Utah Licensing Statute and the Board have combined these 
functions in a single individual, the Director Robinson. However, Withrow1s reasoning is 
persuasive. 
Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable but Mour system 
of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness." In 
re Murchison, supra, at 136; cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). In 
pursuit of this end various situations have been identified in which experience 
teaches us that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or 
decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. Among these cases are 
those in which the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome and in 
which he has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before 
him. 
5 
It must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as 
adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of 
psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and 
adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or 
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process 
is to be adequately implemented. 
Id. at 47. (Emphasis added); accord Huber Pontiac, Inc. v. Allphin, 431 F.Supp. 1168, 1170-71 
(S.D.I11. 1977), vacated on other grounds, Huber Pontiac, Inc. v. Whitler, 585 F.2d 817 (7th 
Cir. 1978). 
The Utah Supreme Court considered the Withrow standards and found them persuasive 
in In re Disciplinary Action of McCune, 111 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986). McCune involved the 
discipline of a lawyer by the Utah State Bar Association. Drawing no distinction between state 
and federal due process standards, the Utah Supreme Court said Tilt would have been a clear 
violation of state due process had bar counsel investigated, prosecuted and then participated as 
a judge in the adjudication of this case." Id. at 706. (Emphasis added). Unlike Utah's 
licensing scheme for physicians, the Utah State Bar Rules adequately divide the different 
functions and protect the integrity of the disciplinary process. Therefore, in McCune the Court 
held there was no violation of due process. 
The way the licensing statutes are structured, the Division Director Robinson is endowed 
with investigatory, prosecutorial and adjudicatory power. This, on its face, is constitutionally 
impermissible. 
n. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-35.1 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
AS APPLIED TO DR. DAVIS IN THIS CASE 
1. The prejudicial and extensive involvement of Robinson in the investigation of Dr. 
6 
Davis. 
In the present case, Mr. Robinson has intensely investigated and then actively and 
viciously prosecuted the Board's charges against Dr. Davis. The cumulative effect of 
Robinson's involvement renders him constitutionally unfit to act as adjudicator in the matter of 
Dr. Davis' license to practice medicine in the State of Utah. 
a. Dr. Davis sued Robinson in past and pending litigation. 
Due to the interrelationship between the Director Robinson and Dr. Davis in the past, 
Dr. Davis sued or tried to sue Robinson on at least three occasions. See Notice of Claim, dated 
August 3, 1988 (ultimately, no lawsuit was filed); (attached as Exhibit HAM); Davis v. City of 
West Jordan, Golden Barrett, David Robinson, Vie Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing, Robert Shober and Sandra Harrington, and John Does 1-10, United States District 
Court No. 90-C-638G; Davis v. Robinson, et. al., District Court No. 89-C-1087G, 10th Cir. 
appeal pending, Case No. 91-4034. The fact that Robinson now sits as adjudicator and sole fact 
finder of the Board's disciplinary division is inherently prejudicial to Dr. Davis. Among the 
various situations identified by the Supreme Court as unconstitutionally prejudicial is the 
situation where "the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome and in which he has 
been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him." Withrow, 421 U.S. 
at 47. In spite of any good faith on the part of Robinson he is unable, based on a "fair appraisal 
psychological tendencies and human weakness" to act as an unbiased finder of fact in this matter. 
Id. 
b. Robinson has investigated and pursued Dr. Davis in the past. 
Due to the confidential and sensitive nature of these issues, Dr. Davis has respectfully 
7 
requested that the Court hold an in camera hearing to consider the nature and extent ot 
Robinson's investigations of Dr. Davis since 1986. See Dr. Davis' Motion to Dismiss and 
Request for an In Camera Hearing, filed August 2, 1991. 
c. Robinson was extensively involved in the present investigation and 
prosecution of Dr. Davis. 
Robinson saw the Division's Petition against Dr. Davis the day before it was filed. 
(Robinson Deposition, p. 30 - 31, attached as Exhibit "B"). Robinson has been in attendance 
at hearings regarding Dr. Davis. (Robinson Deposition, p. 55 - 56, attached as Exhibit MB"). 
Robinson signed the investigative subpoenas issued in this matter. (See Exhibit HC"). He is 
ultimately responsible for the investigation and the state employees working on it. Mr. 
Robinson's bias, interest and personal involvement in the case violates Dr. Davis' due process 
rights to a fair and impartial tribunal. Under a "realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies 
and human weakness," it is clear in this case that Dr. Davis cannot receive a fair and impartial 
adjudication at his licensing revocation hearing from Mr. Robinson. 
CONCLUSION 
The Division's Petition against Dr. Davis should be dismissed because the statute under 
which it is filed is unconstitutional on its face. The statute deprives Dr. Davis of his due 
process rights under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution to a fair and 
impartial tribunal. 
Alternatively, the Petition should be dismissed based on the unconstitutionality of the 
statute as applied in this case. Director Robinson's involvement in the investigation and 
prosecution of Dr. Davis in this case is so extensive that it is utterly impossible for Dr. Davis 
to receive a fair and impartial hearing with Robinson sitting as sole and final finder of fact. 
8 
DATED this day of August, 1991. 
STIR 
Robert C. Davis 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1^ day of August, 1991, I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Melissa M. Hubbell 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State, #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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WILLIAM T THURMAN 
OAVlO P B R O W N 
WILLIAM THOMAS THURMAN 
PETER ST1R8A 
OAVlO L 8IRO 
RE10 TATEOKA 
STEPHEN W RUPP 
HARRY GASTON 
BRYAN A LARSON 
SCOTT C PIERCE 
JOEL T MARKER 
BENSON L HATHAWAY JR 
R BRET JENKINS 
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
A i^Of lSSONk Ct>WO«Ano* 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
SUITE 1200 KENNECOTT BUILDING 
» EAST SOUTH T£MPL£ STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84133 
<80U 521-4135 
August 3, 1988 
TO: State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATIONS 
DIVISION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
L60 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, UT 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO COMMENCE ACTION 
Of COU*S£L 
OAVlO t_ MO<AY 
TELEFAX 801-521 4 2 5 2 
The u n d e r s i g n e d a t t o r n e y s as counsel for Robert Davis , and 
p u r s u a n t t o the p r o v i s i o n s of Utah Code Annotated §63-30-1 
e t . s e q . (1953 , as amended), do hereby n o t i f y the S t a t e of Utah, 
Department of Bus iness R e g u l a t i o n s , D iv i s ion of P r o f e s s i o n a l 
L i c e n s i n g ("Respondent") t h a t they i n t end to commence an a c t i o n 
on b e h a l f of Robert Dav i s , M.D. ("Claimant") a g a i n s t you in the 
Un i t ed S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court fo r the D i s t r i c t of Utah, n i n e t y 
(90) days from s e r v i c e of t h i s n o t i c e . The a c t i o n a r i s e s out of 
the f o l l o w i n g f a c t s : 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about August 5, 1987, the Respondent was conduct -
ing an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of Cla imant . 
2. That p u r s u a n t to the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of Claimant . Respon-
den t s u p p l i e d an i n d i v i d u a l known to the Claimant wi th a r e c o r d -
ing dev i ce for the purpose of s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y record ing conver-
s a t i o n s between the i n d i v i d u a l and Claimant . 
3. That at the encouragement and direction of Respondent 
numerous conversations between the said individual and Claimant 
were recorded between August 5, 1987, and September 1, 1987. 
4. That said individual at the direction of Respondent, 
induced and entrapped through seductive behavior Claimant to make 
certain statements and disclosures of a confidential, personal 
and compromising nature, 
5. Respondent or it employees or agents failed to keep the 
investigation confidential and disclosed said confidential 
information to third parties unrelated to the investigation with 
the intent to deny Claimant his civil or constitutional rights or 
to otherwise defame or damage Claimant. 
NATURE OF CLAIMS ASSERTED 
1. Violation of plaintiff1s rights as protected by the 
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
2. Violation of plaintiff's rights as guaranteed by Section 
14, Article I, of the Constitution of Utah. 
3. Violation of Claimant's Civil Rights under 42 
U.S.C.§1983. 
4. Intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
DAMAGES 
Claimant has, among other things, suffered a deprivation of 
rights, severe emotional distress, humiliation, inconvenience and 
attorney's fees as a result of Respondent's intentional acts as 
set forth generally above and other intentional acts and 
omissions of a similar nature. 
DATED th i s 3 ^ " day of 4 ^"[^^~~ , 1988. 
^ — J 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
By: 
Attorneys for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO COMMENCE ACTION was mailed, postage prepaid, 
t h i s
 3 r day of August, 1988 to the following: 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATIONS 
DIVISION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
160 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney General 
State of Utah 
State CaDitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
BAL3 ^"^ 
1 Q When did that take place? 
2 A Probably three weeks ago, I would best guess. I 
3 don't know. I don't have my calendar. I can't tell you. 
4 About three weeks ago, I would think. 
5 Q Was a decision made at that time? 
6 A No. 
7 Q Whose decision is that? 
8 A It is my understanding that it is the Attorney 
9 General's decision. 
10 Q I believe you were going to indicate another 
11 occasion and I cut you off. 
12 A I was just trying to enumerate increased involvement 
13 I had in the Davis case. I don't think of anything that has 
14 changed. I still keep more than an arm's length from it. 
15 Q In the Davis case — and I'm referring to this most 
16 recent petition — did you review this specific petition 
17 before it was submitted to the Attorney General's Office? 
18 A No. 
19 Q When was the first time you saw this petition? 
2 0 A On the day — may I confer with counsel for a 
21 minute? 
2 2 Q You may. 
23 (Discussion off the record between witness and his counsel.) 
24 MR. HATHAWAY: Back on the record. 
25 A I saw the petition the day before it was filed. It 
30 
1 was presented to me by Melissa Hubbell, and she was in the 
2 process of reviewing it, as I recall, with Golden Berrett. 
3 There were some errors that you recall, some typo 
4 errors your secretary had made? 
5 MS, HUBBELL: Yes. 
6 A You took it back to your office. 
7 They had brought it believing it was a finished 
8 product for filing and they had to take it back and amend it 
9 and I saw it the next day again. So, I saw it the day before 
10 and the day it was filed. 
11 MS. HUBBELL: You didn't really see it the — 
12 A I didn't read it. I just saw it. 
13 MS. HUBBELL: I brought it in and realized 
14 there were typos. 
15 A To this day, I have not read the whole petition. I 
16 have scanned the petition. It is rather redundant and, 
17 frankly, I have not read every word in that petition. I have 
18 a general understanding of what's there, but I have not read 
19 it in its entirety. 
20 Q Have you read the last five allegations of the 
21 petition? 
22 A I'm aware that the last allegations in the petition 
2 3 have to do with sexual matters. I don't know how many there 
24 are, whether it is five or three. If you had asked me a number 
25 I would have said three. I'm aware that the last items in the 
31 
1 A The filing of the petition? 
2 Q Yes. 
3 A It may have been* 
4 Q You don't recall specifically whether it was or not? 
5 A No. 
6 Q Do you know, was Steve Davis involved in the filing 
7 of that petition? 
8 A He was the chief investigator. He would have been, 
9 yes. 
10 Q Do you typically attend the hearings held by the 
11 board? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Were you in attendance at these hearings that you've 
14 been referring to with Dr. Davis? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q Do you recall whether the board ever had a hearing 
17 where Dr. Davis or his counsel were not present? 
18 A I'm not aware of any. 
19 Q Other than your letter, does the board ever prepare 
2 0 an order or any type of findings? 
21 A When a hearing is held, the hearing goes forward. 
22 At the conclusion of the hearing — I'm present at that hearing 
23 and participate in that hearing. When the hearing is 
24 completed, the board deliberates on their own. I do not 
25 participate in that deliberation. With the Administrative 
55 
1 Law Judge, the board considers the case and makes its 
2 recommendations as to an order based upon the findings of fact 
3 that they make as a result of the hearing. That findings of 
4 fact and their recommended order is then drafted by the 
5 Administrative Law Judge. And so, yeah, they do make their 
6 findings of fact and recommended order. That is presented to 
7 me. 
8 Q Do you typically include that with your letter to 
9 the licensee? 
10 A What is generally included is, then I will cover 
11 that recommended order with an order adopting the recommended 
12 order, and that is then sent to the licensee. 
13 Q Have you ever had an occasion where you have not 
14 adopted the findings and recommendations of the board? 
15 A I think there are two times since I have been the 
16 Director that that has occurred. One I remember specifically, 
17 and I think there was one more but I don't remember which case 
18 it was. 
19 Q Neither of the cases involved Dr. Davis? 
20 A No. 
21 Q Once the board has made a decision, what procedure 
22 is followed? For example, in this case, a decision is made tc 
23 revoke a license. What then is procedurally done? 
24 A The order would be issued revoking the license and 
25 he would be given generally 30 days to submit — the 
56 
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DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
Heber M. Wei Is Building 
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45302 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34145 
Telephone: (801) 530-6721 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL ANO PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ) S U B P O E N A 
INVESTIGATION OF ) 
ROBERT C. DAVIS, M.D. ) D U C E S T E C U M 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH TO: 
ROBERT C. DAVIS and/or FAMILY MED. CENTER 
1781 WEST 9000 SOUTH 
WEST JORDAN, UTAH 
GREETINGS: 
PURSUANT to the provisions of Section 53-1-16 (3), Utan Code Ann., (1953 
as amended), you are required to forthwith produce and deliver to the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing of the State of Utah, the following items 
in your possession: 
Copies of all patient medical and business records identified on 
the attached pages including but not limited to sign in logs, 
patient consent forms, x-ray or imaging records, records and 
reports of laboratory work.—both requested and performed, 
progress notes, patient insurance authorization forms, health 
insurance claim forms and billing records. 
If not delivered on date of service, they are to be brought to Room 
460 of the Heber M. Wells Building. 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84110, within five (5) working days from date of service. 
DATED this 7 -cal. dav of 
S E A L 
,:.>.jj'.lr.- .-. 
'A 1989. 
0AV10 E. ROBINSOt/. DIRECTOR 
-2-
Janet K. Blevins 
Martin Blevins 
8 ill Brown 
Audry 0. Callister 
Brooke Ashley Callister 
Justin Clay Chesnut 
Janice Lynn Cisneros 
i/Bart L. Coverstone 
Michelle S. Coverstone 
v Timothy Davis 
Rolando I. Galano 
,'' Dav id Gal legos 
-- Claudia B. Gibbons 
\yy Sharon Grennan 
j
 Ore Halcom 
Connie J. Halcom 
- James R. Halcom 
A00RESS: 
11481 fit. Ridge Circle 
Sandy, UT 84092 
11481 fit. Ridge Circle 
Sandy, UT 84092 
78 Wheatfield Circle 
Draper, UT 84020 
3368 West Starlight Orive 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
3368 West Starlight Drive 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
7260 South 2700 West //5 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
3969 South Jester Drive 
West Valley City, UT 84123 
5542 Heathrow Circle 
Kearns, UT 84118 
5542 Heathrow Circle 
Kearns, UT 84118 
5811 West Lodestone Avenue 
Kearns, Ut 84118 
275 Truman Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
23 4 7 West Sugar Factory Road 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
13537 South 1300 West 
Riverton, UT 84065 
4768 South 700 East #135 
Murray, UT 84107 
3877 West Leicester 8ay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
38/7 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan, UT 84065 
3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan, UT 84065 
-3-
Michelle Halcom 3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan. UT 8406S 
Devin Jay Hardman 3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan, UT 8406S 
Jaylene Hardman 3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan. UT 8406S 
/Robert Calvin Henline 1629 West 11745 South 
Riverton. UT 84065 
Carla G. Jacobson 7245 South 700 East 09 
Midvale. UT 84047 
/George Ray Lewis 7981 South 3725 West 
West Jordan. Ut 84088 
Mildred fl. Martin 7089 South 1160 West 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
Sheri Murray 2076 Happiness Orive 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
Carol Ann Osier 7260 South 2700 West 05 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
Cary Wayne Patterson 9285 Vista West Drive 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
Shalise Patterson 7451 Miriam Way 
Magna. UT 84120 
Reese Snyder 3134 West 8565 South 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
Robin Snyder 3134 West 8565 South 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
Tanya Anne Stauffer 7980 South 2760 West 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
Oonald W. Stump 84 West Inglenood Drive 01112 
Midvale, UT 84047 
F. Esther Stump 84 West Inglenook Orive 01112 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Clifton Leon Wallace 3126 South 9000 West 
Magna, UT 84044 
Deborah Ann Wallace 3126 South 9000 West 
Magna, UT 84044 
-4-
Jennifer Ann Wallace 
Kenneth Dean Wallace 
Pamela Sessions Whitlock 
Wendee Whitlock 
x Bonnie K. Wilcox 
»•' David LeRoy Wilcox 
. Gloraine R. Wilcox 
»/ Jamie Raye Willette 
3126 South 9000 West 
Hagna, UT 84044 
3126 South 9000 West 
ttagna, UT 84044 
1407 West 12295 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
1407 West 12295 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
7245 South 700 East H9 
nidvale, UT 84047 
633 East 9000 South 
Sandy, UT 84070 
633 East 9000 South 
Sandy, UT 84070 
2840 West Strawberry Loop 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
DIVISION OF" OCCUPATIONAL AND PKOrCGGIONAt LICENSING 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 530-6721 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
^^^ OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0-0^^-0-O-O-O-0^^^-O--CM3-O^^^-O-O-O-O-^^ 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ) S U B P O E N A 
INVESTIGATION OF ) 
ROBERT C. DAVIS, M.D. ) D U C E S T E C U M 
_ _ _ ) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH TO: 
ROBERT C. DAVIS, M.D. 
FAMILY MEDICAL CENTER 
1781 WEST 9000 SOUTH 
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088 
GREETINGS: 
PURSUANT to the provisions of Section 58-1-16 (3). Utah Code Ann., (1953 
as amended), you are required to forthwith produce and deliver to the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing of the State of Utah, the following items 
in your possession: 
ALL PATIENT RECORDS INCLUOING X-RAYS, LABORATORY REPORTS, PROGRESS NOTES, 
CONSULTATION NOTES, HEALTH INSURANCE CLAIM FORMS & 8ILLING STATEMENTS 
FOR THE FOLLOWING: 
NAME:, ADDRESS: 
tC'Ienri E. Albertoni 974 Wellwood Road #29K 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
V David Wilford Andersen 4953 West Edinburgh Lane West Jordan, Ut 84088 
Ur'tyn E. Asay, Jr. 10425 Larkspur Drive 
Sandy, UT 84070 
'^ Jo-tTeph J. Balfour 1243 West 800 South 




Tzabeth Ann Black 
Laurence Oean 8lack 
a n e t K. Ble\/ins 
t i l Brown 
1 J£an L. B rown 
r e a Burton 
s t i n Clay Chesnut 
i JfrrCicG Lynn C isneros 
a rv i n R. Coon 
ffad Wayne Crowe 11 
^Ctn^lstine Crowe 11 
ig Scott Crowe 11 
iffini Shay Dunn 
cob Grant Ourtschi 
\j}x>rothy riae Ellis 
) Barbara Ann Espi inoza 
ADDRESS: 
2069 West 53SO South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84118 
2104 West 7420 South 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
2104 West 7420 South 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
11481 Mountain Ridge Circle 
Sandy, UT 84092 
78 Wheatfield Circle 
Draper, UT 84020 
1551 West Riverdale Road, Apt H5 
Ogden. UT 84405 
8976 South 1050 West 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
7260 South 2700 West ffS 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
3969 South Jester Drive 
West Valley City, UT 84123 
4962 Bonnyview Street 
Murray, UT 84107 
4934 West 6600 South 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
4934 West 6600 South 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
4934 West 6600 South 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
2436 Rustic Roads Drive 
South Jordan, UT 84065 
2330 West 12090 South 
Riverton. UT 84065 
46 West Malvern Avenue 
Salt Lake City. UT 84115 
263 Worth Sun Arbor Terrace #1164 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
-3-
NAttE: 
MAcfrn Arthur Fenstermaker 
Rolando I. Galano 
David Gallegos 
Rosetta K. Groves 
(_^Br^Halcom 
LConnie J . Halcom 
I D-ervin Jay Hardman 
y lene Hardman 
FrQd Harlman 
Kenneth Ray Henline 
L> faert Calvin Henline 
een Sue Hep le r 
<U2rYydQ LeRoy Hone, J r . 
AOORESS: 
1401 Luck Lane 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
275 Truman Avenue 
Salt Lake City. UT 84115 
2347 West Sugar Factory Road 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
767 Galena Orive 
Sandy. UT 84094 
3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
1625 West 4270 South 
Salt Lake City. UT 84123 
3877 West Leicester 8ay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
6950 Flamingo Way 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
12711 Bergen Circle 
Riverton. UT 84065 
1629 West 11745 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
2910 West 4650 South tfl48 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
2285 West 12250 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
L-
Catherine Elizabeth Hummell 3546 West 13400 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
-4-
NAHE: 
ristopher Edward Hummell 
es Fredrick Hummell 




/ E p v f n R. Judd 
/ Dei^blTe Kuronya 
Ac^Eric Lea Lawrence 
^dc am Jamison Lolofie 
en Joseph'Lolofie 
L^ftfis* a J o v e t t e L o l o f i e 
o r i Jo L o l o f i e 
W a l f o r d Fagatu lu imalerr .a lo 
L o l o f i e 
LWarfter G. f la lmborg 
esha 0. Mangum 
sa A. ttangum 
I S i f huy le r A. Mangum 
ADDRESS: 
3S46 West 13400 South 
Riverton. UT 8406S 
3546 West 13400 South 
Riverton. UT 84065 
1716 South 2nd East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
276 I Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
7245 South 700 East #9 
ttidvale. UT 84047 
2754 West 7000 South 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
4798 Settlers Way #11 
Murray. UT 84123 
1433 West Little Creek Drive 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
1649 West 8740 South 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
1649 West 8740 South 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
649 West 8740 South 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
1649 West 8740 South 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
1649 West 8740 South 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
3221 South 8000 West 
Magna. UT 84044 
4552 Barrington Orive 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
4552 Barrington Drive 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
4552 Barrington Drive 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
-5-
NAME: ADORESS: 
red M. Martin 
nald Edward Miller 
Canoa Ann Osier 
L~Si5mr~T^an3on 
L X ^ - r y ^ I a y n e P a t t e r s o n 
} Sh^Tise P a t t e r s o n 
t a r v i n Ray P e t t i t 
WAmanda J . Reagan 
LJ£aren J . Reagan 
CJ^PT^fopher M. Shepherd 
\ E&r€h A. Shepherd 
enda Jean Smith 
Tanya Anne Stauffer 
7089 South 1160 West 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
8858 South Capernaum Orive 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
7260 South 2700 West #5 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
4 Regal #63 
Murray. UT 84107 
9285 Vista West Drive 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
7451 Miriam Way 
Magna, UT 84120 
1241 West 10875 South 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
9556 South Angus Drive 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
9556 South Angus Drive 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
6696 Thimbleleaf Circle 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
6696 Thimbleleaf Circle 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
9830 South 475 East 
Sandy. UT 84070 
7980 South 2760 Wc?st 
West Jordan. UT 34088 
fnald W. Stump 84 West Inglenood Drive No. 1112 
Midvale, UT 84047 
i>* 
r s t h e r Stuinp 
rid a V. Thomas 
84 West Inglenook Or. #1112 
Midvale, UT 84047 
9210 South Lisa Avenue 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
1/ ravis Bront Thomas 9210 South Lisa Avenue 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
v.* 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL A NO PNOrCSSIONnL LICErjHirjG 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 530-6721 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL ANO PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
O-O-O-O^-O^-O-O-O-O^-O-O^-O-O-O-O^-^^ 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ) S U B P O E N A 
INVESTIGATION OF ) 
ROOERT C. OAVIS, (1.0. ) O U C E S T E C U M 
: ) • 
THE PEOPLE. OF THE STATE OF UTAH TO: 
ROBERT C. DAVIS, M.O. 
FAMILY MEDICAL CENTER 
1781 WEST 9000 SOUTH 
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088 
GREETINGS: 
PURSUANT to the provisions of Section 58-1-16 (3), Utah Code Ann., (1953 
as amended), you are required to forthwith produce and deliver to the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing of the State of Utah, the following items 
in your possession: 
ALL PATIENT RECORDS INCLUDING X-RAYS, LABORATORY REPORTS, PROGRESS NOTES, 
CONSULTATION NOTES, HEALTH INSURANCE CLAIM FORMS £ BILLING STATEMENTS 
FOR THE FOLLOWING: 
NAME: ADDRESS: 
Glenn E. Albcrtoni 974 Wellwood Road #28K 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
David Wilford Andersen 4953 West Edinburgh Lane 
West Jordan, Ut 84088 
Arlyn E. Asay, Jr. 10425 Larkspur Orive 
Sandy, UT 8 4070 
Joseph J. Balfour 1243 West 800 South 




Elizabeth Ann Black 
2069 West 53SO South 
Salt Lake City. UT 84118 
2104 West 7420 South 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
Laurence Dean Black 2104 West 7420 South 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
Janet K. Blevins 11481 nountain Ridge Circle 
Sandy. UT 84092 
B i l l 8 rown 78 Wheatfield C i rc le 
Draper. UT 84020 
Jean L. Brown 1551 West Riverdale Road, Apt H5 
Ogden, UT 84405 
Andrea Burton 8976 South 1050 West 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
Justin Clay Chesnut 7260 South 2700 West (fS 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
Janice Lynn Cisneros 3969 South Jester Drive 
West Valley City. UT 84123 
Marvin R. Coon 4962 Bonnyview Street 
Murray. UT 84107 
Chad Wayne Crowe 11 4934 West 6600 South 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
Christine Crowell 4934 West 6600 South 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
Craig Scott Crowell 4934 West 6600 South 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
Tiffini Shay Dunn 2436 Rustic Roads Drive 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
Jacob Grant Durtschi 2330 West 12090 South 
Riverton. UT 84065 
Oorothy rtae Ellis 46 West ttalvern Avenue 
Salt Lake City. UT 84115 
Barbara Ann Espinoza 263 Worth Sun Arbor Terrace #1164 
Salt Lake City. UT 84116 
- 3 -
Vern A r t h u r Fenstermaker 
Rolando I . Galano 
Oav/id Gal legos 
R o s e t t a K. Grov/es 
8 re Halcom 
Connie J. Halcom 
James R. Halcom 
Michelle Halcom 
Tony James Hall 
Devin Jay Hardman 
Jaylene Hardman 
Fred Hartman 
Kenneth Ray Henline 
Robert Calvin Henline 
Kaloen Sue Hepler 
Clyde LeRoy Hone, Jr. 
Catherine Elizabeth Hummel 1 
AQORESS: 
1401 Luck Lane 
Salt Lake City. UT 84106 
275 Truman Avenue 
Salt Lake City. UT 84115 
2347 West Sugar Factory Road 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
767 Galena Drive 
Sandy. UT 84094 
3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan, UT 84065 
3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
1625 West 4270 South 
Salt Lake City. UT 84123 
3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
38/7 West Leicester 8ay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
6950 Flamingo Way 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
12711 Bergen Circle 
Riverton, UT 84065 
1629 West 11745 South 
Riverton. UT 84065 
2910 West 4650 South # M 8 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
2285 West 12250 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
3546 West 13400 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
NAttE: ADORESS: 
Christopher Edward Hummell 3546 West 13400 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
James Fredrick Hummell 3546 West 13400 South 
Riverton. UT 84065 
Piper Rose Iverson 1716 South 2nd East 
Salt Lake City. UT 84115 
and/or 
Piper Rose Beagley 276 I Street 
Salt Lake City. UT 84103 
7245 South 700 East #9 
ttidvale. UT 84047 
Carla G. Jacobson 
Ervin R. Judd 
Debbie Kuronya 
Lori Jo Lolofie 
Walter G. ttalmborg 
Alesha 0 ttangum 
Lisa A ttangum 











West 7000 South 
Jordan. UT 84084 
West 8740 South 
Jordan. UT 84084 
West 8740 South 
Jordan. UT 84084 
West 8740 South 
Jordan. UT 84084 
West 8740 South 
Jordan, UT 84084 
West 8740 South 
Jordan. UT 84084 
Walford Fagatuluimalemalo 1649 
Lolofie West 
3221 South 8000 West 
ttagna. UT 84044 
4552 Barrington Drive 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
4552 Barrington Drive 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
4552 Barrington Drive 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
Erica Lawrence 1433 
West 
Adam Jamison Lolofie 
Aren Joseph Lolofie 
Atisa Jovette Lolofie 
4798 Settlers Way #11 
Murray. UT 84123 
West Little Creek 0 
Jordan. UT 84084 
-5-
NAME: AOORESS: 
Mildred M Martin 
Donald Edward Miller 
Carol Ann Osier 
7089 South 1160 West 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
8858 South Capernaum Drive 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
7260 South 2700 West #5 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
Sam Panson 
Cary Wayne Patterson 
4 Regal 063 
Murray. UT 84107 
9285 Vista West Drive 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
Shalise Patterson 
Marvin Ray Pettit 
Amanda J. Reagan 
7451 Miriam Way 
Magna. UT 84120 
1241 West 10875 South 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
9556 South Angus Drive 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
Karen J. Reagan 
Christopher M. Shepherd 
9556 South Angus Drive 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
6696 Thimbleleaf Circle 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
Edith A. Shepherd 6696 Thimbleleaf Circle 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
8renda Jean Smith 
Tanya Anne Stauffer 
Donald W. Stump 
F Esther Stump 
9830 South 475 East 
Sandy. UT 84070 
7980 South 2760 Wc^t 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
84 West Inglenood Drive Wo 1112 
Midvale. UT 84047 
84 West Inglenook Or 01112 
Midvale. UT 94047 
Lynda V Thomas 9210 South Lisa Avenue 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
Travis Brent Thomas 9210 South Lisa Avenue 
West Jo-dan. UT 84088 
-6-
NAME : 
Troy Lynn Thomas 9210 South Lisa Avenue 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
Clifton Leon Wallace 3126 South 9000 West 
magna, UT 84044 
Deborah Ann Wallace 3126 South 9000 West 
Magna, UT 84044 
Jennifer Ann Wallace 3126 South 9000 West 
Magna, UT 8404 4 
Kenneth Oean Wallace 3126 South 9000 West 
Magna, UT 84044 
Pamela Sessions Whitlock 1407 West 1229S South 
Riverton. UT 8406S 
Uiendee Whitlock 1407 West 12295 South 
Riverton, UT 8406S 
Bonnie K. Wilcox 7245 South 700 East #9 
Midvale, UT 84047 
David LeRoy Wilcox 633 East 9000 South 
Sandy. UT 84070 
Gloraine R. Wilcox 633 East 9000 South 
Sandy. UT 84070 
Jamie Raye Willette 2840 West Strawberry Loop 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
Julia Alice Zeeman 2502 Rustic Road Drive 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
If not delivered on date of service, they are to be brought to Room 
460 of the Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84110, within five (5) working days from date of service. 
DATED this //-^day of %k^r^,s.u/ 1989. 
DAVID E 
S E A L 
. ROBINSON. DIRECTOR 
• Jr. v^ v=•«'.-- f.\ 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AMD PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
lleber n. Wei Is 3ui Iding 
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 530-6721 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0-0^-0--0-^-0~0^^^^^-0^-0^^^-0^-0-0-0-0-0^^ 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ) S U B P O E N A 
INVESTIGATION OF ) 
ROBERT C. DAVIS, M.D. ) D U C E S T E C U M 
) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH TO: 
R08ERT C. DAVIS, M.D. 
FAMILY MEDICAL CENTER 
1781 WEST 9000 SOUTH 
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088 
GREETINGS: 
PURSUANT to the provisions of Section 58-1-16 (3), Utah Code Ann., (1953 
as amended), you arQ required to forthwith produce and deliver to the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing of the State of Utah, the following items 
in your possession: 
ALL PATIENT RECORDS INCLUDING X-RAYS, LABORATORY REPORTS, PROGRESS NOTES, 
CONSULTATION NOTES, HEALTH INSURANCE CLAIM FORMS & BILLING STATEMENTS 
FOR THE FOLLOWING: 
NAME: ADDRESS: 
Glenn E. Albertoni 974 Wellwood Road #28K 
Midvale, Utah 04O47 
David Wilford Andersen 4953 West Edinburgh Lane 
West Jordan. Ut 8A»088 
Arlyn E. Asay, Jr. 1042b Larkspur Drive 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Joseph J. Balfour 1243 West 800 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84104 
-2-
Pamela Barnes 
Elizabeth Ann 81ack 
2069 West 5350 South 
Salt Lake City. UT 84118 
2104 West 7420 South 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
Lawrence Oean Black 
Janet K. Bievins 
Bill Brown 
Jean L. Brown 
Andrea 8urton 
Justin Clay Chesnut 
2104 West 74 20 South 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
11481 Mountain Ridge Circle 
Sandy, UT 84092 
78 Wheatfield Circle 
Draper, UT 84020 
1551 West Riverdale Road, Apt H5 
Ogden. UT 84405 
8976 South 1050 West 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
7260 South 2700 West #5 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
Janice Lynn Cisneros 
Marvin R. Coon 
Chad Wayne Crowe 11 
3969 South Jester Orive 
West Valley City, UT 84123 
4962 Bonnyvieui Street 
Murray. UT 84107 
4934 West 6600 South 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
Christine Crowell 
Craig Scott Crowell 
4934 West 6600 South 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
4934 West 6600 South 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
Tiffini Shay Dunn 2436 Rustic Roads Drive 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
Jacob Grant Durtschi 2330 West 12090 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
Dorothy Mae Ellis 
Barbara Arm Espino^a 
46 West Malvern Avenue 
Salt Lake City. UT 84115 
263 Worth Sun Arbor Terrace #1164 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
-3-
PJA.^ E: AOORESS: 
\JQTH Arthur Fenstermaker 
Rolando I. Galano 
H O I Luck Lane 
Salt Lake City. UT 84106 
275 Truman Avenue 
Salt Lake City. UT 84115 
Ore Halcom 38/7 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
Connie J. Halcom 3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
James R. Halcom 3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
niche 1le Halcom 3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
Tony James Hall 1625 West 4270 South 
Salt Lake City. UT 84123 
Devin Jay Hardman 
Jaylene Hardman 
3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
3877 West Leicester Bay 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
Robert Calvin Henline 1629 West 11745 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
Kaleen Sue Hepler 
Clyde LeRoy Hone, Jr. 
2910 West 4650 South #148 
West Valley City. UT 84119 
2285 West 12250 South 
Riverton. UT 84065 
Catherine Elizabeth Humme11 3546 West 13400 South 
Riverton. UT 84065 
Christopher Edward Humme11 3546 West 13400 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
James Fredrick Hummel 1 3546 West 13400 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
Piper Rose Everson 
and/or 
Piper Rose Beagley 
1716 South 2nd Last 
Salt i *ke City. UT 84115 
276 I Street 
Salt L.^ ke Ci ty, UT 84103 
Car la G. Jacobson 7245 South 700 East #9 
nidv^ie UT ^ o n 7 
_ 4 -
NAME: 
Ervin R. Judd 
Oebbie Kuronya 
Erica Lawrence 
Adam Jamison Lolofie 
Aron Joseph Lolofie 
Atisa Jov/ette Lolofie 
Lori Jo Lolofie 
Walford Fagatuluimalomaio 
Lolofie 
Walter G. Malmborg 
Alesha 0. Mangum 
Lisa A. Mangum 
Schuyler A. Mangum 
Mildred M. Martin 
Donald Edward Miller 
Carol Ann Osier 
Sam Panson 
Gary Wayne Patterson 
AOORESS: 
2754 West 7000 South 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
4798 Settlers Way #11 
Hurray. UT 84123 
1433 West Little Creek Drive 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
1649 West 8740 South 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
1649 West 8740 South 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
649 West 8740 South 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
1649 West 8740 South 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
1649 West 8740 South 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
3221 South 8000 West 
Magna, UT 34044 
4 5*52 Barrington Drive 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
45152 Barrington Drive 
West Jordan. UT 84088 
4552 Barrington Drive 
West Jordan. UT 34088 
7089 South 1160 West 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
8858 South Capernaum Drive 
West Jordan. UT 84084 
7260 South 2700 West //S 
West Jordan, UT 'M084 
4 tfegal //6 3 
Murray. UT 84 107 
9285 Vista West 0ri\jQ 




Marvin Ray Pettit 
Amanda J. Reagan 
Karen J Reagan 
Christopher M. Shepherd 
Edith A. Shepherd 
Brenda Jean Smith 
Donald W. Stump 
F. Esther Stump 
Lynda V. Thomas 
7451 Miriam Way 
Magna, UT 84 120 
1241 West 10875 South 
South Jordan, UT 84065 
9556 South Angus Drive 
South Jordan. UT 84065 
9556 South Angus Drive 
South Jordan, UT 84065 
6696 Thimbleleaf Circle 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
6696 Thimbleleaf Circle 
West Jordan, UT 04O84 
9830 South 475 East 
Sandy, UT 84070 
84 West Inglenood Drive Wo. 1112 
Midvale, UT 84047 
84 West Inglenook Or. #1112 
Midvale, UT 84047 
9210 South Lisa Avenue 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
Travis 8rent Thomas 9210 South Lisa Avenue 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
Troy Lynn Thomas 
Clifton Leon Wallace 
Deborah Ann Wallace 
Jennifer Ann Wallace 
Kenneth Dean Wallace 
Pamela Sessions Whit lock 
Wendee Whitloc.K 
9210 South Lisa Avenue 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
3126 South 9000 West 
Magna, UT 84044 
3126 South 9000 West 
Magna, UT 84044 
3 126 South 9000 West 
Magna. UT 84044 
3 126 South 9000 West 
Magna, UT 8404A 
1407 West 12295 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
1407 West 12295 South 
Riverton, UT 84065 
-6-
NAttE: ADDRESS: 
8onnie K. Wilcox 
David LeRoy Wilcox 
Gloraine R. Wilcox 
724S South 700 East #9 
flidvale, UT 84047 
633 East 9000 South 
Sandy, UT 84070 
63 3 East 9000 South 
Sandy, UT 94070 
Jamie Raye Willette 2840 West Strawberry Loop 
West Jordan, UT 84084 
Julia Alice Zeeman 2502 Rustic Road Drive 
South Jordan, UT 84065 
If not delivered on date of service, they are to be brought to Room 
460 of the Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84110, within five (5) working days from date of service. 
DATED this J H J L daY of (Q^>tw 1988, 
S E A L 
A • rtf* - • 
DAVID E. ROBIT^ON, DIRECTOR 
lUCTORK THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL.LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ''''"'• "' 1991 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH r^"°fj>^"^L A PROFEqcm., 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES 
OF ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS TO 
PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO 
PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
• ^ - i lOlfMO 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
CASE OPL-89-73 
Subpoena for X Person X Documents 
TO: Dr. Ted Ailred 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER 
100 North Medical Drive 
(Pathology) 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear at the place, date, and time specified 
below to testify at the taking of a deposition in the above case. 
Place Date and Time 
215 South State Street 
Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
April 16, 1991 
9:00 a.m. 
YOU- ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to bring with you the following papers, 
documents, or other items: 
Any and all files, notes, memos, letters and/or other documents you have in your 
possession that in any way relate to Dr. Robert C. Davis. 
Any subpoenaed organization not a party to this suit is hereby admonished pursuant to Rule 4(B)(5), Model Administrative Discovery Rules for 
Agency Adjudicative Proceedings to designate one or more officers, directors, or managing directors, or managing agents, or other persons who 
consent to testify on its behalf, and setting forth, for each person designated, the matters on which he will testify or produce documents or things. 
The persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or reasonably available to the organization. 
^Pi i^ IDING OFFICER/ _ 
'-:<l?f?^s*z$ 
PLTFK STIRRA 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
215 South Stale Street 
Suite 1150 
Salt Lake Ctl>. I'Mh S41II 
Telephone (SOI) 3A4-S300 
if ? •? / 
UEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL A PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES 
OF ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS TO 
PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO 
PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
CASE OPL-89-73 
Subpoena for Person Documents 
T O : DR. DOUGLAS M. VOGELER 
9600 South 1300 East ^ ^ - t f H ^ j 
S u i t e 303 
Sandy, Utah 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear at the place, date, and time 
specified below to testify at the taking of a deposition in the above case. 
p,acc
 Date and Time Thursday, January 17, 1991 a t 4 :00 P.M. 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to bring with you the following papers, 
documents, or other items: 
Any and all files, notes, memos, letters and/or other documents you have 
in your possession that in any way relate to Dr. Robert Davis. 
Any subpoenaed organization not a paay to this suit is hereby adnKynishcd pursuant to Rule 4(B)(5), Model Administrative Discovery 
Rules for Agency Adjudicative Proceedings to designate one or more officers, directors, or managing dircaors. or managing agents, 
or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf, and setting forth, for each person designated, the matters on which he will 
testify or produce documents or things. The persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or reasonably available to the 
organization. 
ZL- ^2l~ 
'RESIDING OFFICER Haie I-?'?/ 
McKAY. BURTON & TIHJRMAN / / - ~f 
1200 Kennecott Building l£«* VY»?r. _ ^ / ^ / £ -
P ITER bTTRJIA 
*£^Vv 
10 East South Temple 
Salt IJWC Civ. I T S4I33 
Telephone: (KOI) 521-U35 
•%-j%: - ^ ^ 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IK THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES 
OF ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS TO 
PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO 
PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
CASE OPL-89-73 
Subpoena for Person Documents 
TO: Dr. Kent Richards 
Bryner Clinic 
745 East '300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear at the place, date, and time 
specified below to testify at the taking of a deposition in the above case. 
Place Date and Time Wednesday J a n u a r y 16, 1991 at 9:30 A.M. 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to bring with you the following papers, 
documents, or other items: 
Any and all files, notes, memos, letters and/or other documents you have 
in your possession that in any way relate to Dr. Robert Davis. 
Any subpoenaed organization not a party to this suit is hereby admonished pursuant to Rule 4(B)(5), Model Administrative Discovery 
Rules for Agency Adjudicative Proceedings to designate one or more officers, directors, or managing directors, or managing agents. 
or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf, and setting fonh. for cact\ person designated, the matters on which he will 
testify or produce documents or things. The persons so designated sh3(l testify as to matters known or reasonably available to the 
organization. 
M^^M^£=^=. 
PRESIDING OBFICER /-/*-?/ 
PITTER STIIUIA 
McKAY. BURTON & THURMAN" 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake Gty. LT S4133 
Telephone: (SOU 521-4135 
Tab I 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSING 
OF ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS TO 
PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO 
PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. OPL-89-73 
-0O0-
October 29, 1991 
1:00 p.m. 
Heber Wells Building, Third Floor 
-oOo-
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so 
issue. Thus, the assertion that we should exhaust this 
administrative remedy to subsequently aid the court in its 
review of that matter doesn't carry a great deal of 
persuasion with me. 
On the other hand, Mr. Stirba, I have a little 
difficulty with the fact that you have urged the need to get 
a declaratory action initiated and obtain a court decision 
before we have a hearing here. And from what you have 
represented today, you were aware indirectly, through 
counsel and the Federal District Court proceedings, that 
Judge Green had suggested that you were in the wrong forum 
there when you sought the same relief, but you haven't 
already filed that relief now. I question the delay. I 
think that if it it is a potential issue of 
significant importance. I admit and acknowledge that. But 
it seems to me, in requesting me to stay this proceeding, it 
would have been more appropriate to have already filed that 
action and have taken the steps to pursue that remedy before 
you ask me to stay this proceeding now. 
I acknowledge the fact, as set forth in the Clayton 
versus Bennett case, which is cited by the Division, through 
the Supreme Court, decided 298 Pacific 2nd 531 that Justice 
Crocket recognizes that declaratory relief and injunctive 
relief pursuant thereto is a correct method for challenging 
the constitutionality of a statute. 
Diana Kent, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
81 
I think what 1 am suggesting from what 1 just 
indicated is I v/ould deny any stay here and leave to you the 
opportunity to file that request for a declaratory relief in 
the district courts and accompany it with a request for 
injunctive relief and let the court address the issue 
whether they think these proceedings ought to be stayed. It 
is going to sound like a proverbial passing of the buck. 
But under the circumstances, I think it is the most 
equitable decision to make. 
The motion to stay, then, pending a request for 
declaratory judgment action in the District Court, is 
denied. 
Your other motions? 
MR. STIRBA: Fifth Amendment. It is in the nature of 
a dismissal motion or a stay. And basically the Court is 
aware of the issue because we ran through this in discovery. 
And the cases we are relying on, I believe we have cited 
them all. But basically there are three Supreme Court 
cases. And it is the Uniform Sanitation Man Association 
versus the Commissioner, which is 280 U.S. 280. Ifm sorry. 
Yes. Thatfs right. No. 392 U.S. 280. 
Another case is Stevik versus Kline, which is 385 
U.S. 511. Supreme Court case. 
And the final case the Gardner versus Broderick case, 
which is 392 U.S. 273. 
Diana Kent, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
o o 
o2 
And in essence, Judge, right now, and I think we 
attached this to our reply memo. Just recently, within the 
last month, Dr. Davis received a Grand Jury subpoena where 
he is named as a target of a federal investigation, which is 
a continuation of what previously was starting when they 
executed a search warrant in January of 1990. There's been 
a continuing series of subpoenas. And clearly they 
reference, as is indicated in the search warrant, their 
billing issues, same patients that overlap some of the 
patients in the Division's petition. 
There's absolutely no question, although there was 
some raising of this in the Division's response, there's no 
question as we sit here right now he is the target of a 
federal investigation, a criminal investigation, as 
witnessed by the subpoena that was issued to him, produce 
documents as of October 9, I believe it was, which we 
attached. 
Given that, and given the disability he has and the 
right he has under the Fifth Amendment to assert claims of 
privilege, it is our position that, based upon the Supreme 
Court cases which I just cited, which aren't directly on 
point, but they are as close as I could find, it is clear 
that you can't sanction somebody, you can't punish somebody, 
you can't say to somebody you are going to lose your job, 
much less your livelihood, where you are validly asserting a 
Diana Kent, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE"STATE"OF "UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSING 
OF ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS TO 
PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO 
PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. OPL-89-73 
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October 29, 1991 
1:00 p.m. 
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1 against. In a typical case, that individual that is the 
2 subject of this action may not be on probation and he, 
3 meaning Mr. Robinson, may not have been involved in 
4 monitoring compliance with that probation. But this, in 
5 your position, is not a typical case. 
6 MR. STIRBA: You said it very well. 
7 THE COURT: Before I open it to Miss Hubbell, we will 
8 take a brief recess before she begins. 
9 Let me comment on the matter you last raised. You're 
10 sensitive and correctly accurate when you indicate that I 
11 don't believe I have the authority and would not presume to 
12 exercise any jurisdiction over whether the statutory scheme 
13 here is unconstitutional on its face. It is clear, from the 
14 cases the Division has cited, that that's a matter for the 
15 courts to decide. Although it is not inappropriate for you 
16 to raise the issue here, for purposes of preserving it if 
17 necessary, for judicial review or independent action before 
18 any other court, I have no intention and will not rule on 
19 that aspect of your motion, although I do note that it was 
20 filed. Because I don't have the authority to address it. 
21 MR. STIRBA: Very well. 
22 THE COURT: Maybe that will save Miss Hubbell a 
23 little time in having to respond to that. Let's take a 
24 brief five minute recess and then we will proceed. 
25 
Diana Kent, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
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R. PAUL VAN DAM, #3312 
Utah Attorney General 
MELISSA M. HUBBELL, #5090 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State Street, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 533-3200 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL 
LICENSING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE 
OF ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS TO 
PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO 
PRESCRIBE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
NOTICE 
CASE NO. OPL-89-73 
In order to prevent unnecessary delay in the above stated 
matter, David Robinson, Director of the Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing will recuse himself from his usual role 
in these proceedings. The memorandum, depositions, and argument 
that have addressed this issue have clearly demonstrated that Mr. 
Robinson is not prejudice and could fairly and impartially 
participate in these proceedings. Dr. Davis' due process rights 
have not and would not be violated by Robinson's participation. 
Robinson has withdrawn in order to present further unnecessary 
delay in an already lengthy proceeding. 
DATED this
 v 3 day of VJ^MHM&</I /p 1931. 
CC01C0 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above 
is S{& Notice was mailed, postage pre-paid on th 
, 1991 to the following: 
Peter Stirba 
Stirba & Hathaway 
215 South State, #1150 




BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF : 
ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS 
TO PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO : 
ADMINISTER AND PRESCRIBE : 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES : 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER ON RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION TO STAY 
LICENSURE HEARING 
: CASE NO. OPL-89-73 
Appearances: 
Peter Stirba for Respondent 
Delia M. Welch for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: 
Pursuant to a September 2, 1992 motion, Respondent requests 
an indefinite stay of the hearing presently scheduled to commence 
on November 16, 1992 in this proceeding. The Division filed its 
response September 14, 1992. Respondent's final reply was filed 
September 18, 1992. 
Oral argument was conducted September 23, 1992 and 
telephonic conferences with respective counsel were subsequently 
conducted September 28, 1992 and October 1, 1992. 
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the 
premises, now enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondent contends the hearing in this disciplinary 
licensure proceeding should be indefinitely postponed until the 
resolution of a 41 count mail fraud indictment, now pending in 
federal district court. Respondent asserts any hearing in this 
adjudicative proceeding while that criminal prosecution is also 
pending would violate his privilege against self-incrimination, 
he would be substantially prejudiced by the "parallel prosecution 
of the administrative and criminal matters" and this Court 
"should exercise its discretion and ensure" he receives "a fair 
disposition of the charges pending against him in both matters". 
In response, the Division acknowledges the pending criminal 
prosecution involves "much of the same subject matter as the 
Petition in this case and even alleges misconduct with respect to 
some of the same patients". However, the Division contends no 
stay of the hearing in this proceeding is constitutionally 
mandated and Respondent would suffer no substantial prejudice if 
the November 16, 1992 hearing were conducted as presently 
scheduled. The Division further asserts the state's interest "in 
protecting the citizens of Utah from potential harm outweighs Dr. 
Davis' interest in delaying the hearing" in this forum. 
Prior to specifically addressing the instant motion, a brief 
summary is warranted as to the procedural history of both this 
licensure matter and the pending criminal prosecution. The 
Division initiated this adjudicative proceeding on December 7, 
1989 and substantial prehearing discovery has since been 
conducted. This Court previously stayed discovery in this 
proceeding for approximately three (3) months to increase the 
likelihood that a related criminal prosecution in state court 
proceedings could be concluded prior to any hearing in this 
2 
forum. Thereafter, further discovery was conducted and numerous 
motions and other procedural matters have been addressed. 
On August 2, 1991, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss or 
stay this administrative proceeding pending the resolution of 
various criminal investigations by the U.S. Attorneys Office, 
the State of Utah and the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. 
This Court took both that and numerous other motions under 
advisement as additional prehearing matters were addressed and 
resolved. By Order, dated May 7, 1992, Respondent's motion was 
denied. When that Order was entered, no federal, state or county 
criminal prosecution had been filed. Pursuant to a July 22, 1992 
Scheduling Order, a hearing of approximately 4 - 5 weeks is 
presently scheduled to commence in this proceeding on November 
16, 1992. 
On August 13, 1992, a federal grand jury returned a 41 count 
indictment which includes allegations of mail fraud, fictitious 
and fraudulent claims and aiding and abetting. On September 21, 
1992, the anticipated four week criminal trial was placed on a 
second calendar setting for November 30, 1992. Respective 
counsel in the criminal prosecution subsequently agreed to 
continue the trial of that matter, which is presently scheduled 
to commence April 5, 1993. 
This Court now reaffirms certain conclusions set forth in 
its May 7, 1992 Order. Specifically, no dismissal or stay of 
this adjudicative proceeding is constitutionally mandated by 
reason of any criminal prosecution which parallels - in some 
3 
respects - certain charges to be heard in this forum as to 
whether a basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction 
concerning Respondent's licenses to practice medicine and to 
administer and prescribe controlled substances. Simply put, no 
infringement of Respondent's Fifth Amendment privilege would 
occur if this case proceeds forward to a hearing under such 
circumstances. See Arthurs v. Stern, 560 F.2d 477 (1st. Cir. 
1977); Hoover v. Knight, 678 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1982); Diebold v. 
Civil Service Commission of St. Louis County, 611 F.2d 697 (8th 
Cir. 1979) ; Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Unnamed 
Attorney. 298 Md. 36, 467 A.2d 517 (1983); Smith v. Charnes. 728 
P.2d 1287 (1986). 
A court may decide "in its discretion to stay civil 
proceedings . . . when the interests of justice seerof ] to 
require such action" and such a determination is to be made "in 
light of the particular circumstances of the case". Securities 
and Exchange Commission v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F.2d 
1368, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The most compelling reason to enter 
a stay exists where "a party under indictment for a serious 
offense is required to defend a civil or administrative action 
involving the same matter". Id. at 1376. Thus, a court "may be 
justified in deferring" a noncriminal proceeding if delay of that 
proceeding "would not seriously injure the public interest". Id. 
(Emphasis added). 
This Court necessarily concludes it would be a gross 
miscarriage of justice to merely await the resolution of the 
4 
pending criminal prosecution at some unknown and distant time and 
to thus permit Respondent to effect any intended delay of that 
(and/or this) proceeding in efforts to promote and protect his 
varied interests which may be jeopardized by the eventual outcome 
of either that criminal prosecution or this administrative 
action. The Division has an appropriate ongoing interest in 
proceeding expeditiously to bring this case to resolution. This 
Court acknowledges Respondent will elect not to testify in any 
disciplinary licensure hearing conducted while the criminal 
prosecution is still pending. This Court finds no merit in 
Respondent's repeated assertion this administrative proceeding 
was initiated to obtain evidence for any subsequent criminal 
trial. 
Notwithstanding the similarities between certain allegations 
pertinent to both this administrative action and the pending 
criminal prosecution, the Court notes the distinctly different 
nature of sanctions which could enter in each proceeding. 
Regardless of the outcome of the criminal prosecution, further 
proceedings would likely still be necessary in this forum to 
address the status of Respondent's licenses to practice medicine 
and to administer and prescribe controlled substances. 
It is unknown whether Respondent's ongoing medical practice 
involves any conduct allegedly similar to that set forth in the 
December 7, 1989 Petition as to pose an immediate, significant or 
continuing danger to the public. However, this Court emphasizes 
a just and expeditious resolution of this proceeding is a proper 
5 
objective to both promote the public interest and bring this 
extended controversy between the Division and Respondent to an 
ultimate conclusion. This Court squarely rejects Respondent's 
urgence that a continuing and indefinite delay of the hearing 
before the Physicians Licensing Board in this proceeding is 
tolerable simply because approximately three years has already 
elapsed since the Division initiated this proceeding. 
Both parties acknowledge it rests within the sound 
discretion of this Court to determine whether there should be any 
continuance of the November 16, 1992 hearing. This Court is 
generally aware of the previous publicity attendant to this 
disciplinary licensure proceeding. The Court fully anticipates 
continued publicity of an escalated nature would probably occur 
during any subsequent hearing in this forum. It is foreseeable 
such publicity could jeopardize Respondent's right to a fair 
trial if this licensure action were held prior to that criminal 
prosecution. 
Further, the parallel proceedings in question involve 
certain common allegations of either unlawful or unprofessional 
conduct. Were Respondent to understandably and necessarily elect 
to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege in this proceeding 
prior to any subsequent criminal prosecution, certain evidence 
which might be otherwise presented to the Board during a hearing 
in this forum and which could assist the Board in its 
understanding of this case would not be available. 
With due regard for all of the foregoing, this Court 
6 
reluctantly concludes the November 16, 1992 hearing should be 
continued for a reasonably brief time. It is unfortunate the 
criminal prosecution will not commence until April 5, 1993. This 
Court would have preferred an earlier calendaring of that matter. 
However, this Court also concludes the public interest will not 
be seriously injured if the pending criminal prosecution is 
concluded on or about April 30, 1993 and this adjudicative 
proceeding is resolved - either by a stipulation or an order 
entered pursuant to a hearing before the Board - no later than 
mid-June 1993. 
One further matter must be addressed. This Court recognizes 
the possibility exists some intervening circumstances could 
prompt a rescheduling of the trial in the criminal prosecution to 
a later date. Entry of the order set forth below is only 
intended to afford Respondent the opportunity to defend the 
pending criminal prosecution as it is presently scheduled. There 
is little, if any, measurable likelihood of a continuance of the 
hearing in this adjudicative proceeding beyond mid-May 1993. 
This Court concludes the pending matter in this forum should be 
resolved within the above-described time. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED the November 16, 1992 hearing 
before the Physicians Licensing Board in this proceeding is 
continued. 
It is further ordered a subsequent hearing before the Board 
shall commence on or about mid-May 1993. The parties, respective 
7 
counsel, any witnesses and Board members shall be available and 
prepared to so commence that hearing, which may not conclude 
until mid-June 1993. The Court will contact respective counsel 
during the week of March 22 - 26, 1993 to address a schedule for 
both a final prehearing conference and the subsequent hearing in 
this proceeding. 
Counsel for Respondent shall notify the Court of any change 
in the date presently scheduled for commencement of the pending 
criminal prosecution. 
Dated this c day of October, 1992 
8 
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[8] Petitioner places great weight on 
oar decision in United States Catholic 
Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobiliza-
tion, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 108 S.Ct 2268, 101 
L.Ed.2d 69 (1988), a case involving a civil 
contempt order entered by the District 
Court. The contemnors, two nonparty wit-
nesses, refused to comply with a district 
court document subpoena. The District 
Court found them in civil contempt and 
ordered them to pay a fine of $50,000 per 
day. The contemnors, as was their nght, 
immediately appealed the contempt order, 
challenging the District Court's subject-
matter jurisdiction. We held that the 
Court of Appeals was obligated to consider 
the jurisdictional challenge in full, rather 
than simply contenting itself with an in-
quiry into whether the District Court color-
ably had jurisdiction. We further conclud-
ed that if the district court was found to be 
lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, that the 
contempt order would also fall. Focusing 
on this second part of our decision, petition-
er cites Catholic Conference as establish-
ing the proposition that a sanction must 
fall if imposed when jurisdiction is in fact 
absent4 
Catholic Conference does not stand for 
such a broad assertion. A civil contempt 
order has much different purposes than a 
Rule 11 sanction. Civil contempt is de-
signed to force the contemnor to comply 
with an order of the court, id., at 79, 108 
S.Ct, at 2272; Rule 11 is designed to pun-
ish a party who has already violated the 
court's rules. Cooter & Gell, supra, 496 
U.S., at 110 S.Ct, at . Given that 
civil contempt is designed to coerce compli-
ance with the court's decree, it is logical 
that the order itself should fall with a 
showing that the court was without author-
ity to enter the decree. Accord, United 
States v. Mine Workers, supra, 
4. Petitioner does acknowledge certain limited 
exceptions, see supra, n. 2. 
5. Our conclusion that the District Court acted 
within the scope of the Federal Rules and that 
the sanction may constitutionally be applied 
even when subject-matter jurisdiction is even-
The interest in having rules of procedure 
obeyed, by contrast, does not disappear 
upon a subsequent determination that the 
court was without subject-matter jurisdic-
tion. Courts do make mistakes; in cases 
such as Catholic Conference it may be 
possible immediately to seek relief in an 
appellate tribunal. But where such an im-
mediate appeal is not authorized, there is 
no constitutional infirmity under Article III 
in requiring those practicing before the 
courts to conduct themselves in compliance 
with the applicable procedural rules in the 
interim, and to allow the courts to impose 
Rule 11 sanctions in the event of their 
failure to do so.5 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
John J, MCCARTHY, Petitioner, 
v. 
Larry MADIGAN et al. 
No. 90-6861. 
Argued Dec. 9, 1991. 
Decided March 4, 1992. 
Federal prisoner brought Bivens ac-
tion seeking only money damages for deni-
al of medical care. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Kansas, Rich-
ard Dean Rogers, J., dismissed for failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies. The 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed, 914 F.2d 1411. The Supreme 
tually found lacking makes it unnecessary for 
us to consider respondent's alternative conten-
tion that the sanction may be upheld as an 
appropriate exercise of the District Court's "in-
herent powers." 
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Court, Justice Blackmun, held that prisoner 
who sought only money damages was not 
required to exhaust administrative reme-
dies provided by Bureau of Prisons' griev-
ance procedure. 
Reversed. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist filed an opin-
ion concurring in the judgment in which 
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
e»229 
Doctrine of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies is one among related doc-
trines, including abstention, finality, and 
ripeness, that govern the timing of federal 
court decision making. 
1. Miivmistratwt L O T smd Procwhure 
«=»229 
Of paramount importance to any ex-
haustion inquiry is congressional intent; 
where Congress specifically mandates, ex-
haustion is required but, where Congress 
has not clearly required exhaustion, sound 
judicial discretion governs. 
3. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=>229 
Constitutional Law «=>70.1(11) 
Appropriate deference to Congress' 
power to prescribe the basic procedural 
scheme under which claim may be heard in 
federal court requires fashioning of ex* 
haustion principles in a manner consistent 
with congressional intent and any applica* 
ble statutory scheme. 
4. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<8=>229 
Exhaustion is required because it 
serves the twin purposes of protecting ad-
ministrative agency authority and promot-
ing judicial efficiency. 
5. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<fc=>229 
Exhaustion doctrine recognizes the no* 
tion, grounded in deference to Congress' 
delegation of authority to coordinate 
branches of government, that agencies, not 
the courts, ought to have responsibility for 
programs that Congress has charged them 
to administer. 
6. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<*=229 
Exhaustion concerns apply with partic-
ular force when action under review in-
volves exercise of agency's discretionary 
power or when agency proceedings in ques-
tion allow agency to apply its special exper-
tise. 
7. Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=>229 
Exhaustion doctrine acknowledges 
commonsense notion of dispute resolution 
that agency ought to have an opportunity 
to correct its own mistakes with respect to 
programs it administers before it is haled 
into federal court 
8. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=>229 
Exhaustion principles apply with spe-
cial force when frequent and deliberate 
flouting of administrative processes could 
weaken agency's effectiveness by encour-
aging disregard of its procedures. 
9. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<*=>229 
When agency has opportunity to cor-
rect its own errors, judicial controversy 
may well be mooted, or at least piecemeal 
appeals may be avoided and, even when 
controversy survives administrative review, 
exhaustion of administrative procedure 
may produce useful record for subsequent 
judicial consideration, especially in a com-
plex or technical factual context 
10. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<S=>229 
Federal Courts <&»41 
Notwithstanding substantial institu-
tional interests in favor of exhaustion re-
quirement, federal courts are vested with 
virtually unflagging obligation to exercise 
jurisdiction given them. 
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11. Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=>229 
In determining whether exhaustion is 
required, federal courts must balance inter-
ests of individual in retaining prompt ac-
cess to federal judicial forum against coun-
tervailing institutional interests favoring 
exhaustion; application of balancing princi-
ple is intensely practical because attention 
is directed to both the nature of the claim 
presented and the characteristics of partic-
ular administrative procedure provided. 
12. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=>229 
Circumstances in which interests of in-
dividual weigh heavily against requiring 
administrative exhaustion are when requir-
ing resort to administrative remedy may 
occasion undue prejudice to subsequent as-
sertion of a court action, when the adminis-
trative remedy is inadequate because of 
some doubt as to whether the agency is 
empowered to grant effective relief, or 
when the administrative remedy would be 
inadequate because the administrative body 
is shown to be biased or has otherwise 
predetermined the issue before it. 
13. United States <3=>127(2) 
Administrative Law and Procedure 
e=>229 
Federal prisoner who brought Bivens 
action seeking only money damages for 
violation of Eighth Amendment rights be-
cause of inadequate medical treatment was 
not required to exhaust administrative rem-
edies through Bureau of Prisons' general 
grievance procedure; grievance procedure 
presented significant procedural hurdles to 
assertion of claim and did not provide for 
award of money damages. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 8. 
14. United States e=»127(2) 
By delegating authority in the most 
general terms to the Bureau of Prisons to 
administer federal system, Congress did 
not speak to the particular issue of wheth-
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Re-
porter of Decisions for the convenience of the 
er prisoners in the custody of the Bureau 
should have direct access to federal courts. 
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 4001(b), 4042. 
15. United States <*=>127(2) 
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Per-
sons Act, imposing limited exhaustion re-
quirement for claim brought by state pris-
oner under federal civil rights statute, does 
not apply to Bivens claims. Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act, § 6, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1997e. 
16. United States e=>50(3) 
Bivens remedy does not lie where Con-
gress has provided equally effective alter-
native remedy and declared it to be substi-
tute for recovery under Constitution or 
where, even in absence of affirmative ac-
tion by Congress, special factors counsel 
hesitation. 
Syllabus * 
While a federal prisoner, petitioner 
McCarthy filed a damages action under 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct 1999, 29 
L.Ed.2d 619, alleging that respondent pris-
on officials had violated his Eighth Amend-
ment rights by their deliberate indifference 
to his needs and medical condition resulting 
from a back operation and a history of 
psychiatric problems. The District Court 
dismissed his complaint on the ground that 
"he had failed to exhaust the Federal Bu-
reau of Prisons' administrative remedy pro-
cedure, which, inter alia, includes rapid 
filing and response timetables to promote 
efficient dispute resolution but does not 
provide for any kind of hearing or for the 
granting of any particular type of relief. 
The court then denied McCarthy's motion 
for reconsideration, rejecting his argument 
that exhaustion was not required because 
he sought only money damages, which the 
Bureau could not provide. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed. 
reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 
200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct 282, 287. 50 LXd. 
499. 
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Held: Exhaustion of the Bureau of 
Prisons1 administrative procedure is not re-
quired before a federal prisoner can initiate 
a Bivens action solely for money damages. 
Pp. 1086-1092. 
(a) Exhaustion serves the twin pur-
poses of protecting administrative agency 
authority and promoting judicial efficiency. 
Where Congress specifically mandates, ex-
haustion is required. Otherwise, the feder-
al courts must exercise sound judicial dis-
cretion, determining whether to require ex-
haustion by balancing the individual's inter-
est in retaining prompt access to a federal 
judicial forum against countervailing insti-
tutional interests favoring exhaustion. In-
dividual interests have weighed heavily 
where resort to the administrative remedy 
would occasion undue prejudice to subse-
quent assertion of a court action, where 
there is some doubt as to whether the 
agency is empowered to grant effective 
relief, or where the administrative body is 
shown to be biased or has otherwise prede-
termined the issue before it Pp. 1086-
1088. 
(b) Congress has not required exhaus-
tion of a federal prisoner's Bivens claim. 
And, given the type of claim McCarthy 
raises and the particular characteristics of 
the Bureau's general grievance procedure, 
McCarthy's individual interests outweigh 
countervailing institutional interests favor-^  
ing exhaustion. The procedure's short, 
successive filing deadlines and the absence 
of any monetary remedy heavily burden a 
petitioning inmate's individual interests. 
In contrast, while the Bureau has a sub-
stantial interest in encouraging internal 
resolution of grievances and in preventing 
the undermining of its authority by unnec-
essary resort of prisoners to the federal 
courts, other institutional concerns do not 
weigh heavily in favor of exhaustion. The 
Bureau's alleged failure to render medical 
care implicates only tangentially its author-
ity to carry out the control and manage-
1. Compare Hessbrook v. Lennon, 111 F.2d 999 
(CA5 1985) (exhaustion required), and Brice v. 
Day, 604 F.2d 664 (CA10 1979) (same), cert 
denied, 444 U.S. 1086,100 S.Ct. 1045, 62 L.Ed.2d 
ment of the federal prisons, and the Bu-
reau does not bring to bear any special 
expertise on the type of issue presented for 
resolution here. Nor are the interests of 
judicial economy advanced substantially by 
the grievance procedure, which does not 
create a formal factual record of the type 
that can be relied on conclusively by a 
court for disposition of a prisoner's claim 
on the pleadings or at summary judgment 
without the aid of affidavits. Pp. 1088-
1092. 
914 F.2d 1411 (CA10 1990), reversed. 
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion 
of the Court, in which WHITE, STEVENS, 
O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, 
JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, CJ., filed an 
opinion concurring in the judgment, in 
which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined. 
Paul M. Smith, argued, for petitioner. 
Maureen E. Mahoney, argued, for re-
spondents. 
Justice BLACKMUN delivered the 
opinion of the Court 
The issue in this case is whether a feder-
al prisoner must resort to the internal 
grievance procedure promulgated by the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons before he may 
initiate a suit, pursuant to the authority of 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct 1999, 29 
L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), solely for money dam-
ages. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit ruled that exhaustion of the griev-
ance procedure was required. McCarthy 
v. Maddigan, 914 F.2d 1411 (CA10 1990). 
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict 
among the Courts of Appeals.1 — U.S. 
, 111 S.Ct 1618, 113 L.Ed.2d 716 
(1991). 
772 (1980), with Muhammad v. Carlson, 739 
F2d 122 (CA3 1984) (exhaustion not required), 
and Goar v. Civtletti, 688 F.2d 27 (CA6 1982) 
(same). 
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I 
While he was a prisoner in the federal 
penitentiary at Leavenworth, petitioner 
John J. McCarthy filed a pro se complaint 
in the United States District Court for the 
District of Kansas against four prison em-
ployees: the hospital administrator, the 
chief psychologist, another psychologist, 
and a physician. McCarthy alleged that 
respondents had violated his constitutional 
rights under the Eighth Amendment by 
their deliberate indifference to his needs 
and medical condition resulting from a 
back operation and a history of psychiatric 
problems. On the first page of his com-
plaint, he wrote: "This Complaint seeks 
Money Damages Only." App. 7. 
The District Court dismissed the com-
plaint on the ground that petitioner had 
failed to exhaust prison administrative rem-
edies. Id., at 12. Under 28 CFR Part 542 
(1991), setting forth the general "Adminis-
trative Remedy Procedure for Inmates" at 
federal correctional institutions, a prisoner 
may "seek formal review of a complaint 
which relates to any aspect of his imprison-
ment/' § 542.10.* When an inmate files a 
complaint or appeal, the responsible offi-
cials are directed to acknowledge the filing 
with a "signed receipt" which is returned 
to the inmate, to "[conduct an investiga-
tion," and to "[r]espond to and sign all 
complaints or appeals." §§ 542.11(aX2) to 
(4). The general grievance regulations do 
not provide for any kind of hearing or for 
the granting of any particular type of re-
lief. 
2. Certain categories of filings, however, "will 
not be accepted" under the general procedure. 
These include, among others, "tort claims.'* See 
' 28 CFR § 542.12 (1991). The Bureau of Prisons 
has interpreted this "tort claims'* exception to 
include claims under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act but not constitutional claims for relief rec-
ognized under the Bivens case. Brief for Re-
spondents 3, n. 1. Claims under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act are governed by a separate 
administrative procedure. See §§ 543J0 to 
543.32 (1991). 
3. McCarthy actually had initiated a grievance 
prior to filing his complaint in the District 
To promote efficient dispute resolution, 
the procedure includes rapid filing and re-
sponse timetables. An inmate first seeks 
informal resolution of his claim by consult-
ing prison personnel. § 542.13(a). If this 
informal effort fails, the prisoner "may file 
a formal written complaint on the appropri-
ate form, within 15 calendar days of the 
date on which the basis of the complaint 
occurred." § 542.13(b). Should the ward-
en fail to respond to the inmate's satisfac-
tion within 15 days, the inmate has 20 days 
to appeal to the Bureau's Regional Di-
rector, who has 30 days to respond If the 
inmate still remains unsatisfied, he has 30 
days to make a final appeal to the Bureau's 
General Counsel, who has another 30 days 
to respond. §§ 542.14 and .15. If the in-
mate can demonstrate a "valid reason for 
delay," he "shall be allowed" an extension 
of any of these time periods for filing. 
§ 542.13(b). 
Petitioner McCarthy filed with the Dis-
trict Court a motion for reconsideration 
under Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 60(b), arguing 
that he was not required to exhaust his 
administrative remedies, because he sought 
only money damages which, he claimed, the 
Bureau could not provide.3 Record (Exh. 
7), The court denied the motion. App. 14. 
The Court of Appeals, in affirming, ob-
served that because Bivens actions are a 
creation of the judiciary, the courts may 
impose reasonable conditions upon their fil-
ing. 914 F.2d, at 1412. The exhaustion 
rule, the court reasoned, "is not keyed to 
the type of relief sought, but to the need 
for preliminary fact-finding" to determine 
Court. Brief for Petitioner 5, n. 7. But he did 
not exhaust the procedures at that time and, in 
any event, he concedes that that grievance relat-
ed to his request for a private cell and not to the 
medical issues at the heart of his federal com-
plaint. After his initial grievance was dis-
missed, he filed a grievance with respect to the 
medical issues. It was accepted, even though it 
was late, but was denied by the warden on the 
merits. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. McCarthy's subse-
quent appeal to the Bureau's regional office was 
rejected because it was filed late. Id., at 16; 
Brief for Petitioner 5, n. 7. 
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"whether there is a possible Bivens cause 
of action." Ibid. Accordingly, "'[a]l-
though the administrative apparatus could 
not award money damages . . . , administra-
tive consideration of the possibility of cor-
rective action and a record would have aid-
ed a court in measuring liability and deter-
mining the extent of the damages.' " Ibid., 
quoting Goar v. Civiletti, 688 F.2d 27, 29 
(CA6 1982) (emphasis in original). Exhaus-
tion of the general grievance procedure 
was required notwithstanding the fact that 
McCarthy's request was solely for money 
damages. 
II 
[1-3] The doctrine of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies is one among related 
doctrines—including abstention, finality, 
and ripeness—that govern the timing of 
federal court decisionmaking. Of "para-
mount importance" to any exhaustion in-
quiry is congressional intent Patsy v. 
Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 
501, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2560, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 
(1982). Where Congress specifically man-
dates, exhaustion is required. Coit Inde-
pendence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 
U.S. 561, 579, 109 S.Ct 1361, 1371, 103 
L.Ed.2d 602 (1989); Patsy, 457 U.S., at 502, 
n. 4, 102 S.Ct, at 2560, n. 4. But where 
Congress has not clearly required exhaus-
tion, sound judicial discretion governs. 
McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479,^83, 
n. 6, 91 S.Ct 1565, n. 6, 29 L.Ed.2d 47 
(1971). See also Patsy, 457 U.S., at 518, 
102 S.Ct, at 2568 (WHITE, J., concurring 
in part) ("[E]xhaustion is 'a rule of judicial 
administration/ . . . and unless Congress 
direete othfcr*ri&fc, rigtvtfulfy %vb}e£t to 
crafting by judges."). Nevertheless, even 
in this field of judicial discretion, appropri-
ate deference to Congress* power to pre-
scribe the basic procedural scheme under 
which a claim may be heard in a federal 
court requires fashioning of exhaustion 
principles in a manner consistent with con-
gressional intent and any applicable statu-
tory scheme. Id., at 501-502, and n. 4, 102 
S.Ct, at 2560, and n. 4. 
A 
[4] This Court long has acknowledged 
the general rule that parties exhaust pre-
scribed administrative remedies before 
seeking relief from the federal courts. 
See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuild-
ing Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, and n. 9, 58 
S.Ct 459, 463-464, and n. 9 (1938) (discuss-
ing cases as far back as 1898). Exhaustion 
is required because it serves the twin pur-
poses of protecting administrative agency 
authority and promoting judicial efficiency. 
[5-8] As to the first of these purposes, 
the exhaustion doctrine recognizes the no-
tion, grounded in deference to Congress' 
delegation of authority to coordinate 
branches of government, that agencies, not 
the courts, ought to have primary responsi-
bility for the programs that Congress has 
charged them to administer. Exhaustion 
concerns apply with particular force when 
the action under review involves exercise 
of the agency's discretionary power or 
when the agency proceedings in question 
allow the agency to apply its special exper-
tise. McKart v. United States, 395 U S. 
185, 194, 89 S.Ct 1657, 1662, 23 L.Ed.2d 
194 (1969). See also Bowen v. City of New 
York, 476 U.S. 467, 484, 106 S.Ct 2022, 
2032, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986). The exhaus-
tion doctrine also acknowledges the com-
monsense notion of dispute resolution that 
an agency ought to have an opportunity to 
correct its own mistakes with respect to the 
programs it administers before it is haled 
into federal court. Correlatively, exhaus-
tion principles apply with special force 
when "frequent and deliberate flouting of 
agency's effectiveness by encouraging dis-
regard of its procedures. McKart v. Unit-
ed States, 395 U.S., at 195, 89 S.Ct, at 
1663. 
[9] As to the second of the purposes, 
exhaustion promotes judicial efficiency in 
at least two ways. When an agency has 
the opportunity to correct its own errors, a 
judicial controversy may well be mooted, or 
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at least piecemeal appeals may be avoided. 
See, e.g., Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 
37, 92 S.Ct 815, 817, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972); 
McKart v. United States, 395 U.S., at 195, 
89 S.Ct., at 1663. And even where a con-
troversy survives administrative review, 
exhaustion of the administrative procedure 
may produce a useful record for subse-
quent judicial consideration, especially in a 
complex or technical factual context. See, 
e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765, 
95 S.Ct 2457, 2466, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) 
(exhaustion may allow agency "to compile 
a record which is adequate for judicial re-
view"). 
B 
[10,11] Notwithstanding these substan-
tial institutional interests, federal courts 
are vested with a "virtually unflagging ob-
ligation" to exercise the jurisdiction given 
them. Colorado River Water Conserva-
tion Dist v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 
817-818, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246-1247, 47 
L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). "We have no more 
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction 
which is given, than to usurp that which is 
not given." Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 
264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821). Accordingly, 
this Court has declined to require exhaus-
tion in some circumstances even where ad-
ministrative and judicial interests would 
counsel otherwise. In determining wheth-
er exhaustion is required, federal courts 
must balance the interest of the individual 
in retaining prompt access to a federal 
judicial forum against countervailing insti-
tutional interests favoring exhaustion. 
"[Administrative remedies need not be 
pursued if the litigant's interests in imme-
diate judicial review outweigh the govern-
ment's interests in the efficiency or admin-
istrative autonomy that the exhaustion doc-
trine is designed to further." West v. 
Bergland, 611 F.2d 710, 715 (CA8 1979), 
cert, denied, 449 U.S. 821, 101 S.Ct. 79, 66 
L.Ed.2d 23 (1980). Application of this bal-
ancing principle is "intensely practical," 
Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S., at 
484, 106 S.Ct, at 2032, citing Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331, n. 11, 96 S.Ct 
893, 901, n. 11, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), be 
cause attention is directed to both the na-
ture of the claim presented and the charac-
teristics of the particular administrative 
procedure provided. 
C 
[12] This Court's precedents have rec-
ognized at least three broad sets of circum-
stances in which the interests of the indi-
vidual weigh heavily against requiring ad-
ministrative exhaustion. First, requiring 
resort to the administrative remedy may 
occasion undue prejudice to subsequent as-
sertion of a court action. Such prejudice 
may result, for example, from an unreason-
able or indefinite timeframe for administra-
tive action. See Gibson v. Berry hill, 411 
U.S. 564, 575, n. 14, 93 S.Ct 1689, 1696, n. 
14, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973) (administrative 
remedy deemed inadequate "[m]ost often 
. . . because of delay by the agency"). See 
also Coit Independence Joint Venture v. 
FSLIC, 489 U.S., at 587, 109 S.Ct, at 1376 
("Because the Bank Board's regulations do 
not place a reasonable time limit on 
FSLIC's consideration of claims, Coit can-
not be required to exhaust those proce-
dures"); Walker v. Southern R. Co., 385 
U.S. 196, 198, 87 S.Ct 365, 366, 17 L.Ed.2d 
294 (1966) (possible delay of 10 years in 
administrative proceedings makes exhaus-
tion unnecessary); Smith v. Illinois Bell 
Telephone Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591-592, 46 
S.Ct 408, 410, 70 L.Ed. 747 (1926) (claimant 
"is not required indefinitely to await a deci-
sion of the rate-making tribunal before ap-
plying to a federal court for equitable re-
lief). Even where the administrative deci-
sionmaking schedule is otherwise reason-
able and definite, a particular plaintiff may 
suffer irreparable harm if unable to secure 
immediate judicial consideration of his 
claim. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 
U.S., at 483, 106 S.Ct, at 2031 (disability-
benefit claimants "would be irreparably in-
jured were the exhaustion requirement 
now enforced against them"); Aircraft & 
Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 
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countervailing institutional interests favor-
ing exhaustion. 
[14] Turning first to congressional in-
tent, we note that the general grievance 
procedure was neither enacted nor mandat-
ed by Congress. Respondents, however, 
urge that Congress, in effect, has acted to 
require exhaustion by delegating power to 
the Attorney General and the Bureau of 
Prisons to control and manage the federal 
prison system. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4001(b) 
and 4042. Brief for Respondents 3, 16; Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 41-42. We think respondents 
confuse what Congress could be claimed to 
allow by implication with what Congress 
affirmatively has requested or required. 
By delegating authority, in the most gener-
al of terms, to the Bureau to administer the 
federal prison system, Congress cannot be 
said to have spoken to the particular issue 
whether prisoners in the custody of the 
Bureau should have direct access to the 
federal courts. 
[15] Respondents next argue that Con-
gress, by enactment of § 7 of the Civil 
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 
Pub.L. 96-247, 94 Stat 352, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e, has articulated a policy favoring 
exhaustion of the prison grievance proce-
dure prior to the filing of a constitutional 
claim against prison officials. Section 
1997e imposes a limited exhaustion require-
ment for a claim brought by a state prison-
er under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provided that 
the underlying state prison administrative 
remedy meets specified standards. See 
Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 
U.S., at 507-512, 102 S.Ct, at 2563-65. 
4. The Conference Committee report states: "It is 
the intent of the Congress that the court not find 
such a requirement [of exhaustion] appropriate 
in those situations m which the action brought 
. •. raises issues which cannot, in reasonable 
probability, be resolved by the grievance resolu-
tion system...." HJLConf.Rep. No. 96-897, p. 
15 (1980). 
The Attorney General, charged under the stat-
ute with certifying the adequacy of state admin-
istrative remedial schemes, has provided by reg-
112ASCL-6 
Section 1997e has no direct application in 
this case, because at issue here is a Bivens 
claim by a federal prisoner against federal 
prison officials. We find it significant that 
Congress, in enacting § 1997e, stopped 
short of imposing a parallel requirement in 
the federal prison context. 
Section 1997e is not only inapplicable to 
Bivens claims, but—by its own terms— 
cuts against respondents' claim that the 
particular procedure now at issue need be 
exhausted. First, unlike the rule of ex-
haustion proposed here, § 1997e does not 
authorize dismissal of an action for failure 
to exhaust Instead, it provides that the 
action is to be stayed for a maximum of 90 
days. See § 1997e(a)(l). Second, § 1997(e) 
does not mechanically require exhaustion in 
every case where an acceptable state proce-
dure is in place. Rather, it directs federal 
courts to abstain "if the court believes that 
such a [waiting] requirement would be ap-
propriate and in the interests of justice." 
§ 1997e(aKl). In other words, if an inmate 
fails to meet filing deadlines under an ad-
ministrative scheme, a court has ample dis-
cretion to determine that exhaustion none-
theless should be forgone. Third, in con-
trast to the absence of any provision for 
the award of money damages under the 
Bureau's general grievance procedure, the 
statute conditions exhaustion on the exist-
ence of "effective administrative reme-
dies." 4 It is difficult to see why a stricter 
rule of exhaustion than Congress itself has 
required in the state prison context should 
apply in the federal prison context 
[16] Respondents also argue that re-
quiring exhaustion is appropriate because 
Bivens relief gives way when necessary to 
ulation: The [state] grievance procedure shall 
afford a successful grievant a meaningful reme-
dy." 28 CFR § 40.6 (1991) (emphasis added). 
At the time of promulgating these regulations, 
the Department of Justice observed on the pub-
lic record: "Presumably, where monetary relief 
was the sole adequate remedy and could not be 
obtained through a grievance procedure, ex-
haustion would not be appropriate." 46 Fed. 
Reg. 3845 (1981). 
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accommodate either the effective function-
ing of government or an articulated con-
gressional policy. Brief for Respondents 
15. We have recognized that a Bivens 
remedy does not lie in two situations: (1) 
where Congress has provided an equally 
effective alternative remedy and declared it 
to be a substitute for recovery under the 
Constitution, and (2) where, in the absence 
of affirmative action by Congress, special 
factors counsel hesitation. Carlson v. 
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19, 100 S.Ct 1468, 
1471-72, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). As to the 
first exception, Congress did not create the 
remedial scheme at issue here and that 
scheme, in any case, as noted above, cannot 
be considered to be equally effective with 
respect to a claim for money damages. As 
to the second exception, respondents ap-
pear to confuse the presence of special 
factors with any factors counseling hesi-
tation. In Carlson, the Court held that 
"special factors" do not free prison offi-
cials from Bivens liability, because prison 
officials do not enjoy an independent status 
in our constitutional scheme nor are they 
likely to be unduly inhibited in the perform-
ance of their duties by the assertion of a 
Bivens claim. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S., 
at 19, 100 S.Ct, at 1472. 
Interpreting the "special factors" excep-
tion in Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 
108 S.Ct 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988), and 
in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 103 S.Ct. 
2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983), the Court 
found the Bivens remedy displaced because 
Congress had legislated an elaborate and 
comprehensive remedial scheme. Sckweik-
er, 487 U.S., at 425, 108 S.Ct, at 2469; 
Bush, 462 U.S., at 388, 103 S.Ct, at 2416. 
"When the design of a Government pro-
gram suggests that Congress has provided 
what it considers adequate remedial mecha-
nisms for constitutional violations that may 
occur in the course of its administration, 
we have not created additional Bivens rem-
edies." Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S., at 
423,108 S.Ct, at 2468. Here Congress has 
enacted nothing. 
B 
Because Congress has not required ex-
haustion of a federal prisoner's Bivens 
claim, we turn to an evaluation of the indi-
vidual and institutional interests at stake in 
this case. The general gnevance proce-
dure heavily burdens the individual inter-
ests of the petitioning inmate in two ways. 
First, the procedure imposes short, succes-
sive filing deadlines that create a high risk 
of forfeiture of a claim for failure to com-
ply. Second, the administrative "remedy" 
does not authorize an award of monetary 
damages—the only relief requested by 
McCarthy in this action. The combination 
of these features means that the prisoner 
seeking only money damages has every-
thing to lose and nothing to gain from 
being required to exhaust his claim under 
the internal grievance procedure. 
The filing deadlines for the gnevance 
procedure require an inmate, within 15 
days of the precipitating incident, not only 
to attempt to resolve his gnevance infor-
mally but also to file a formal wntten 
complaint with the prison warden. 28 CFR 
§ 542.13. Then, he must successively hur-
dle 20-day and 30-day deadlines to advance 
to the end of the grievance process. 
§ 542.15. Other than the Bureau's general 
and quite proper interest in having early 
notice of any claim, we have not been ap-
prised of any urgency or exigency justify-
ing this timetable. Cf. Yakus v. United 
States, 321 U.S. 414, 435, 64 S.Ct 660, 672, 
88 L.Ed. 834 (1944) ("The sixty days' period 
allowed for protest of the Administrator's 
regulations cannot be said to be unreason-
ably short in view of the urgency and exi-
gencies of wartime price regulation"). As 
a practical matter, the filing deadlines, of 
course, may pose little difficulty for the 
knowledgeable inmate accustomed to griev-
ances and court actions. But they are a 
likely trap for the inexperienced and un-
wary inmate, ordinarily indigent and unrep-
resented by counsel, with a substantial 
claim. 
Respondents argue that the deadlines 
are not jurisdictional and may be extended 
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for any "valid" reason. See 28 CFR 
§§ 542.13(b) and 542.15. Yet the regula-
tions do not elaborate upon what a "valid" 
reason is. Moreover, it appears that prison 
officials—perhaps the very officials subject 
to suit—are charged with determining 
what is a "valid" reason. 
All in all, these deadlines require a good 
deal of an inmate at the peril of forfeiting 
his claim for money damages. The "first" 
of "the principles that necessarily frame 
our analysis of prisoners' constitutional 
claims" is that "federal courts must take 
cognizance of the valid constitutional 
claims of prison inmates." Turner v. Saf-
ley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 
L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Because a prisoner ordi-
narily is divested of the privilege to vote, 
the right to file a court action might be 
said to be his remaining most "fundamen-
tal political right, because preservative of 
all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 
356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1071, 30 L.Ed. 220 
(1886). The rapid filing deadlines counsel 
strongly against exhaustion as a prerequi-
site to the filing of a federal court action.5 
As we have noted, the grievance proce-
dure does not include any mention of the 
award of monetary relief. Respondents ar-
gue that this should not matter, because 
"in most cases there are other things that 
the inmate wants." Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. 
This may be true in some instances. But 
we cannot presume, as a general matter, 
that when a litigant has deliberately for-
5. Petitioner concedes that if his complaint con-
tained a prayer for injunctive relief, exhaustion 
principles would apply differently. Brief for 
Petitioner 20, EL 20. Were injunctive relief 
sought, the grievance procedure probably would 
be capable of producing the type of corrective 
action desired. Additionally, because of the 
continuing nature of conduct subject to injunc-
tive relief, the short filing deadlines would pose 
less difficulty because the limitations period 
would be triggered anew by ongoing conduct. 
6. Respondents contend that Bivens claims are 
almost always categorizable as FTCA claims, 
especially in view of the Attorney General's con-
cession that corrections guards are "law en-
forcement officers" within the meaning of the 
exception to the intentional-tort exception of the 
FTCA Tr. of Oral Arg. 41. As to those claims 
gone any claim for injunctive relief and has 
singled out discrete past wrongs, specifical-
ly requesting monetary compensation only, 
that he is likely interested in "other 
things." The Bureau, in any case, is al-
ways free to offer an inmate administrative 
relief in return for withdrawal of his law-
suit. We conclude that the absence of any 
monetary remedy in the grievance proce-
dure also weighs heavily against imposing 
an exhaustion requirement 
In the alternative, respondents argue 
that, despite the absence of any provision 
in the general grievance procedure for the 
award of money damages, such damages in 
fact are available for most prisoners assert-
ing Bivens claims. As to Bivens claims 
that could have been brought under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),6 respon-
dents contend that a grievance asking for 
money damages can be "converted" by 
prison officials to an FTCA claim for which 
prison officials are authorized, under 28 
CFR § 543.30 (1991), to award money dam-
ages. This "conversion" authority does 
not appear in the regulations having to do 
with the grievance procedure, which raises 
substantial doubt that an inmate would 
have sufficient notice as to how his claim 
would be treated. In any event, respon-
dents have not pointed to anything in the 
record showing that prison officials have a 
practice of converting a claim filed under 
the general grievance procedure to a claim 
that are not categorizable as FTCA claims, re-
spondents concede that the Bureau of Prisons 
has no authority to offer a monetary settlement. 
Id., at 40. Instead, they contend that the De-
partment of Justice has a general settlement 
authority under the federal regulations that 
might be exercised to dispose of general griev-
ance claims. 28 CFR § 50.15(cX2) (1991). 
Nothing in the record indicates that this author-
ity has ever been exercised to recompense a 
prisoner with a Bivens claim. Moreover, it is 
highly unlikely that a monetary settlement 
would be made in the course of an administra-
tive proceeding, because the regulation provides 
that *[a]bsent exceptional circumstances" a 
monetary settlement will not be paid "before 
entry of an adverse verdict, judgment, or 
award." § 50.15(c)(3). 
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under the FTCA procedure. We agree 
with petitioner that it is implausible to 
think that they do. The availability of a 
money damages remedy is, at best, un-
certain, and the uncertainty of the adminis-
trative agency's authority to award relief 
counsels against requiring exhaustion. 
See Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 
620, 626, 66 S.Ct. 445, 449, 90 L.Ed. 358 
(1946); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Board of 
Comm'rs of Weld County, 247 U.S. 282, 
287, 38 S.Ct 510, 512, 62 L.Ed. 1110 (1918), 
We do not find the interests of the Bu-
reau of Prisons to weigh heavily in favor of 
exhaustion in view of the remedial scheme 
and particular claim presented here. To be 
sure, the Bureau has a substantial interest 
in encouraging internal resolution of griev-
ances and in preventing the undermining of 
its authority by unnecessary resort by pris-
oners to the federal courts. But other 
institutional concerns relevant to exhaus-
tion analysis appear to weigh in hardly at 
all. The Bureau's alleged failure to render 
medical care implicates only tangentially its 
authority to carry out the control and 
management of the federal prisons. Fur-
thermore, the Bureau does not bring to 
bear any special expertise on the type of 
issue presented for resolution here. 
The interests of judicial economy do not 
stand to be advanced substantially by the 
general grievance procedure. No formal 
factfindings are made. The paperwork 
generated by the grievance process might 
assist a court somewhat in ascertaining the 
facts underlying a prisoner's claim more 
quickly than if it has only a prisoner's 
complaint to review. But the grievance 
procedure does not create a formal factual 
record of the type that can be relied on 
conclusively by a court for disposition of a 
prisoner's claim on the pleadings or at sum-
mary judgment without the aid of affida-
vits. 
C 
In conclusion, we are struck by the ab-
sence of supporting material in the regula-
tions, the record, or the briefs that the 
general grievance procedure here was 
crafted with any thought toward the princi-
ples of exhaustion of claims for money 
damages. The Attorney General's pro-
fessed concern for internal dispute resolu-
tion has not translated itself into a more 
effective grievance procedure that might 
encourage the filing of an administrative 
complaint as opposed to a court action. 
Congress, of course, is free to design or 
require an appropriate administrative pro-
cedure for a prisoner to exhaust his claim 
for money damages. Even without further 
action by Congress, we do not foreclose the 
possibility that the Bureau itself may adopt 
an appropriate administrative procedure 
consistent with congressional intent 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
reversed. 
It is so ordered, 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, with whom 
Justice SCALIA and Justice THOMAS join, 
concurring in the judgment 
I agree with the Court's holding that a 
federal prisoner need not exhaust the pro-
cedures promulgated by the Federal Bu-
reau of Prisons. My view, however, is 
based entirely on the fact that the griev-
ance procedure at issue does not provide 
for any award of monetary damages. As a 
result, in cases such as this one where 
prisoners seek monetary relief, the Bu-
reau's administrative remedy furnishes no 
effective remedy at all, and it is therefore 
improper to impose an exhaustion require-
ment See McNeese v. Board of Edu-
cation for Community Unit School DisL 
187, 373 U.S. 668, 675, 83 S.Ct 1433, 1437, 
10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963); Montana Bank v. 
Yellowstone County, 276 U.S. 499, 505, 48 
S.Ct 331, 333, 72 L.Ed. 673 (1928). 
Because I would base the decision on this 
ground, I do not join the Court's extensive 
discussion of the general principles of ex-
haustion, nor do I agree with the implica-
tion that those general principles apply 
without modification in the context of a 
Bivens claim., In particular, I disagree 
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with the Court's reliance on the grievance 
procedure's filing deadlines as a basis for 
excusing exhaustion. As the majority ob-
serves, ante, at 1087-1088, we have previ-
ously refused to require exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies where the adminis-
trative process subjects plaintiffs to unrea-
sonable delay or to an indefinite timeframe 
for decision. See Coit Independence Joint 
Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 587, 109 
S.Ct. 1361, 1376, 103 L.Ed.2d 602 (1989); 
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575, n. 
14, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1696, n. 14, 36 L.Ed.2d 
488 (1973); Walker v. Southern R. Co., 385 
U.S. 196, 198, 87 S.Ct. 365, 366, 17 L.Ed.2d 
294 (1966); Smith v. Illinois Bell Tele-
phone Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591-592, 46 S.Ct. 
408, 410, 70 L.Ed. 747 (1926). This princi-
ple rests on our belief that when a plaintiff 
might have to wait seemingly forever for 
an agency decision, agency procedures are 
"inadequate" and therefore need not be 
exhausted. Coit Independence Joint Ven-
ture v. FSLIC, supra, 489 U.S., at 587, 109 
S.Ct, at 1376. 
But the Court makes strange use of this 
principle in holding that filing deadlines 
imposed by agency procedures may provide 
a basis for finding that those procedures 
need not be exhausted. Ante, at 1090 
1091. Whereas before we have held that 
procedures without "reasonable time lim-
it[s]" may be inadequate because they 
make a plaintiff wait too long, Coit Inde-
pendence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, supra, 
at 587, 109 S.Ct, at 1376, today the majori-
ty concludes that strict filing deadlines 
might also contribute to a finding of inade-
quacy because they make a plaintiff move 
too quickly. But surely the second proposi-
tion does not follow from the first In fact, 
short filing deadlines will almost always 
promote quick decisionmaking by an agen-
cy, the very result that we have advocated 
repeatedly in the cases cited above. So 
long as there is an escape clause, as there 
is here, and the time limit is within a zone 
of reasonableness, as I believe it is here, 
the length of the period should not be a 
factor in deciding the adequacy of the rem-
edy. 




Argued Nov, 12, 1991. 
Decided March 9, 1992. 
Defendant was convicted in a Dela-
ware Superior Court of first-degree murder 
and sentenced to death, and he appealed. 
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, 
581 A.2d 1078, and certiorari was granted. 
The Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, held that it was constitutional error 
to admit stipulation of defendant's mem-
bership in white racist prison gang where 
that evidence was not relevant to any issue 
being decided at the punishment phase. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Justice Blackmun filed a concurring 
opinion 
Justice Thomas filed a (lissen,ting opin-
ion. 
1. Constitutional Law €=»91 
First Amendment protects individual's 
right to join groups and associate with 
others holding similar beliefs. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 1. 
2. Constitutional Law «»91 
First Amendment does not erect a per 
se barrier to admission of evidence concern-
ing one's beliefs and associations at sen-
tencing simply because his beliefs and asso-
ciations are protected by the First Amend-
ment U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 1. 
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WARD v. VILLAGE OF MOXROEVILLE 
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
No. 71-496. Arsued October 17, 1972—Decided November 14, 1972 
Petitioner was denied a trial before a disinterested and impartial 
judicial officer as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment where he was compelled to stand trial 
for traffic offenses before the mayor, who was responsible for 
village finances and whose court through fines, forfeitures, costs, 
and fees provided a substantial portion of village funds. Tumey 
v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510. A statutory provision for the disqualifi-
cation of interested or biased judges did not afford petitioner 
a sufficient safeguard, and it is of no constitutional relevance that 
petitioner could later be tried de novo in another court, as he 
was entitled to an impartial judge in the first instance. Pp. 59-6*2. 
27 Ohio St. 2d 179, 271 N. E. 2d 757, reversed and remanded. 
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 
BURGER, C. J., and DOUGLAS, STEWART, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and 
POWELL, J J., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 62. 
Bernard A. Berkman argued the cause for petitioner. 
With him on the brief was Niki Z. Schwartz. 
Franklin D. Eckstein argued the cause for respondent. 
With him on the brief was Joseph F. Dush. 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1905.01 et seq. 
(1968), which authorizes mayors to sit as judges in cases 
of ordinance violations and certain traffic offenses, the 
Mayor of Monroeville, Ohio, convicted petitioner of two 
traffic offenses and fined him $50 on each. The Ohio 
Court of Appeals for Huron County, 21 Ohio App. 2d 17, 
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254 N. E. 2d 375 (1969), and the Ohio Supreme Court. 27 
Ohio St. 2d 179. 271 N. E. 2d 757 (1971), three justices 
dissenting, sustained the conviction, rejecting petitioner's 
objection that trial before a mayor who also had re-
sponsibilities for revenue production and law enforcement 
denied him a trial before a disinterested and impartial 
judicial officer as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. We granted certiorari. 
404 U. S. 1058 (1972). 
The Mayor of Monroeville has wide executive powers 
and is the chief conservator of the peace. He is pres-
ident of the village council, presides at all meetings, votes 
in case of a tie, accounts annually to the council respecting 
village finances, fills vacancies in village offices and has 
general overall supervision of village affairs. A major 
part of village income is derived from the fines, forfeit-
ures, costs, and fees imposed by him in his mayor's court. 
Thus, in 1964 this income contributed $23,589.50 of 
total village revenues of $46,355.38; in 1965 it was 
$18,508.95 of $46,752.60; in 1966 it was $16,085 of 
$43,585.13; in 1967 it was $20,060.65 of $53,931.43; and 
in 1968 it was $23,439.42 of $52,995.95. This revenue 
was of such importance to the village that when legisla-
tion threatened its loss, the village retained a manage-
ment consultant for advice upon the problem.1 
1
 Ordinance No. 59-9: 
"WHEREAS, the legislation known as the County Court law 
passed by the 102nd General Assembly greatly reduces the jurisdic-
tional powers of Mayor Courts as of January 1, 1960; and 
"WHEREAS, such restrictions may place such a hardship upon 
law enforcement personnel in this village and surrounding areas as 
to endanger the health, welfare and safety of persons residing or 
being in our village; and 
"WHEREAS, other such provisions of this legislation may cause 
such a reduction in revenue to this village that an additional burden 
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Conceding that uthe revenue produced from a mayor's 
court provides a substantial portion of a municipality's 
funds," the Supreme Court of Ohio held nonetheless that 
"such fact does not mean that a mayor's impartiality is 
so diminished thereby that he cannot act in a disinter-
ested fashion in a judicial capacity." 27 Ohio St. 2d. 
at 185. 271 X. E. 2d, at 761. We disagree with that 
conclusion. 
The issue turns, as the Ohio court acknowledged, on 
whether the Mayor can be regarded as an impartial judge 
under the principles laid down by this Court in Tumey 
v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927). There, convictions for 
prohibition law violations rendered by the Mayor of 
North College Hill, Ohio, were reversed when it appeared 
that, in addition to his regular salary, the Mayor re-
may result from increased taxation and/or curtailment of services es-
sential to the health, welfare and safety of this village; . . . 
"BE IT ORDAINED BY THE VILLAGE OF [MONROE-
VILLE] OHIO: 
"Section 1. That the services of the management consulting firm 
of Midwest Consultants, Incorporated of Sandusky, Ohio, be em-
ployed to conduct a survey and study to ascertain the extent of the 
effects of the County Court Law on law enforcement and loss of 
revenue in and to the Village of [Monroeville], Ohio, so that said 
Village can prepare for the future operations of the Village to safe-
guard the heath [sic], welfare and safety of its citizens . . . ." 
Moreover, Monroeville's Chief of Police, appointed by the Mayor, 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 737.15 (Supp. 1971), testified that it was his 
regular practice to charge suspects under a village ordinance, rather 
than a state statute, whenever a choice existed. App. 9. That policy 
must be viewed in light of §733.40 (1954), which provides that 
fines and forfeitures collected by the Mayor in state cases shall 
be paid to the county treasury, whereas fines and forfeitures collected 
in ordinance and traffic cases shall be paid into the municipal treas-
ury. Petitioner asserts that the Mayor conceded at trial that this 
policy wTas carried out under the Mayor's orders. The record lends 
itself to this inference. App. 10-11. 
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ceived S696.35 from the fees and costs levied by him 
against alleged violators. This Court held that "it 
certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and de-
prives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of 
law, to subject his liberty or property to the judgment 
of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, sub-
stantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion 
against him in his case.' Id., at 523. 
The fact that the mayor there shared directly in 
the fees and costs did not define the limits of the 
principle. Although "the mere union of the executive 
power and the judicial power in him can not be said to 
violate due process of law,'' id., at 534, the test is whether 
the mayor's situation is one "which would offer a possible 
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the 
burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or 
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear 
and true between the State and the accused . . . ." Id., 
at 532. Plainly that "possible temptation'' may also exist 
when the mayor's executive responsibilities for village 
finances may make him partisan to maintain the high 
level of contribution from the mayor's court. This, too, 
is a "situation in which an official perforce occupies 
two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one 
partisan and the other judicial, [and] necessarily in-
volves a lack of due process of law in the trial of de-
fendants charged with crimes before him." Id., at 534. 
This situation is wholly unlike that in Dugan v. Ohio, 
277 U. S. 61 (1928), which the Ohio Supreme Court 
deemed controlling here. There the Mayor of Xenia, 
Ohio, had judicial functions but only very limited execu-
tive authority. The city was governed by a commission 
of five members, including the Mayor, which exercised 
all legislative powers. A city manager, together with 
the commission, exercised all executive powers. In those 
circumstances, this Court held that the Mayor's relation-
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ship to the finances and financial policy of the city was 
too remote to warrant a presumption of bias toward 
conviction in prosecutions before him as judge. 
Respondent urges that Ohio's statutory provision. Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 2937.20 (Supp. 1971). for the disqual-
ification of interested, biased, or prejudiced judges is a 
sufficient safeguard to protect petitioner's rights. This 
argument is not persuasive. First, it is highly dubious 
that this provision was available to raise petitioner's 
broad challenge to the mayor's court of this village in 
respect to all prosecutions there in which fines may be 
imposed. The provision is apparently designed only 
for objection to a particular mayor "in a specific case 
where the circumstances in that municipality might war-
rant a finding of prejudice in that case!1 27 Ohio St. 
2d, at 184, 271 X. E. 2d, at 760 (emphasis added;. 
If this means that an accused must show special prejudice 
in his particular case, the statute requires too much and 
protects too little. But even if petitioner might have 
utilized the procedure to make his objection, the Ohio 
Supreme Court passed upon his constitutional conten-
tion despite petitioner's failure to invoke the procedure. 
In that circumstance, see Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423, 
436 (1959), he may be heard in this Court to urge that 
the Ohio Supreme Court erred in holding that he had 
not established his Fourteenth Amendment claim. 
Respondent also argues that any unfairness at the 
trial level can be corrected on appeal and trial de novo 
in the County Court of Common Pleas. We disagree. 
This "procedural safeguard" does not guarantee a fair 
trial in the mayor's court; there is nothing to suggest that 
the incentive to convict would be diminished by the pos-
sibility of reversal on appeal. Nor, in any event, may the 
State's trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally 
acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a 
defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is en-
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titled to a neutral and detached judge in the first in-
stance.2 Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio is reversed and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE R E H N -
QUIST joins, dissenting. 
The Ohio mayor who judged this case had no direct 
financial stake in its outcome. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 
510 (1927), is therefore not controlling, and I would 
not extend it. 
To justify striking down the Ohio system on its face, 
the Court must assume either that every mayor-judge 
in every case will disregard his oath and administer 
justice contrary to constitutional commands or that this 
will happen often enough to warrant the prophylactic, 
per se rule urged by petitioner. I can make neither as-
sumption with respect to Ohio mayors nor with respect 
to similar officials in 16 other States. Hence, I would 
leave the due process matter to be decided on a case-by-
case basis, a question which, as I understand the posture 
of this case, is not now before us. I would affirm the 
judgment. 
2
 The question presented on this record is the constitutionality of 
the Mayor's participation in the adjudication and punishment of a 
defendant in a litigated case where he elects to contest the charges 
against him. We intimate no view that it would be unconstitutional 
to permit a mayor or similar official to serve in essentially a minis-
terial capacity in a traffic or ordinance violation case to accept a 
free and voluntary plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a forfeiture of 
collateral, or the like. 
